

**DOKTORI DISSZERTÁCIÓ**

**THE METAMORPHOSIS OF “PASSION” IN THE CULTURE  
OF THE MIND: EARLY MODERN CONFIGURATIONS**

**SOÓS GÁBOR**

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**Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem  
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

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# **I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

## I. 1. Passions and Their Relevance in the Early Modern Context

A woman's face with Nature's own hand painted  
Hast thou, the master-mistress of my *passion*;  
(Shakespeare, "Sonnet XX")

Come, go with me. I will go seek the King.  
This is the very ecstasy of love,  
Whose violent property fordoes itself  
And leads the will to desperate undertakings  
As oft as any *passion* under heaven  
That does afflict our natures.  
(*Hamlet*, II. 1. 105-109)

Give me that man  
That is not *passion's* slave, and I will wear him  
In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart,  
As I do thee.  
(*Hamlet*, III. 2. 74-77)

Nay truly learned men have learnedly thought, that where once reason hath so much over-mastered *passion*, as that the minde hath a free desire to doo well, the inward light each minde hath in it selfe, is as good as a Philosophers booke, since in Nature we know it is well, to doo well, and what is well, and what is evill, although not in the wordes of Art which Philosophers bestow uppon us: for out of naturall conceit the Philosophers drew it; but to be moved to doo that which wee know, or to be mooved with desire to know. *Hoc opus, hic labor est.*  
(Sir Philip Sidney, *A Defence of Poesie*)

Then it is thus: the *passions of the mind*,  
That have their first conception by misdread,  
Have after-nourishment and life by care,  
And what was first but fear what might be done  
Grows elder now, and cares it be not done.  
(Shakespeare, *Pericles*, I. 2. 11-15)

Desire, though thou my old companion art  
And oft so clings to my pure love, that I  
One from the other scarcely can descry,  
While each doth blow the fire of my heart,  
Now from thy fellowship I needs must par.  
Venus is taught with Dian's wings to fly;  
I must no more in thy *sweet passions* lie;  
(Sir Philip Sidney, *Astrophil and Stella*, "Sonnet 72", ll 1-7)

In this great *passion* of unwonted lust,  
Or wonted feare of doing ought amis,  
He started up, as seeming to mistrust,  
Some secret ill, or hidden foe of his:  
(Edmund Spencer, *The Faerie Queen*, Book 1. Canto 1. 49.)

The noble hart, that harbours vertuous thought,  
 And is with child of glorious great intent,  
 Can neuer rest, untill it forth have brought  
 Th'eternall brood of glorie excellent:  
 Such *restlesse passion* did all night torment  
 The flaming corage of that Faery knight,  
 Devizing, how that doughtie turnament  
 With greatest honour he atchieven might;  
 Still did he wake, and still did watch for dawning light.  
 (Edmund Spencer, *The Faerie Queen*, Book 1. Canto 5. 1.)

As the quotations above show, “passion” is far from being a univocal term in Early Modern English literature. The present study wishes to examine how “passion” was understood in the period, what were the implications of the term with relation to ethical behaviour and right action, and how did its sense evolve? Thus it is a kind of a background study in the history of ideas, in the study of words and concepts, using different branches of philosophical inquiry in order (it is hoped) to enhance the understanding and appreciation of the literary works of the period under consideration. The study seeks to explore the ethical, theological and anthropological concerns “passion” (as a word and as a concept) mobilized, the challenges did it raised and the implicit or explicit ethical stakes and preoccupations involved in the change of the meaning of the word ‘passion’ in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century? What were the theological and ethical accommodations and transformations that this change entailed in the historical context of Early Modern Humanism<sup>1</sup>? This historical context is characterised by the resuscitation of certain elements of Classical humanism, most prominently the doctrines of Hellenistic and Roman Stoicism in what is usually termed as the neo-Stoic trend of the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Of course, Renaissance humanism helped to revitalise the legacy of other Hellenistic philosophical schools as well, such as Epicureanism, Scepticism but for the evolution of the word and concept of ‘passion’, the Stoic

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<sup>1</sup> For ease of reference, I shall refer to *Early Modern Humanism* bearing in mind that 1) as is well-known, this humanism developed a bit later North of the Alps and more specifically in England (second half of 16<sup>th</sup> century) cf. Warren Boutcher, “Vernacular Humanism in the sixteenth century” in *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism* edited by Jill Kraye, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 189-203; and 2) most of the authors I shall be discussing in this study belong already to a second generation of humanists.

impact was the most important. This is because the passions were of particular concern to the Stoics and with their revival, this issue and the problems associated with it were transposed and accommodated into an Early Modern Christian context. Part of the attraction for the Stoic authors and their Early Modern interpreters was due to the appeal that the Stoic precepts of rational, emotion-free response to external events had for the European public as the ideal solution for the political and religious turbulences of late 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> The topic did have its place in Medieval treatises but it gained even more pertinence and acuity with the Renaissance Humanist movement due to the possibilities it opened for the human being on two, corresponding and interdependent levels: the indeterminacy and malleability of human nature and the ensuing practical questions of how to face the adversities of life and how to behave. Both of these issues can be seen as belonging to the cluster of ideas that constituted the Renaissance conception of the dignity of man. Early Modern Humanism, just as Classical humanism, was dependent on a number of philosophical, theological assumptions that determined its view of what it is to be human and the place of man in the universe. The differences in these assumptions are necessarily reflected in the understanding and treatment of the passions. Thus the aim of this study is to consider how the ensuing interaction between the two humanisms (Classical and Early Modern) surface in the perception of the passions.

The perspective in which the present study wishes to tell this story can be characterised as *intercultural* inasmuch as the peculiarity of Renaissance Humanism lies in the encounter of Europe with what it claims to be its own past and this past is, in the case of Europe, a cultural *other*. This is because the constitutive element of Early Modern Humanism, the return to the works of the Greco-Latin Classical authors, was confronting European culture with what was *outside* it. The contemporary French cultural historian and philosopher, Rémi Brague, describes European culture and civilisation as having this capacity (in contrast with Islam for example) to have a *re*-naissance (or indeed, to be in continual renaissances), to interrogate its own past in order to formulate from it an ideal of culture toward which it measures itself in an attitude of willed cultural secondariness. This is what Brague calls “*attitude romaine*” characterised by an “*identité excentrique*” in the sense of establishing its

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Jill Kraye, “Philologists and philosophers” in *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism*, p. 152.

point of normative reference outside itself.<sup>3</sup> He contrasts religious *revival* movements, which aim to return to the source of the religion *within* the same tradition, with the concept of renaissance proper. In the case of the latter, the source from which one wants to draw is to be found *outside* a historical continuity. « Il s'agit alors de *s'approprier une origine par rapport à laquelle on se sent étranger, voir aliéné* – et en particulier les sources antiques. » [“One has to appropriate an origin towards which one feels like a stranger, to the point of being alienated – the Classical sources in particular.”]<sup>4</sup>

This “Roman attitude” of a cultural secondariness<sup>5</sup> (in the unequivocally positive sense that Brague attributes to it) can also be exploited for its self-reflexive potentials. The Early Modern perception of the passions is part and parcel of this intercultural encounter taking place within the Early Modern context. Furthermore, our own historical perspective on this process can help to lay bare the changing assumptions about human nature. If Early Modern thinkers became aware of the difference between their own and the ancients’ treatment of the passions, it was but one step forward in the acknowledgement and recognition of the historical contingency of human nature. Thus the story of the passions in the Early Modern context considered as a case of cultural appropriation can form part of a critical ontology of human nature.

This perspective is partly inspired by some of the writings of the late Michel Foucault to whom we shall have the occasion to return below. Let it suffice to state in this introductory context that these considerations were encouraged by his essay “What is Enlightenment?”<sup>6</sup> in which he describes a philosophical ethos that has its origins in Kant and is oriented toward probing the “contemporary limits of the necessary”<sup>7</sup>. According to Foucault, this entails a “historical ontology of ourselves” established through precise historical inquiries that are

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Rémi Brague, *Europe, la voie romaine*, Paris : Gallimard, 1992, « Folio essais », in particular pp. 142ff

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p. 156-157. Emphasis in the original – my translation, G.S.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the formulation in the *History of Western Philosophy* 3. *Renaissance Philosophy*, p. 62.: “On the assumption that the age of an idea was an index of its value, the humanists elevated antiquity itself – all of it – to a position of cultural superiority.”

<sup>6</sup> Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*, New York: Pantheon Book, 1984, pp. 32-50.

<sup>7</sup> M. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” p. 43.



concerned with the “events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.” Its ‘limit-attitude’ means a probing of the frontiers, analysing the limits in order to see that “in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints?” This philosophical ethos is rooted in the Enlightenment and has nothing to do with a chameleon-like humanism that, according to Foucault, is “too supple, too diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis of reflection”. Foucault explains his reservations concerning humanism by the observation that there have been various humanisms in European societies and that they have been closely linked to and served the purposes of certain value-judgements. Thus they were dependent on views of man borrowed from the prevailing religion, science, or politics. According to Foucault, these humanisms, instead of performing a progressive critical role and attitude, served as justification of the borrowed views of man.

In the historiography of Renaissance humanism, in the wake of Paul Oskar Kristeller’s works that have emphasized the importance of rhetoric in order to demonstrate the underlying unity of a singularly complex movement, attempts were made to explore the inherent duality and struggle within humanism. Such an attempt was made in an essay by William J. Bouwsma, published originally in a Festschrift for Kristeller, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday.<sup>8</sup> The internal tension, within humanism, between the two ideological poles of Stoicism and Augustinianism as set out by Bouwsma, generate an “internal struggle [that] also helps to explain the adaptability of Renaissance humanism to changing needs, and hence its singular durability.”<sup>9</sup>

I wish to argue that Early Modern Humanism, inasmuch as it is part of a renaissance in Brague’s sense of the term, inherently contains a self-reflexive element on culture and on human nature itself. Thus, rather than contrasting Early Modern Humanism with the

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<sup>8</sup> William J. Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Later Renaissance Culture” in *Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of Its European Transformations*, edited by Heiko A. Oberman with Thomas Brady, Jr. E. J. Brill: Leiden, 1975, pp. 3-60. I am using its reprint from W. J. Bouwsma, *A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History*, University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1990, pp. 19-73.

<sup>9</sup> W. J. Bouwsma, *Ibid.*, p. 20.

philosophical ethos of a *critical* Enlightenment, I would rather emphasize its reflexive potentials deriving from its intercultural nature. As Early Modern authors reassess and adapt Classical authors to a Christian humanist context and the expectations of the readership, they appropriate a cultural other. This process requires conceptual, terminological and even semantic accommodations that inescapably contribute to an increasing awareness of the contingencies of what it is to be human. Even if it were not explicitly thematised in the period under consideration, our present historical perspective<sup>10</sup> on what we think took place in the late 16<sup>th</sup> – early 17<sup>th</sup> century should allow for such reflexivity. This, I hope to show, is particularly true with regard to the passions that mobilize theological, anthropological and ethical assumptions. I believe Foucault is right in claiming that humanism in its historical forms borrowed conceptions of man from the prevailing religion, politics, and science. But even if that is the case, the very phenomenon of the renaissance in the sense of an intercultural confrontation with a cultural other has a self-reflexive potential. Thus the study of the history of Classical and Early Modern humanisms as renaissance can elicit the kind of philosophical ethos prompted by the Foucauldian-Kantian enlightenment and may also contribute to a critical ontology of human nature inasmuch as it reveals the historical contingencies in the evolution of ‘passion’.

In order to elicit the historical contingencies and to assess the historical changes related to the notion of ‘passion’ in the Early Modern context, I shall take stock of the various semantic layers in ‘passion’ proper, Chapter I.2; in Chapter I.4. I shall expose the broader historical argument of this thesis by relating ‘passion’ to the much more recent term of ‘emotion’. The rich etymology of the word ‘passion’ and of its changing meanings

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<sup>10</sup> Another but related aspect inherent in our historical situation is the issue of mediation. The study of the passions at a given historical moment shares with all historical studies the difficulty of having to pass by mediation. To put it bluntly, one cannot assist and witness directly how individuals and societies in the past handled passions just as one cannot be the witness to the Battle of Agincourt. Beside the obvious fact that humans must have experienced passions in all times and all places (even if the denominations are far from being uniform) we are left with written, discursive practices as the direct object of investigation. If we want to gain an insight into the culture of the passions in Early Modern England one must look at the moral, philosophical treatises, dramas, homilies, poems, conduct-books, and, in particular, various lexicons and dictionaries, produced in the period. Of course, this study is far from being all-inclusive in this respect.

underscores the succeeding cultural appropriations and highlights the semantic instability inherent in a term so charged with value-judgements. These examinations of the semantic evolution of the word should serve as a canvass for Chapter II and III which delve more into the historical depths of how ‘passion’ was employed in order to describe its changing cultural and ethical contexts. Chapter II will single out certain stages from the rich Classical heritage including some Medieval mediations; Chapter III examines how it is accommodated to Early Modern use in the Humanist agenda and the theological debates of the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, in Bacon’s programme for the advancement of science, and in Michel de Montaigne’s *Essais* read parallel with John Florio’s 1603 translation. Part of the difficulty of writing about the passions in a given historical context is the manifold ways in which it is connected to a multitude of other issues. As we shall see, ‘passion’ is never a stand-alone issue – it is linked to and mobilizes anthropological, physiological, medical, ethical ideas. Therefore, chapter III.1. will single out some from this cluster of ideas that the problem of the passions is involved with and map their connections in the Early Modern context such as the theme of the dignity of man, the orientation of moral philosophy as knowledge of one’s self (the *Nosce teipsum* tradition), and the manner in which the operation of the passions is described as physiological processes involving body and soul. In chapter III.2. the presentation and a tentative explanation of the different uses of ‘passion’ (conducive to, as I wish to suggest, its semantic shift) will take account of some of the theological underpinnings of these concerns about the ‘passions’, and their ethical implications. Chapter III.3. will turn to Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s *Essais* as the locus of vernacular innovations on the meaning of the word. The aim is to present the different planes of analysis in order to show how the concept is re-inscribed, with a new sense, in a new field: as different senses of the word ‘passion’ are negotiated within the Early Modern Christian context leading to a semantic shift from the Classical Stoic-coloured technical sense of the word to a narrower, Early Modern sense. Chapter III.4. will be devoted to Bacon’s understanding of the passions and his *cultura animi* in the context of *The Advancement of Learning* (1605) and his *Essayes or Counsels Civill and Moral* (1597, 1612 and 1625). The discussion is related to the Early Modern humanist preoccupation about the use of learning as instrumental for moral advancement and thus as a form of care for the self. The choice of Bacon is motivated by his encyclopaedic *tour de force* of Early Modern learning and his systematic overview of what has been achieved and what requires further study. Of course, for Bacon, the problem of the passions is only one among many fields concerning knowledge about man. His attitude can also be taken as a response to

humanistic discourses about the nature and dignity of man, the role of learning in life and in matters of ethics.

## I. 2. “Passion”: the Story of the *Oxford English Dictionary*

It seems plausible to assume that the various historical accommodations the term ‘passion’ underwent are reflected in the semantic evolution of the word. The entry ‘passion’ of the *Oxford English Dictionary* can therefore serve as a good introduction to examining the cultural appropriation of the term in the Early Modern context. A brief survey of the history of the meaning of the word can also highlight the semantic instability inherent in a term so charged with value-judgements. The enlargement of the temporal horizon to which the *Oxford English Dictionary* article invites us can also be taken as a heuristic device: the broadening of the perspective makes us even more aware of the semantic transformations of ‘passion’ between the Renaissance and today. The series of changes in the meaning of the word underscore the succeeding cultural appropriations involving the use and meaning of a web of related words such as soul, disease, culture of the mind, etc. that have either disappeared from our affective vocabulary or has completely changed signification and significance. This semantic history suggests that probably the most important change in the meaning began around the 16<sup>th</sup> century and culminated in the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

A recapitulation of the main stages of the history of the word exhibit different layers of meaning which were at times coeval and superposed on each other, sometimes one layer of meaning superimposing on others.<sup>11</sup> Thus we can distinguish a markedly Biblical layer as the word arrives to Middle English from Latin (*passio*) through Old French mediation and refers to the sufferings of Christ or of the Christian martyrs and related expressions implying “the suffering of pain.”<sup>12</sup> Another layer that came to English from late Latin *passio* could be called

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<sup>11</sup> For ease of reference and in order to avoid long citations from *The Oxford English Dictionary*, I attach the article “passion” in Appendix 1.

<sup>12</sup> I shall return to this sense of the word and its relationship to the other layers of meaning in Chapter I.4 and II.

broadly philosophical in that it goes back to the ancient Greek πάθος / *pathos* and conveys the general sense of “being acted upon, being passive”. This passivity in Ancient Greek πάθος / *pathos* implies a movement by an external force that can be another person, events of fate, or the divine. This passivity was perceived as a hindrance to developing a course of action. If we go back to the etymological origins of the Ancient Greek word itself we find in pre-classical Greek culture numerous antecedents of πάθος / *pathos* covering a relatively undifferentiated and overcharged semantic field. Examples are πάσχω / *paskho* meaning “to have pleasure when talking about woman or a pederast”<sup>13</sup>; the Homeric sense of παθεῖν / *páthein* is “to endure a treatment or being punished”; but there was probably a link between these two because πενθεῖν / *penthein*, which derives from the same stem as πενθεῖν / *páthein* ( *páthein* / *páskhein*), means “to be bereaved, to lament the death of somebody”.

A third layer, which could be termed as psychologico-moral, means “an affection of the mind” and this segment concentrates the greatest number of significations including the most current, modern sense as well. In the enumeration of the *Oxford English Dictionary* there are eleven senses attributed to passions altogether out of which 1-4. are contained in I. (what I termed as the Biblical layer); the “philosophical” layer (II) has only one subdivision (5.); whereas the psychologico-moral layer (III) has more than half of all the documented meanings (6-11.). The present study is mostly concerned with this third layer since the conceptual changes and cultural accommodations in the Early Modern period take place within this segment. As the numbering of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, following the chronological order, indicates: a change is under way in the period from the meanings listed under III.6.a towards the meanings of III.6.b – 8.a. This can be attested by the simple but highly significant fact that all first appearances of the new meanings of III.6.b. – 8.a. occur in 1580s-1590s. As a first approximation of this complex problem let me proceed in a large sweep in order to draw the contours of the issue under consideration. Let me suggest the following thought-experiment: let us locate ourselves in around 1580s and see what comes to us from accepted meaning for ‘passion’. We have then the Biblical (I.), the philosophical layers (II.) and, I wish to argue, the sense structure of 6.a from the psychological-moral layer.<sup>14</sup> Broadly speaking, the definition given in 6.a is what comes to the Early Modern

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<sup>13</sup> P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, Paris : Klincksieck, 1968, p. 862.

<sup>14</sup> “6.a Any kind of feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or moved; a vehement, commanding, or overpowering emotion; in psychology and art, any mode in which the mind is

period from Classical and Medieval authorities beginning with Plato, Aristotle, various Hellenistic schools (the Stoics in particular), Galen and Christian Church Fathers, Aquinas and Petrarch. While their doctrines and teachings on how to handle the passions differed largely, these authors had one thing in common: by the word ‘passion’ (πάθος / *pathos* and *passio*) they meant a group of – what we would call today - emotions and mental states understood as “perturbations or affections of the mind”. Thinkers of the antiquity explicitly contrasted *pathos* with *logos* (reason) and thus established a dichotomy of the pathetic-irrational vs. the logical-rational. In Latin, Ancient Greek *pathos* was translated as *passio*, *affectio*, *perturbatio animi*.<sup>15</sup> This negative connotation was evident in the designation of the passions as *perturbatio animi* (Cicero), and in Saint Augustine's definition as "movement of the soul against reason"<sup>16</sup> For example, for Cicero all passions are a movement of the soul devoid of reason or contrary to reason. This movement, provoked by an imaginary good or evil believed to exist in the present or the future, expresses itself as one of the four primary passions (the Ciceronian tetrachord of the passions): distress (*aegritudo*), delight (*laetitia*), fear (*metus*), lust (*libido* or *cupiditas*). The Ancient Greek *pathos* is translated by him as *perturbatio animi*.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, albeit in a different perspective, St. Augustine spoke of delight (*laetitia*), sadness (*tristitia*), desire (*cupiditas*) and fear (*timor*) as the most important passions.<sup>18</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas established a classification of eleven passions: six in the

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affected or acted upon (whether vehemently or not), as ambition, avarice, desire, hope, fear, hatred, joy, grief, anger, revenge. Sometimes personified.” (*Oxford English Dictionary*)

<sup>15</sup> Although this study is concerned with ‘passion’ in a given context (Early Modern English culture), it also has to be noted that vernacular ‘passion’ (whether in French, in Italian or in English) corresponds, in fact, to several Classical words: *pathos*, *pathema*, and *epithumia*, in Ancient Greek mediated through Latin *commotio animi*, *affectus*, *passio*, and also *libido*. While it is beyond the scope of this study to explore the far-reaching implications of this diversity of origins, an awareness of this rich semantic background helps us to avoid a “naturalistic fallacy” (about which more below) in studying the shifting meaning of this word in our context proper.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Saint Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, IX. 4. (*The City of God against the Pagans*, edited and translated by R. W. Dyson, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, 1988.)

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, IV. vii. 14-15. in Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, with an English translation by J. E. King, “Loeb Classical Library”; Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1966 (1927, rev. 1945) vol. XVIII.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Saint Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XIV. 6 and similarly in *De anima et spiritu*, passim

concupiscible appetite (in three pairs of joy - sadness, desire - aversion, love - hatred); and five in the irascible appetite (hope – despair, courage – fear, and anger).<sup>19</sup> Apart from the specialised elite that were well versed in the ins and outs of the Aquinian system the less scholarly-minded reading public<sup>20</sup> was more familiar with the Ciceronian tetrachord of the passions. As St. Augustine knew, it was based not only on the authority of Cicero, but also on that of Virgil. The *Aeneid* (especially Book VI) was the subject of several commentaries in the Renaissance that related Virgil's account of the passions to that of the Stoic philosophers.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, the four passions were related to the structure of the universe (sky, heavens, earth, sea) and to the four elements composing the human body (earth, moisture, breath, heat) as well as establishing a connection between the four passions and the four humours (blood, bile, black bile, phlegm). This complex of the four passions and the four humours was a commonplace of Renaissance medicine and anthropology attesting to the centuries-old influence of Hippocratic and Galenist tradition in European medicine. Galen's view and treatment of the passions owes a great deal to Plato's tri-partite model and even more to Stoic physical, metaphysical, epistemological and ethical views on the *pathe*.

Thus the Stoic tetrachord of the passions underpins Renaissance anthropology and such a dramatist as Ben Jonson who received his education and immense classical learning from the humanist William Camden can consciously build on this relationship in his so-called “comedies of humours” as he exposes for satiric deflation the prevailing eccentricities and ruling passions (or humours) of men. The favourable reception of such comedies further testifies to the fact that the four passions – four humours complex was not only the knowledge of an initiated humanist elite but was also a commonplace for the less scholarly-minded reading and theatre-going public. Thus the reference to this issue in title of Jonson's first published play, *Every Man in His Humour* (1598) was certainly not missed on the audience

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Part II., Question 23; Question 25, Art 4.

<sup>20</sup> The phrase “less scholarly-minded reading public” comes from Zsolt Almási, *Angelic Monster – Custom in Early Modern Context*, The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003, p. 24-25.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Rolf Soellner, “The Four Primary Passions: A Renaissance Theory reflected in the Works of Shakespeare”, *Studies in Philology*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, vol. 55 (1958), p. 551ff who cites the commentaries of Servius and Landino from a 1504, Venice edition Virgil, *Opera*, p. CCXXXVIII. And Marsilio Ficino's *Theologica Platonica de immortalitate animorum* (Paris, 1559), p. 344, lib. XVIII, cap. 10.

and in *Every Man out of His Humour* (1599) Macilente can ask “but, Stoque, where (in the vast world) / Doth that man breathe, that can so much *command his bloud, and his affection?*” (I. 1. 2-4). Later in his career, Jonson even put on stage the four humours with the four passions in his masque *Hymenaei*<sup>22</sup>.

That the tetrachord based on Cicero’s and Saint Augustine’s authority enjoyed greater popularity than the scheme of eleven passions elaborated by Aquinas can also be inferred from the moral treatises dealing with the passions and published in England in the period, that is between 1580s and 1610s. Some of these were translations from French, Italian or Latin – I propose a non-exhaustive list as Appendix 2. From the great number of treatises on the passions published in English around the turn of the 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> century and aimed at a more general, less scholarly-minded, readership, only four follow the scheme of Saint Thomas Aquinas. These are the following: Thomas Wright, *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1601); Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621) which owes much to Wright’s treatise; the work of the French neo-Stoic, Pierre Charron, *Of Wisdome* (1606) translated into English by Sampson Lennard; and Nicolas Coffeteau, *A table of humane passions* (1621) translated into English by Edmund Grimeston. The Ciceronian tetrachord is used in Thomas Rogers, *A philosophicall discourse, entitled, The anatomie of the minde* (1576); La Primauday, *The French Academy* (1586); Timothy Bright, *A Treatise of Melancholie* (1586); *Batman vpon Bartholome, his booke De proprietabus rerum* (1592); Sir John Davies, *Nosce Teipsum*, (1599); John Davies of Hereford, *Microcosmus, the discovery of the little world*, (1603); Anthony Dixon, *The dignitie of man* (1612).

In the case of those four authors who relied on Aquinas’s scheme of the passions rather than that of Cicero, the preference for Aquinas can be explained by different motifs albeit none of these is absolutely decisive. For the works written in English by English writers, the choice of Cicero is probably due to the prominence of the works of Cicero in the English grammar school of the 16<sup>th</sup> century that was itself a result and reflection of the great number of translations of Cicero published in English starting at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> “[O]ut of a microcosm or globe figuring man with a kind of contentious music issued forth the first masque of eight men. These represented the four *Humours* and the four *Affections*, all gloriously attired, distinguished only by their several ensigns and colours.” Quoted by Rolf Sollner, *Ibid.*, p. 553.

<sup>23</sup> For example: *De Amicitia* (1481), *De senectute*, *De Officiis* (translated by Robert Whytinton, 1534, and by Nicholas Grimald, 1553), *Tusculanae Disputationes*, (translated by John Dolman, 1561).



The moral training of the 16<sup>th</sup> century English grammar school was centred upon Cicero – coloured and combined with Christian doctrine of course. Roger Ascham who wrote *The Schoolmaster* “in the English tongue for Englishmen” consciously patterned his style on Cicero whose prose was the ultimate norm of Latin in schools.<sup>24</sup> It might be the case that the Aquinian system had a greater appeal on the Continent since two of the treatises following it were originally written by French authors. In the case of the English Jesuit priest, Thomas Wright, the preference for Aquinas may be due to his Catholic-Jesuit background.

For the sake of the argument I wish to put forward in this chapter, and without going into further detail about the individual treatises referred here, it suffices to take a look at the title of some of these treatises to see that these authors write in the Classical idiom on the passions. The titles of the works of Wright, Rogers and Juan de Huarte Navarro speak for themselves and bear testimony to the fact that they use the Classical (Ciceronian or Aquinian) vocabulary of the passions that refers to “affections of the mind” in a collective sense referring to certain emotions as disturbances of the mind (*perturbatio animi*). They use the word ‘passion’ as a hyperonym for the four or eleven perturbations or affections of the mind. The word is thus employed as a generic term implying a family of mental states and includes the entire affective life of the subject that is distinct from mere sensations, physiological appetites or purely intellectual processes. The Early Modern period still has this Classical (mainly Stoico-Aquinian) vocabulary and framework at its disposal denoting this broad field of experience. But the semantic change attested by the *Oxford English Dictionary* shows that this field of experience was changing its very contours and internal delimitations. Certain elements within the field were losing importance while others rose to predominance reflecting a change of focus and scope in the meaning of the word and resulting in a re-mapping of

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. J. B. Trapp, “Education in the Renaissance” in *Background to the English Renaissance – Introductory Lectures*, foreword by J. B. Trapp, London : Gray-Mills Publishing, 1974, p. 82f. and Ralph Graham Palmer’s Introduction to *Seneca’s De remedies Fortuitorum and the Elizabethans – An essay on the influence of Seneca’s ethical thought in the sixteenth century, together with the newly-edited Latin text and English translation of 1547 entitled: Lucii Annei Senecae ad Gallioneni de Remedis Fortuitorum. The Remedyes against all casuall chances. Dialogus inter sensum et Rationem. A dialogue between Sensualyte and Reason. Lately translated out of Latyn into Englyshe by Robert Whyttynton poet Laureat and nowe newly Imprynted, by Ralph Graham Palmer, Chicago: Institute of Elizabethan Studies, Ill., 1953.*

‘passions’. It is the methodological assumption and premise of this study to understand the word’s semantic change in terms of changing concerns and preoccupations with the phenomenon in question. Although this assumption may sound somewhat commonsensical, it is better to be formulated explicitly in order to better define the objectives of this study. It can also be stated in the following terms: since we use words for practical/pragmatic ends (and the example of ‘passion’ is a particularly strong case in point), changes in these ends (purpose) go hand in hand with changes in meaning and usage. While we do not claim to give a fully-fledged answer concerning the reasons for changes in the ends, we shall try to present the cultural context of this change and assess its significance. In other words, although the semantic change will be assessed in terms of the underlying cultural semiotics in which it is enmeshed.

As the examples given under III. 6.b – 8.a indicate, ‘passions’ or ‘passion’ assumed a more specific and more circumscribed definition. This semantic shift related more to poetry and drama than to the systematic discourse in the 1590s. ‘Passions’ referred less to the collective, generic meaning of the Classical definition and more to the excess of uncontrollable emotion and amorous feeling in particular. As the *Oxford English Dictionary* attests it: in the meanings and examples of first appearances in English listed under 6b - 8a we witness such a shift away from the classically-coloured meaning towards the Present-Day English sense and common usage.

When we say ‘passion’ in contemporary English, we mean most often one of the followings: “a commanding, vehement, or overpowering feeling or emotion” (6. b); “a fit or mood marked by stress of feeling or abandonment to emotion; a transport of excited feeling; and outburst of feeling” (6. c); “an outburst of anger or bad temper” (7. a); “amorous feeling; strong sexual affection; love; sexual desire or impulse” (8. a). Unless employing a consciously scholarly language, we do not consider as ‘passion’ the emotional and mental states of fear, hope or grief. In this regard, it is noteworthy that *The Concise Oxford English Dictionary of Current English*<sup>25</sup>, published in 1964 as the fifth edition of the 1911 first edition (after numerous revisions), lists the following meanings only:

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<sup>25</sup> *The Concise Oxford English Dictionary of Current English*, edited by H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler based on *The Oxford Dictionary*, Fifth edition revised by E. McIntosh, etymologies revised by G. W. S. Friedrichsen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964<sup>5</sup> (1911)

1. Strong emotion; outburst of anger; sexual love; strong enthusiasm and 2. Passion as the sufferings of Christ and related theological usages.

This indicates that while the “Biblical layer” (in my division) is retained as the second sense, the other sense recorded for the word by the authors is to be found in what I termed as the “psychologico-moral layer” of the word’s historical semantic field. In *The Concise Oxford English Dictionary of Current English* this latter sense (numbered as 1) concerns exclusively post-17<sup>th</sup> century senses of the word’s semantic development as attested by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (6.b., 6.c., 7.a., and 8.a. as above). Apparently, the Early Modern semantic shift from 6.a. to these sense structures is left without a trace in this entry just as the entire “philosophical layer” (5.a. and 5.b.) denoting “passivity, being acted upon”.

Apparently, we do not mean the same thing by ‘passions’ today as it was understood until roughly the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. For the modern understanding, what were the ‘passions’ in Classical and Early Modern culture display a heterogeneous list of different mental states. A semantic shift took place in the English language and in our psychological-moral-affective vocabulary. This change in the ordinary use of the word over time attests perhaps to a change in the grammar of our affectivity. The meaning of ‘passion’ shifted from the “tetrachord of passions” and from the larger group of affections named as ‘passions’ by Classical and Medieval authorities to intense emotion and amorous feeling in particular. This is not to say, of course, that amorous feeling, love was not part of the ‘passions’ before; but this *eros*-based sense was only one of the affections, mental states called collectively as ‘passions’. There were changes both in the importance of intensity and in the field of meaning (a limitation). On the one hand, *intensity* gained importance: not all affections qualify as passions, only those that possess a particularly heightened intensity. On the other hand, the meaning shifted *from a general* sense of “perturbation of the mind” towards *a more specific* sense of emotional perturbation and, more specifically, towards amorous ardour and excitement (*eros*). To put it briefly, there is a general shift from “affection” in the Classical sense towards *eros* although the traditional, Classical meanings survive as well. And this change begins to emerge around the 1580s.

In order to corroborate this point of semantic change, I propose to turn to a recent study written from a linguistic point of view, more precisely from the perspective of historical lexicology. Heli Tissari discusses the changes in prototypical senses and cognitive metaphors related to them since 1500. Her study is focused on the changes in emotion-words, and

includes a chapter on the word ‘passion’.<sup>26</sup> The book is most valuable not only for the richness of its insights but also for the wide range of historical material of the English language its author had the possibility to consult as her corpus data. Some of the “raw material” researched by Tissari goes back even to the Late Middle English period (15<sup>th</sup> century), the most voluminous body of the *corpus* is from the Early Modern (ca 1500-1700) and Present-Day English.<sup>27</sup> More specifically, the corpora used for her chapter “AFFECTION, FRIENDSHIP, PASSION and CHARITY: A history of four “love lexemes” since the fifteenth century” are: the *Helsinki Corpus of English Texts* (HC), Shakespeare’s *Complete Works*, the *Corpus of Early English Correspondence Sampler* (CEECS), and the *British National Corpus* (BNC).<sup>28</sup> The immense advantage of these corpora used by Tissari is their machine readability which allow her to draw conclusions about semantic change on a much more solid and broader base than I attempted to do on the basis of the *Oxford English Dictionary* only. Her findings help me to further refine my point about the semantic change ‘passion’ underwent around and since the Early Modern period.

Tissari’s perspective concerning this word is defined in the title of the chapter dealing with ‘passion’: “PASSION”: “AFFECTION, FRIENDSHIP, PASSION, and CHARITY: A history of four ‘love lexemes’ since the fifteenth century”<sup>29</sup>. This title – that is more than well-served, so to say, by the chapter itself – reflects a consciously retrospective attitude made manifest by considering “PASSION” passion as one love lexeme among others such as “AFFECTION, FRIENDSHIP, and CHARITY”. This démarche is legitimate when one is concerned with prototypical categories of love-lexemes from the perspective of historical lexicology and wants to see how different categories of love can be assigned to different

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<sup>26</sup> Heli Tissari, *LOVEscapes – Changes in prototypical senses and cognitive metaphors since 1500*, Helsinki : Mémoires de la Société Néophilologique de Helsinki, Tome LXII, Société Néophilologique, 2003. pp. 305-313.

<sup>27</sup> Although, as Heli Tissari, notes we have far more data from the Present-Day English period given that much less was published in the Early Modern period than today. The three Early Modern sources together do not constitute even the tenth of the data from the Present-Day English period. Cf. Tissari, *Ibid.*, p. 295.

<sup>28</sup> Tissari, *Ibid.*, p. 294.

<sup>29</sup> Tissari, *Ibid.*, pp. 289-324.

domains.<sup>30</sup> However, I have the impression that the overall picture is incomplete because, by placing PASSION in the context of love lexemes from the start it misses certain layers of meaning. It looks as if the preliminary decision about the meaning of the word, inherent in approaching it as a love lexeme, leaves no room for the broader, Classical sense. The narrowing of the focus to ‘passion’ as a love lexeme thereby loses some of the ramifications of the broader conceptual grid that ‘passion’ entails. Thus, in Heli Tissari’s analysis, “PASSION is both a hyperonym for ‘(strong) emotion’ and its own hyponym, denoting a single emotion.”<sup>31</sup> It seems to me that some of the pre-modern underpinnings of the “affections of the mind” (*perturbatio animi*) are not fully taken into account in this description that assimilates ‘passion’ to emotions in the modern sense too quickly. I wish to contend that ‘passion’ is a Janus-faced word that, at around the turn of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century, displays both pre-modern and modern aspects at the same time and by this twofold nature presents a genuinely *Early Modern* visage.

Tissari notes that, in the Early Modern English data, “[t]he dominant sense is ‘an affection of the mind’, i.e. ‘emotion’, but this result may be somewhat distorted because Shakespeare influences the result so much.”<sup>32</sup> In a way, this sentence carries all the ambiguities latent in the historical period under consideration. First of all, it can be argued that what is termed by ‘passion’ in the sense of an ‘affection of the mind’ in this period (in the Classical idiom) will be called “emotion” later. It is also true that the Shakespeare’s usage of ‘passion’ was taking part, as well as contributing to this semantic change. Several facts seem to corroborate this point. First, there are one-hundred and fifty-two occurrences of ‘passion’ in Shakespeare’s works<sup>33</sup> that is probably the greatest number when compared to his contemporaries. In the *Oxford English Dictionary* entry ‘passion’, Shakespeare is the most often cited author in the psychologico-moral layer (III.) seconded by Spenser when the whole layer is considered and matched by him when the categories from 6.b onwards are considered: five examples are cited from Shakespeare (in 6.a, 6.b, 6.d and twice in 8.a) and four from Spenser (in 6.b, 6.c, 7.a, and 8.a). Although, as Tissari notes citing other scholars in support of her point, the *Oxford English Dictionary* suffers from certain limitations due to the fact that

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<sup>30</sup> Tissari, *Ibid.*, p. 290-291.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307.

<sup>32</sup> Tissari, *Ibid.*, p. 306.

<sup>33</sup> I consulted the online 1866 Globe edition: <http://etext.virginia.edu/shakespeare/works/>

“some authors have been researched and quoted more thoroughly than others, certain kinds of texts have not been included at all”.<sup>34</sup> Given the *OED*’s origins in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when Shakespeare’s reputation reached its highest since the death of the poet, the pre-eminence of Shakespearean texts as example could reflect a cultural bias. But, and this is the second case in point, we also have evidence from Shakespeare’s contemporaries concerning his status as the “poet of passion”. The publication of the erotic tales of *Venus and Adonis* (1593) and of *The Rape of Lucrece* (1594) firmly secured their author’s reputation as the poet of love as the two poems were lodged together in the general contemporary estimate of Shakespeare.<sup>35</sup> Thus Francis Meres, surveying the current state of English letters, in *Palladis Tamia* listed Shakespeare as one of “the most passionate among us to bevail and bemoan the perplexities of love” and declares that “the soul of Ovid lives in mellifluous and honey-tongued Shakespeare, witness his *Venus and Adonis*, his *Lucrece*, and his sugared sonnets among his private friends.”<sup>36</sup> So if Shakespeare “distorts” the result of the dominant sense of ‘passion’ in the Early Modern English data – as Tissari puts it – then it is because he employs the term so frequently. But even if the contemporary perception of Shakespeare at the beginning of his career as the “poet of passion” meant primarily that he was a poet of love, when looking at the totality of the Shakespearean oeuvre, his usage of “passion” included of course all the broader, Classical “affection of the mind” senses.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Tissari, *Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Richard Dutton, *William Shakespeare – A Literary Life*, (Basingstoke and London, etc.: Macmillan Press, 1989) pp. 36.ff. Cf. also Bruce R. Smith, “Studies in Sexuality” in *Shakespeare – An Oxford Guide*, edited by Stanley Wells, Lena Cowen Orlin, (Oxford, New York, etc. : Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 431.ff.

<sup>36</sup> Francis Meres, *Palladis Tamia, Wit’s Treasury*, ed. D. C. Allen, New York: Scholar’s Facsimiles and Reprints, 1938, fols. 280v-281. cited by Bruce R. Smith, *Ibid.* p. 431. Richard Dutton notes that there is no way of knowing, however, whether Meres’s ‘sugared sonnets’ represented all, or even some of those published by the printer Thomas Thorpe in 1609. But Meres’s expression “among his private friends” suggest, as Smith notes, that they circulated in manuscript, well before their publication in 1609, among Shakespeare’s private friends including, most probably, the Earl of Southampton and his circle.

<sup>37</sup> Examples could be enumerated at length, instead, let me refer to the *Shakespeare lexicon* that registers the following five senses definition based on the oeuvre: “‘Passion’ (n)

(1) any suffering. Emphatically, the last suffer of the Saviour.

The complex Early Modern sense of ‘passion’ hinges on changing cultural assumptions about the nature and role of the passions in human life. Changes in these assumptions are leading to the change of meaning of the word and towards the gaining ground of ‘emotion’ replacing much of what the pre-moderns meant by ‘passion’. Thus in 19<sup>th</sup> century English naturalist psychology (A. Bain, Ch. Darwin, J. Sully, W. James) the use of the word ‘passion’ is rejected because of its ethical implications and the value-judgements involved and the more neutral term ‘emotion’ is employed instead.<sup>38</sup> This reservation notwithstanding, I find extremely helpful Tissari’s conclusions drawn from the comparison between the Early Modern and the Present-Day period:

While the Early Modern data often names the ‘strong emotion’ in question or describes its symptoms, in the Present-Day English data the emphasis falls more and more on the strength and intensity of the emotion or the characteristic of emotionality at the expense of exact identification of the emotion. *The data thus suggests a metonymic development in which the subset ‘intensity’ is foregrounded.*<sup>39</sup>

This formal description of the change that occurred also indicates that a “semantic shift” took place. Let me put aside for the moment my reservation concerning the still marked existence of the pre-modern sense of ‘passion’ in the Early Modern period as *perturbatio animi* as “affection of the mind” (and not only *strong* emotion). Tissari’s findings too point in the sense of a semantic shift from a technical (one could say ‘umbrella’) sense of ‘passion’

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- (2) Disorder, disease
  - (3) Any violent commotion of the mind
  - (4) Amorous desire
  - (5) Any disposition or affection ruling the mind”

(*Shakespeare lexicon. A Complete Dictionary of all the English words, phrases and constructions in the Works of the Poet* by Alexander Schmidt, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, revised and enlarged by Gregor Sarrazin, Anno Press: New York, 1980.) In this way, the Shakespearian usage is quite mainstream, even if more frequent.


<sup>38</sup> Out of a similar concern to differentiate between ethically neutral and negative contents, Kant makes a marked distinction between *Leidenschaft* and *Affekt*. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point Of View*, (1798) § 73. and I. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, translated by James Creed Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, (reprint of 1911) §29.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, p. 313. (emphasis mine, G.S.)

(that can explain the need in the Early Modern period for naming the emotion in question) towards a narrowing of its use and *eros* taking predominance. Although she can find evidence from the Present-Day English data to almost all the senses the pre-moderns and the Early Moderns still grouped under the umbrella sense of ‘passion’, the development of the sense shows the foregrounding of intensity and amorous intensity in particular.<sup>40</sup>

The emphasis is on *eros* and straightforward sexuality, which may be accentuated by adjectives like *erotic*, *physical*, or *sexual*, or cognitive metaphors of fire. Passion is associated with being in love. [... it fits] ideal and typical models of love where the experienter lacks any control of the emotion and ‘love’s intensity is maximal’.<sup>41</sup>

Even more telling is her figure showing the comparison between the two periods:



**Figure 1:** ‘passion’, the percentage shares of the domains in each period.<sup>42</sup>

Source: Heli Tissari (2003)

The interpretation of this figure requires a brief note on the use of the different Greek words denoting different sense of love. Building on research by C. S. Lewis and others, Tissari distinguishes among the following senses:

<sup>40</sup> Tissari notes that “[t]he phrase *with passion* seems to be a new means to imply the strength or intensity of the emotion.” She cites as evidence that this phrase occurs 63 times in the *British National Corpus* (BNC), while *without passion* occurs only 7 times. *With passion* seems to be particular to accompanying verbs of utterance and describing acts of *eros* love.

<sup>41</sup> Tissari, *Ibid*, p. 311.

<sup>42</sup> Tissari, *Ibid*, p. 313. The figure is reproduced here with Heli Tissari’s kind permission.



- (1) *Storge* occurs in the domain of family, between family members.
- (2) *Philia* occurs in the domain of friendship, between friends.
- (3) *Eros* occurs in the domain of sexuality, between lovers.
- (4) *Agape* occurs in the domain of religion, between people and God and by people acting according to their faith in God.
- (5) *Love of things* involves non-human participants and covers the remaining cases. From now on, I will be calling this love *khreia*.<sup>43</sup>

The figure shows that, in the Early Modern period, ‘passion’ takes the sense of *eros* in roughly 20% of all the cases, while almost 80% of occurrences of ‘passion’ are “other” i.e. other than any of the ‘love lexemes’. This statistics attests the predominance of the broader, “umbrella sense” of ‘passion’ in the Early Modern period. The data from Present-Day English shows *eros* increasing to 40%, *khreia* (love of things) having 20%, whereas “other” senses of ‘passion’ reduced to its half: 40%. My assumption is that what Tissari categorizes as “other” in Early Modern would come under Christ’s passion and its cognates or they would fall into the category of the “affections of the mind” as the umbrella sense of ‘passion’ excepting “love” of course.<sup>44</sup> This then further corroborates the point that the umbrella sense declines (from 80% to 40%) and the specified love-senses (*eros* and *khreia*) rise to dominance having – together - 60% of all occurrences of ‘passion’ (*eros*: 40% plus *khreia*: 20%). Although my study is not concerned specifically with the Present-Day English developments of ‘passion’ it would be interesting to follow up on Tissari’s suggestion about *khreia*. She notes that “while in the Early Modern period the ‘love’ is almost always *eros*, in Present-Day English almost a quarter of items are *khreia*. In other word, beside being more often used about ‘*eros* love’, PASSION has acquired a new frequent sense of ‘loving some *thing* intensely’. She suggests that a tendency of secularisation is under way in the development of this lexeme.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, the use of ‘passion’ in the sense of *khreia* has recently found its way into the language of advertisements and marketing which build precisely on the prestige of this word. Hence slogans like “Volvo: the passion of quality” or “Our passion, your comfort” (Microsoft) while

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<sup>43</sup> Tissari, *Ibid*, p. 292.

<sup>44</sup> The fact that she does not explore these categories further is understandable from her point of view: the historical lexicology of love-lexemes and not the study of ‘passion’ as such. I admit though that it is not possible to tell from her figure how much is the theological sense (Christ’s passion) within the “other”.

<sup>45</sup> Tissari, *Ibid.*, p. 313.

inciting to the love of things tamper with the romantic and post-romantic resonances of the cult of passion as the source of inspiration and energy for creation.

Tissari's findings provide a solid linguistic background for analysing and assessing the Early Modern cultural context in which the change began. Looking at these conclusions from a broader perspective, they further advance the perhaps obvious claim that 'passion' has a certain historical contingency. There is no fixed or permanent definition of 'passion' and its content is affected by changes in value-judgements, cultural practices and discourses. Thus the perspective of historical lexicology should help us to avoid the "naturalistic fallacy" in dealing with this term. It would be an error to think of 'passions' as something given in advance and established within human nature waiting to be named and deciphered. Not only are the ancient origins of *πάθος* / *pathos* diverse but also the historical development of the word in the vernacular languages bears witness to changes in ethical outlooks and changing preoccupations with certain aspects of human behaviour. Thus the discourses about the passions (be they philosophical, medical, or other) circumscribe a certain semantic field and delimit a field of experience in order to make it an object proper for study, discussion, and moral/medical counsel. To put it somewhat radically, it is the historically situated discourses with their changing perspectives about these fields of experience that constitute them as 'passions'. It does not imply that there is no distress (*aegritudo*), delight (*laetitia*), fear (*metus*), lust (*libido* or *cupiditas*), to use the Ciceronian tetrachord, without discourse, however, calling them collectively as 'passion' involves value-judgements and other cultural assumptions that may be explicit or not.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on the unstable and pragmatic character of psychological concepts point also in this sense and they are probably valid for this word as well:

Psychological concepts are just everyday concepts. They are not concepts newly fashioned by science for its own purpose, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry. Psychological concepts are related to those of the exact sciences as the concepts of the science of medicine are to those of old women who spend their time nursing the sick.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, two volumes edited by G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, translated by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, The University of Chicago Press, 1980, II. § 62.

As we shall see in the following chapters, the medical parallels are very much to the point in discussions about the ‘passions’. Even more relevant is Wittgenstein’s reference to the pragmatic ends of psychological concepts. This study is concerned with, to take Wittgenstein’s example, the change in what is considered ‘sickness’ and the simultaneous change in the ‘old woman’, that is, the practices and prescriptions the prevailing culture provides for their treatment. In the context of Early Modern culture, such practices and prescriptions are the subject matter of cultural appropriations taking place between Classical, Christian and Early Modern vernacular culture. The adoption of the intercultural perspective in the study of the passions calls for a method and terminology that is capable of comparing and assessing the implications of the use of the notion of ‘passion’ in different cultural contexts. In order to be able to assess these broader historical and cultural underpinnings of the semantic change, I propose to turn to the writings of the late Michel Foucault. His genealogical perspective and even more his notion of “care for the self” as a form of ethical practice provide a vantage point for analysing changes in meaning in terms of changes in the substance of ethical practice. I wish to expose this methodological inspiration by turning to the writings of the late Foucault.

### **I. 3. In Search of a Vantage Point: Foucault on the ‘Care for the Self’**

By exposing the semantic evolution of ‘passion’ the previous chapter showed the inherent historical contingency of passion. It could be argued that ‘passion’, together with its etymological antecedents, is a somewhat over-determined word invested with different layers of meaning from the very beginnings of Western consciousness. When addressing the issue of passions in a given historical context, the problem consists partly in the multiplicity of layers of significations attached to ‘passions’ as describing the affective and emotive life of the subject. Any discussion quickly finds itself embedded in a complex web of determinations. A historical reconstruction of the meaning of ‘passion’ and, in particular, one that tries to account for the historical change described in the previous chapter as a “semantic shift” requires a vantage point and a method of analysis. The method I will be proposing in this chapter builds on the work of the late Michel Foucault and, more specifically, on the idea that the approach to passions is part of a certain ethical practice understood as a means of

transforming the subject. This approach is motivated by the understanding that the word 'passion' is a meta-level of discourse that reflects not only a certain structuring and grouping of mental and bodily states but also their evaluation. The historical contingency and change in what 'passion' means shows that the phenomena described by this word is not given in a natural, spontaneous way whereby 'passions' would come as a given mental experience waiting for an adequate name. The unstable and pragmatic character of psychological concepts indicated by Wittgenstein and cited above is particularly true for the 'passions'. It would be a naturalistic fallacy to set up passions as a pre-given mental disruption awaiting a discourse that would describe, canalise, and temper it. This model would imply that, on the one hand, there would be nature with its own force and, on the other hand, there would be culture, human discourse, exercising a counter-force: defining what passion is, evaluating and, if needs be, combating them. But in fact, there is no such division, no such antagonism: passions are not a naturally given category, they are from the outset defined by culture and cultural discourses that shape the subject relations to his or her passions. In a way, discourse about passions constitutes them by establishing a particular grouping and selection on a meta-level of discourse. Interpreting Foucault's project of subjectivation Christian Jambet describes this process in the following way:

Certain states of being, certain acts, arise out of the lack of material distinction where they were vegetating before calling forth or giving rise to this sort of questioning." [...] Whereas other modes of existence remain in a state of indifference where they are of no interest to the search for the true: they do not disturb knowledge (*savoir*) and they do not require of it that it should be the material of its analyses and maxims. In Aristotelian terms, they remain pure possibilities.<sup>47</sup>

The word *πάσχω* / *paskho*, for example, was in pre-classical Greek culture was a relatively undifferentiated or overcharged semantic field implying both grief and sexual pleasure. This field of multiple and contrasting meanings was later explored by Homer, Plato and Aristotle, who invested it with more specific values, imperatives, requirements, rules and exhortations, thus creating a form of knowledge about it that was the effective content of a particular

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<sup>47</sup> Christian Jambet, "The constitution of the subject and spiritual practice" in *Michel Foucault, Philosopher*, Essays translated from the French and German by Timothy J. Armstrong, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1992, p. 241.

problematisation. 'Passions' came to life as they became ethical problems, requiring theoretical and practical treatment in Plato, Aristotle, and later in the writings of the Stoics.

I propose to situate that problem of the passions as an interrogation about instituted modes of relation to the self and their possible history. What I find common to practically every field of knowledge related to the passions in the Renaissance period are questions related in some way or another to practices related to the subject and to means of transforming its state and behaviour. After all, the imperative of 'know thyself', often evoked in 16<sup>th</sup> century treatises about the passions, could be taken as the motto of popular philosophy in the Renaissance. But this imperative of 'know thyself' must also be placed in the broader historical and conceptual context it is derived from: namely Classical Greek culture and its *care for the self*. As we shall see, the preoccupation with the passions is part of this practice.

The issue of the care for the self was the central theme of Michel Foucault's work in the 1970s-1980s.<sup>48</sup> He studied it in the context of Classical Greek culture where, at least for the European consciousness, it takes its origins and one of its first manifestations in philosophy in Plato's *Alcibiades*. Foucault followed the various uses to which care of the self were put in Hellenistic philosophy and later in early Christianity roughly until the 4<sup>th</sup> century A.C. Although Foucault's studies on this topic do not address the care for the self or more specifically the issue of the passions in the context of the Renaissance<sup>49</sup>, I find them methodologically inspiring that conceptually encouraging for my topic. As for the strictly historical relevance of Foucault's analyses of Hellenistic authors for the Renaissance, it is noteworthy that Stoic practices of care for the self – a topic he dealt with in detail – were extremely important in shaping the Renaissance attitude towards the passions due to the neo-Stoic revival in the second half of 16<sup>th</sup> century.

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<sup>48</sup> As Foucault himself indicates in his *Histoire de la sexualité* 3. *Le souci de soi*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984) p. 60. the centrality of the topic "culture of the self" (*techné tou biou*) had been well documented before him by Pierre Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, Paris, 1981. In another book dealing with similar issues Pierre Hadot notes this influence on the work of Michel Foucault; cf. P. Hadot, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* Paris: Gallimard, 1995, p. 24.

<sup>49</sup> With the exception of some sporadic remarks in the interview given in Dreyfus-Rabinow, of which see more below.

The very notion of “technologies of the self” (often used as a synonym for “care for the self”) is an issue difficult to grasp because this practice is so widespread and almost self-evident in our culture. Foucault himself was aware of this and he noted that

... the hermeneutics of the self has been diffused across Western culture through different channels and integrated with various types of attitudes and experience so that it is difficult to isolate and separate it from our own spontaneous experiences.<sup>50</sup>

The importance of Foucault’s study of this concept was that he was able to show, by historical comparisons among practices in Classical Greek, Hellenistic and early Christian culture – and often with specific hindsight to our own modern world – that the technologies of the self are far from being self-evident. Instead, he demonstrated that these techniques exhibit certain specificities in different historical periods, they undergo major changes and transformations and are thus part of the historical contingency of our being.

What follows is a brief presentation of Foucault’s evolving concept of technologies of the self. We shall briefly locate it in Foucault’s oeuvre with indications to the broader programmatic agenda of Foucault’s intellectual outlook.

What I mean by the phrase are those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an *oeuvre* that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. These ‘arts of existence’, these ‘techniques of the self’, no doubt lost some of their importance and autonomy when they were assimilated into the exercise of priestly power in early Christianity and later, into educative, medical, and psychological types of practices. Still, I thought that the long history of aesthetics of existence and these technologies of the self remained to be done, or resumed. It has been a long time since Burckhardt pointed out their significance for the epoch of the Renaissance, but their perpetuation, their history, and their development do not end here. (IN FOOTNOTE: It is not quite correct to imply that since Burckhardt the study of these arts and this aesthetics of existence has been completely neglected. One thinks of Benjamin’s study on Baudelaire. There is also an interesting analysis in Stephen Greenblatt’s recent book, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1984)) In any case, it seemed to me that the study of the problematisation of sexual behaviour in antiquity could be regarded as a chapter – one of the first chapters – of that general history of the ‘techniques of the self’

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<sup>50</sup> M. Foucault, *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Edited by L. H. Martin, et al., London, Tavistock, 1988, pp. 16-49.

AND

And to explain how I was led, through certain paradoxes and difficulties, to substitute a history of ethical problematisations based on practices of the self, for a history of systems of morality based, hypothetically, in interdictions.<sup>51</sup>

The present study can be seen as appendix to this “history of ethical problematisations based on practices of the self” inasmuch as the technologies of the self, being *praxis*, presuppose a language in which acts, phenomena and behaviour of the self are represented with a view to modifying them. When changes in that language denoting affective and mental states of the subject occur then these changes are necessarily accompanied by *concomitant changes in what to be cared for*: the very terms used to denote phenomena that is of relevance for ethical substance and practice. Foucault refers to the prescriptive texts he studies as “functional devices that would enable individuals to question their own conduct, to watch over and give shape to it, and to shape themselves as ethical subjects; in short, their function was ‘etho-poetic’, to transpose a word found in Plutarch.”<sup>52</sup> If the texts are “etho-poetic”, then the keywords the texts use, the terms in which the possible prescriptions arise or are formulated and possible gestures of care for the self / techniques of the self are deployed and carried out are the atoms, the basic elements and units of this poetics. And while Foucault may be right in arguing for an underlying continuity in the moral codes, and for emphasising instead that it is “a history of ethical problematisations based on practices of the self” that really matters, it remains, however, that those codes and prescriptions as well as the techniques of the care for the self are formulated and mediated by a language, even if only an internal monologue. And that language too, has its history interlaced with and imbricated in the history of the codes and of the techniques of the self: systematic changes in patterns of belief and attitude intersect with and are correlated with changes in meaning, language. Coming closer to the period that is by and large the subject of this study, certain words of that code and of those practices involved show a remarkable semantic instability from around 1600 and ultimately lead to a marked change of affective vocabulary by the turn of 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> century.

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<sup>51</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality Volume 2*, translated from the French by Robert Hurley, New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, p. 10-13 passim

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* p. 12-13.

In the early 1980s, as a retrospective view about his work in an article written under the pseudonym “Maurice Florence” for the entry “Foucault” in the *Dictionnaire des philosophes* Michel Foucault situated himself in the philosophical tradition of Kant and called his project a “Critical History of Thought”.<sup>53</sup> He defined it as “an analysis of the conditions under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified, insofar as those relations constitute a possible knowledge.” More specifically, this meant an analysis of those relations of subject and object in which “the subject himself is posited as an object of possible knowledge”. This lead first to the study of formations of knowledge relating to the subject (*The Order of Things*), then to the study of the formation of the relationships to fields of power (*Madness and Civilization*, *Birth of the Clinic*, *Discipline and Punish*), and last to the study of the constitution of the subject as object for himself. This latter entails “the formation of procedures by which the subject is led to observe himself, analyse himself, interpret himself, recognize himself as a domain of possible knowledge.” In the second volume of *The History of Sexuality* Foucault gives an outline of the way his different works relate to each other:

A theoretical shift had seemed necessary in order to analyse what was often designated as the advancement of learning; it led me to examine the forms of discursive practices that articulated the human sciences. A theoretical shift had also been required in order to analyse what is often described as 'manifestations of power'; it led me to imagine, rather, the manifold relations, the open strategies, and the rational techniques that articulate the exercise of powers. It appeared that I now had to undertake a third shift, in order to analyse what is termed 'the subject'. It seemed appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject. After first studying the games of truth (*jeux de vérité*) in their interplay with one another, as exemplified by certain empirical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and then studying their interaction with power relations, as exemplified by punitive practices - I felt obliged to study the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject, taking as my domain of

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<sup>53</sup> Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*. edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley and others, *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume two*, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1998. p. 456.



reference and field of investigation what might be called 'the history of desiring man'.<sup>54</sup>

The *History of Sexuality* and the various lectures and seminars in the Collège de France and various universities in the United States emanating from this project were concerned with the study of ethical modes and the ways of how we constitute ourselves as ethical subjects.<sup>55</sup> It is for this reason that his study of this topic have proved so seminal; in fact, through a historical study of how subjects have constituted themselves in various ways in Antiquity and early Christianity, Foucault addressed issues central to contemporary philosophical discourse and made a significant contribution that had its repercussions in political science, literary and social criticism, educational studies, feminism, etc. But despite the changed focus of the book about the history of sexuality, Foucault's interest in this topic had its coherence within the oeuvre as suggested also by his retrospective article on his work. His analysis of technologies of the self are inscribed in a series of theoretical shifts that occurred in his work and are related to different domains of what he calls "genealogies": a

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<sup>54</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*, 1985, p. 6. In an interview, Foucault himself describes these, often interrelated, domains in the following way: "First a historical ontology of ourselves in our relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as *subjects of knowledge*. Then a historical ontology of ourselves in our *relationships to a field of power* where we constitute ourselves as subjects acting over others. And finally a historical ontology of our *relationship to morals* that constitutes us as ethical agents." (Italics and translation mine – G.S.) in *Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988*, édition établie sous la direction de Daniel Defert et François Ewald avec la collaboration de Jacques Lagrange, Quarto, Paris : Gallimard, 2001<sup>2</sup> (1994), p. 1212.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. "Par là, je ne veux pas dire faire une histoire des conceptions successives du désir, de la concupiscence ou de la *libido*, mais analyser les pratiques par lesquelles les individus ont été amenés à porter attention à eux-mêmes, à se déchiffrer, à se reconnaître et à s'avouer comme sujets de désir, faisant jouer entre eux-mêmes et eux-mêmes un certain rapport qui leur permet de découvrir dans le désir la vérité de leur être, qu'il soit naturel ou déchu. Bref, l'idée était, dans cette généalogie, de chercher comment les individus ont été amenés à exercer sur eux-mêmes, et sur les autres, une herméneutique de désir dont leur comportement sexuel a bien été sans doute l'occasion, mais n'a certainement pas été le domaine exclusif. M. Foucault, *L'Usage des plaisirs. Histoire de la sexualité 2*. Paris : Gallimard, 1984. p. 10.

Nietzsche-inspired concept and practice of historical-philosophical research.<sup>56</sup> These domains of genealogy are relationships of knowledge or truth, of power, and of ethics. What gives the methodological unity of Foucault's research in these fields is that they are all centred on the analysis of certain *practices* with a view to bring out and make intelligible their historical contingency.<sup>57</sup>

As for the *historical contingency* of the subject's practices, a topic Foucault insists on throughout his career, it is part of his broader critical strategy of contributing to a historical ontology of human nature. In the "Foucault"-article a "systematic scepticism toward all anthropological universals" is established as a rule. "In regard to human nature or the categories that may be applied to the subject, everything in our knowledge which is suggested to us as being universally valid must be tested and analysed. [...] Insofar as possible, circumvent the anthropological universals (and, of course, those of a humanism that would assert the rights, privileges, and the nature of a human being as an immediate and timeless truth of the subject) *in order to examine them as historical constructs*."<sup>58</sup> Foucault wrote more explicitly on how this 'systematic scepticism' functions as part of a philosophical ethos rooted in the Enlightenment and more specifically in Kant's instruction of *Aude sapere*: 'dare to know', "have the courage, the audacity to know".<sup>59</sup> This scepticism is part and parcel of a type of philosophical interrogation that simultaneously problematises man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject. This interrogation is "oriented toward the 'contemporary limits of the necessary', that is, toward what is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous

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<sup>56</sup> For the Nietzschean origin of this practice see for example M. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley and others, *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984* volume two, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1998. pp. 369-392.

<sup>57</sup> For approaching Foucault's writing along the two primary axes of philosophical history and historicist philosophy cf. Gary Gutting, "Introduction. Michel Foucault: A user's manual" in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, edited by Gary Gutting, Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, p. 462. (my emphasis, G.S.)

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment" in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*, New York, Pantheon Book, 1984, pp. 32-50.

subjects.”<sup>60</sup> It entails a “historical ontology of ourselves” established through precise historical inquiries that are concerned with the “events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.” Its ‘limit-attitude’ means a probing of the frontiers, analysing the limits in order to see that “in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints?”

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.<sup>61</sup>

In summary then and coming back to Foucault’s methodology the Enlightenment-article proposes a philosophical ethos that is deployed in concrete historical inquiries in order to grasp the contingencies in the practices that shaped and still shape us. In studying the practices of a historical period, the goal is of course not to reactivate past practices or to see exemplary value in them as if they constituted a golden age. Instead of a nostalgic evocation, they can serve as vantage points in order to see the contingencies in our current limitations requiring “a patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty.”<sup>62</sup>

Foucault’s analyses and comparisons of self-relation in Classical Greek, Stoic Greek and early Christian contexts explore the different different modalities and finalities of the self.<sup>63</sup> For an analysis of the Renaissance concern with the passions Foucault’s study of how

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<sup>60</sup> What is Enlightenment, p. 43.

<sup>61</sup> “What is Enlightenment?” p. 50.

<sup>62</sup> “What is Enlightenment?” p. 50.

<sup>63</sup> Publications related to this topic are *The History of Sexuality* 3 vols. as well as Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France from 1978-94 of which summaries are accessible in French and some in English. Cf. *Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988* ; and *Résumé des cours, 1970-1982* ; Paris : Julliard (1989). The course of 1981-1982 was published in a separate volume as Michel Foucault, *L’Herméneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France, 1981-1982*. Edition établie sous la direction de François Ewald et Alessandro Fontana, par Frédéric Gros, (Paris : Hautes Etudes, Seuil/Gallimard, 2001) The 1977-1978 course on “Sécurité, territoire et population” appeared as “Historical Systems of Thought, 1978” translated by James Bernauer in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, vol. 8:2, Summer, pp. 238ff.

self-relations operated in Classical culture (both Greek and Stoic) and early Christianity are important not only as a conceptual device in this study but also because of the importance of these epochs in shaping the Renaissance outlook and practices concerning the passions. Since the issue of the passions in Renaissance culture is at the crossroads of Classical humanism, of neo-Stoicism and of the Christianity of the day, the concern with the passions entails a reconfiguration of this threefold legacy. The concatenation of Stoic and Christian ideas about technologies of the self are presented (albeit in a different vocabulary) by Gordon Braden, in *Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition. Anger's Privilege* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985)<sup>64</sup>

Foucault himself gives an indication of this possibility in the interview cited above on the genealogy of ethics:

It seems to me that in the religious crisis of the sixteenth century - the great rejection of the Catholic confessional practices - new modes of relationship to the self were being developed. We can see the reactivation of ancient Stoic practices of the Classical era.<sup>65</sup>

Foucault refers to the notion of self-test as being thematically very close to what one can find among the Stoics for whom the experience of the self is not the discovery of a hidden self within us but rather an attempt to determine what we can do and what we cannot do given the liberty we dispose of. Both Catholics and Protestants reactivate these ancient practices and give them the form (and finality) of Christian spiritual practice. What emerges is that similar techniques of the self may hide differences in the *telos* of care for the self. Thus Foucault's description of ethical practices may serve as a method for studying the debates and cultural interactions between different ethical practices in the context of Early Modern culture as cultural appropriations took between Classical, Christian and Early Modern vernacular cultures.

Foucault's conceptualisation of ethics shows us where to locate the transvaluations consequent upon the emergence of Christian ethics. And, moreover, by isolating the relation to oneself as a separate component of ethics, he

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<sup>64</sup> In particular in the chapters "Stoicism and Empire" (pp. 5-27) and "Stoicism and Renaissance" (63-98).

<sup>65</sup> Cf. p. 1226-1227 in *Dits et écrits II*

opened up a domain of analysis that can be profitably investigated both when moral codes are relatively static and when they undergo great upheaval.<sup>66</sup>

As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I do not mean to apply Foucault's categories to Early Modern texts and to the practices implied in them in a strict, "strait-jacket" sense. Rather the point is to use his insights liberally as a source of methodological inspiration that can help to understand semantic shifts, ethical debates in terms of differences in care for the self and ethics as a study of the self's relationship to itself, *rapport à soi*. That is how Foucault defined ethics: as a component of morality concerning the self's relationship to itself. "Foucault argued that our histories of morality should not be exclusively focused on the history of codes of moral behaviour, and that we must also pay careful attention to the history of the forms of subjectivation, to how we constitute ourselves as moral subjects of our own moral actions."<sup>67</sup> His work and moreover his historical analysis of care for the self are useful *mutatis mutandis* for an analysis of the evolution of the meaning of 'passion' in the Early Modern period. In my view, the study of the Early Modern reconfiguration of 'passions' is related to the history of the care for the self in the following way. In most cases, if not exclusively<sup>68</sup>, care for the self passes by verbal processes that involve language as its medium. Although practices of the self are not limited to discursive practices, but it is from discursive testimonies that we can study practices far broader in range than what can be described discursively. Foucault, as a historian, was obliged to turn to diaries, self-inspections, treatises on dreams, letters of counsel, etc.<sup>69</sup> It is legitimate and almost banal to assume that the history of our relationship to ourselves is paralleled in the history of the

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<sup>66</sup> Arnold I. Davidson, "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics" in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, edited by David Couzens Hoy, Oxford and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1986, (1992<sup>5</sup>), p. 231.

<sup>67</sup> Arnold I Davidson, "Ethics as ascetics: Foucault, the history of ethics, and ancient thought" in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, edited by Gary Gutting, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 118.

<sup>68</sup> Ultimately, all such practices, when historical, are mediated to us through written or other semiotic records. This means that irrespective of whether they were verbal or not on the first place, they come to us through written records. Of course, there is a lot of room for contemplation as to how thought, feeling, emotion and other mental processes are related to verbal acts...

<sup>69</sup> M. Foucault, "L'Herméneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France. 1981-1982" in *Résumé des cours, 1970-1982* ; Paris : Julliard, 1989, 145ff

medium of these verbal processes, language, and more specifically, in the semantic fields specific words acquire.<sup>70</sup> The semantic fields of the words we use are adapted to changing needs of our care for the self. When there are changes in what needs care (governance and control), changes in meanings of words, even of whole clusters of words are attending to it. Thus tracing the phases of and moments of renegotiations of semantic shifts in language is tantamount to identifying changes in care for the self – in fact, the two are hardly separable from one another and cannot be rendered simply in relationships of causality (which is why I prefer to refer to ‘Early Modern configurations’).

#### **I. 4. The Broader Historical Argument: ‘Passions’ and ‘Emotions’**

As stated in the first chapter, this study is concerned with presenting and possibly explaining, albeit tentatively, the change of the meaning of ‘passion’ around the late 16<sup>th</sup> century in the English language. Drawing on the *Oxford English Dictionary* and related historical evidence, Chapter I.2. took stock of the shift in the meaning. But an understanding of the terms of this change requires a broader historical perspective situating this development in the history of what could be called “affectivity”. While the presentation of the change itself can be done by turning to the linguistic evidence and historical material within the Early Modern period, the explanation of this change is a more difficult and complex issue. It requires a method that will do justice to the historical complexities involved (and evoked above as the intercultural context of the Renaissance cf. Chapter I.1.) and will meet the requirements of conceptual clarity. To put my tentative explanation for the semantic change in question in the broadest possible terms, I would venture to claim that it was within the complex intercultural constellation and interaction combining elements of various and on crucial points often conflicting traditions that ‘passion’ acquired a culturally, philosophically and theologically unsustainable semantic *richness/plenitude* that called for *change*. I wish to contend that the Early Modern period – and precisely by virtue of its intercultural character – plays a pivotal

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<sup>70</sup> Cf. L. Wittgenstein’s remark on the on the unstable and pragmatic character of psychological concepts above, chapter I. 2.

role in the re-negotiation of the very terms of affectivity.<sup>71</sup> To put it briefly: prior to the Early Modern period affects were subsumed under the term ‘passion’ (*pathē*): a broader historical view should allow us to see how that history of affects is embedded in that of the passions. Of course, it would go far beyond the confines of this study to follow in detail this intertwined history of ‘passion’ from pre-classical Greece (Homer in particular), to the Greek tragedies and philosophers through Hellenistic and Roman culture, Early Christianity (Saint Augustine in particular) and scholasticism.<sup>72</sup> For the sake of understanding and exploring the significance of the change in the Early Modern period, I shall, however, highlight major points of this history; those moments in particular that had an impact on the Early Modern transformation in order to elicit, retrospectively, the double nature of ‘passion’ prior to the Renaissance and to account for the semantic shift that takes place in this period.

A remark by a noted Classical scholar will illustrate the point about the ambiguity of ‘passion’. In his *Emotion and Peace of Mind; From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*<sup>73</sup> (that was originally given as the prestigious Gifford Lectures in 1997) Richard Sorabji makes the following remark at the outset:

I shall speak of ‘emotions’ rather than ‘passions’ when rendering the Greek term *pathē*. This is for the reason given in the Introduction, that, in so far as there is a distinction nowadays, passion is thought of as a very strong type of emotion. Those who, like the Stoic Chrysippus, wanted to eradicate emotion hoped to

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<sup>71</sup> While it has to be acknowledged that the concept of affectivity emerges within the framework of the modern institution of the subject but it would be a case of excessive nominalism to suppose that it had not existed prior to its recent “invention” about two hundred years ago. (The case is also valid of course in a spatial dimension referring to other cultures codes...)

<sup>72</sup> For a similar approach but taking the Kantian distinction between *Affekt* and *Leidenschaft* as a historical vantage point cf. Marc Richir, “Affectivité” in *Encyclopædia Universalis*, France, 1996 (CD-ROM version) who traces the filiations of the “double conception of *pathos* as both ‘passion’ and ‘affect’” back to Classical Greece (Plato, Aristotle), and Stoicism as well as Christianity, most notably in the Protestant re-elaboration of Christian interiority. Cf. also Jürgen HENGELBROCK and Jakob LANZ, “Affekt” in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* edited by Joachim RITTER, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, translated into French by Jacques Gillot as « Examen historique du concept de passion »

<sup>73</sup> Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. The Gifford Lectures*, Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press, 2000.

eradicate not only the strong ones, but very nearly all, as I shall argue in Chapters 2 and 14. So their view would not be well expressed by saying that they were only against passions.<sup>74</sup>

Similarly, another eminent Classical and medievalist scholar, Simo Knuuttila, offers the same translation of the Greek *pathos* as modern ‘emotion’ already in the title of his commanding study *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, one may also turn to modern translations of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* to verify that translations of *pathos* may even vary. Thus in 1147a 11ff (Book VII. Chapter 3) of the *Nicomachean Ethics* the word is translated by J. A. K. Thomson as being “in the grip of emotion”,<sup>76</sup> whereas a more recent translation by Roger Crisp, published in the prestigious “Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy Series” the translation is a rather vague “under the influence of the ways they are affected”<sup>77</sup>. Examples of this sort could be enumerated much further.<sup>78</sup> My point is of course not to criticise Sorabji’s, Knuuttila’s, Thomson’s and others’ rather elegant and neat solution to the problem of terminological history but rather to alert to the ambiguity of the term as the source of later semantic rearrangements. (I shall return to the Stoic concept

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<sup>74</sup> Richard Sorabji, *Ibid.* p. 17, cf. also p. 7. and 206-210 on whether the dispute on *apatheia* is merely verbal

<sup>75</sup> Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Cf. also the same logic at work in Deborah J. Brown, *Descartes and the Passionate Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 32. and *passim*.

<sup>76</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by J. A. K. Thomson, revised with notes and appendices by Hugh Tredennick, introduction and bibliography by Julian Barnes, London: Penguin Books, 1955, p. 232.

<sup>77</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated and edited by Roger Crisp, “Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy”, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000, p. 124. It has to be noted that the “Glossary” at the end of the book defines or rather glosses “*pathos*” as “feeling *or* way of being affected. Alternative translation: ‘passion’. Opposed to ‘actions’ (*praxeis*), connotes passivity as against activity, experiencing rather than doing.” *Ibid.* p. 207.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Tad Brennan, “The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions” in J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen, (eds.) *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy*, Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1998. As well as problematic translations of Cicero’s *perturbatio* as ‘emotion’ in the Loeb edition of *De finibus* and the translation of *animi motibus* as ‘mental emotions’ in the “Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought” series edition of Augustine, *Civitate Dei* (both will be cited below).



of the ‘passions’ in more detail in Chapter II.1.3.) Although the historical studies contained in these scholarly books make clear that the authors are far from throwing an anachronistic semantic veil unto the disturbing strangeness of a Classical term. There is, however, a risk of assimilating a historically defined term that was conditioned by a host of assumptions about what it is to be human, what is the right action, etc., to a modern concept. The fact that the theological-moral associations of *pathē* (such as *vitium*, (fault, defect, vice) *perturbatio* (perturbation, disturbance)) have progressively been eliminated in modern discourses resulted in a narrowing and a marked shift of in the semantic field under consideration. Thus, since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it has been limited to the sphere of ‘sentiments’, ‘emotions’. Therefore it is important to emphasise that the retrospective perspective focusing on the historical ambiguity of ‘passion’ as sketched out above is in no way meant to occult historical change and to suppose instead transhistorical continuity in human affectivity. The point is rather, to lay bare, to the extent possible, the conditions within which we can assess changes in ‘passion’ at all and to expose how such a semantic change is influenced by and intersects with changes in systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes. The history of the concept of ‘passion’ has been attempted from various perspectives albeit with different emphases on the aspects of the phenomenon under consideration.

Jürgen Hengelbrock and Jakob Lanz presented a survey of the concept of passion in a twin article: the first one tracing the history of the concept up to the Thomas Aquinas, while the second article, addressing the modern era, starts, noticeably with 17<sup>th</sup> century authors like Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, Pascal – with the early-modern phase conspicuously missing.<sup>79</sup> However, the second article presents three phases through which the modern conception of ‘passion’ developed. The historically first phase is of ‘passion’ denotes, in a large and generic sense all non-rational psychological phenomena often considered as passive. The second phase reflects a change in their evaluation: rather than seeing them as obstacle to virtue, or as diseases, they are examined from aesthetic, psychological, and economic points of view (Hume, Pope, Vico, Helvétius, Mandeville). It is in the third phase that a significant semantic change comes about: the distinction ‘passion’ / ‘emotion’ is established between extreme desire / movement of the sensitive faculties. The article also notes that in the course

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<sup>79</sup> Jürgen Hengelbrock and Jakob Lanz, « Examen historique du concept de passion » “Affekt” in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* edited by Joachim Ritter, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, translated from German by Jacques Gillot.

of the transition from the large to the narrower sense of ‘passion’, the use of the term varies largely in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century. As indicated above, the present study is concerned with the transition from the first, large to the third, narrow sense, and in particular the beginnings and possible motivations of this change.

Amélie Oksenberg Rorty published an article in 1982 entitled “From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments”<sup>80</sup> that, albeit its main focus is on Descartes and Hobbes, provides interesting and inviting clues for understanding the change in conceptions of the passions. Her account of the change is in terms of a shift from invading passions external to the self linked with the fallen condition of man and requiring operations of control, transformation, and suppression to conceiving passions as “the very activities of the mind, its own motions”, “a person’s own resources and direction of energy, and then, as sentiments, they provide the conditions for civilized society”<sup>81</sup>. While the Early Modern period can still be characterised as falling, by and large, into the first phase of this description, there are, however, significant developments that signal a shift of focus. A. O. Rorty’s description is noteworthy in this regard and goes straight to the heart of the issue:

And of course as conceptions of the passions change, the prime examples of the passions change, and their relations to the other activities of the mind also shift. When fear and anger are the prime examples of invading passions then we are ‘overcome’ by love, pity or compassion. In such a system, it is rationality that assures justice. But when the primary examples of the passions include sentiments acquired by sympathetic vibrations to others like ourselves – when we sorrow because others sorrow – the virtue of justice can become the *sense* of justice, its operations assured by benevolent social passions rather than by rationality.<sup>82</sup>

As we shall see in the context of the Early Modern debate between neo-Stoics and Christians of an Augustinian inspiration, this shift from the rule of reason (with the radicalism of psychological monism in the case of the Stoics) to Christian accommodations of “sympathetic vibrations” partly modelled on Christ will be central to the change in the conceptions of ‘passion’. But A. O. Rorty’s more general approach to the issue is also convincing: she claims that “we can use transformations of the passions to emotions and sentiments as a scarlet dye,

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<sup>80</sup> A. O. Rorty, “From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments” in *Philosophy: the Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy*, 57 (1982), pp. 159-172.

<sup>81</sup> A. O. Rorty, *Ibid.* p. 159.

<sup>82</sup> A. O. Rorty, *Ibid.* p. 159-160.

as it were, to locate other changes in the mind.”<sup>83</sup> For her “one of the reasons that the passions are especially interesting, red dye tracers of the shifts of the mind, is that they are found in that no-man’s land where theories create experiences they describe...”<sup>84</sup> I find the metaphor of “scarlet dye” particularly apt to describe the interwoven nature of conceptions of the passions with ideas in ethics, theology and anthropology. Furthermore, these ideas do not stop there but find their way to inform our everyday lives and words. Thus, in a playful coda to her article, A. O. Rorty concludes:

Philosophy begins at home, but with any lick it doesn’t end there: it moves back and forth to sermons, scientific treatises, political rhetoric, poetry and trashy fiction, obituaries that praise and editorials that blame, and above all the daily gossip that explains the mysterious actions of friends and foes. All these, combining theory and practice as they do, carry our predecessors alive within them. We carry all the participants *in foro interno*. That is what comes of our being historical creatures, formed by the words of our predecessors as well as by The Look of the Other. Not only society, but history with its babble of conflicting tongues remains alive and intact within us.<sup>85</sup>

It is also the premise of the current study to understand the ordinary use of the word ‘passion’ as informed by philosophical, theological and other ideas even if, as we shall see the ordinary, literary and scholarly uses of the word do not always coincide.

Hans-Jürgen Diller traced a pre-history of ‘emotion’ Old and Middle English texts<sup>86</sup> and I can concur with his approach that shares my (and Marc Richir’s) working assumption that there is, of course, a prehistory of ‘emotion’ prior to the existence of this word. Diller’s scope of research takes into account, rightly, in my view, not only ‘passion’ and ‘affection’ but also such vernacular developments as ‘mood’, ‘feeling’ and ‘stirring’ and the minutiae of his analysis are extremely insightful and informative. Since my focus in the present study is the semantic change of ‘passion’ around 1600, and since this change is precisely about the disambiguation of ‘passion’, namely that modern ‘emotion’, ‘affection’, ‘passion’ were all

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<sup>83</sup> A. O. Rorty, *Ibid.* p. 159.

<sup>84</sup> A. O. Rorty, *Ibid.* p. 171.

<sup>85</sup> A. O. Rorty, *Ibid.* p. 172.

<sup>86</sup> Hans-Jürgen Diller, “*Affection, passion, feeling, stirring*: Towards a pre-history of the category ‘emotion’” in Paul Michel (ed.), *Unmitte(i)lbarkeit: Gestaltungen und Lesbarkeit von Emotionen*, PANO Verlag, 2005, pp. 155-191.

part of ‘passion’ in the Classical sense, our fields of research are contiguous and to some extent overlap. I.e. Diller traces the pre-history of ‘emotion’ that, from my perspective at least, is part and parcel of the history of ‘passion’. Perhaps it is due to such differences in perspective and the material considered that I would somewhat disagree with him concerning the pertinence of the first question he raises in his article<sup>87</sup>: “1. Was there a need, before the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, for a generic term covering phenomena like fear, hope, joy, sadness etc.?”<sup>88</sup> As it may be clear from my subsequent chapters on the Classical heritage of ‘passion’, such a collective term existed in Greek (*pathē*) as well as Latin (*passiones*) and was adopted and adapted in European vernacular languages especially due to Stoic influence mediated by Cicero and Saint Augustine. Some of the examples cited by Diller from the Middle English period attest it, for example his quotation from Chaucer<sup>89</sup> that lists the Classic tetrachord of passions established by the Stoics and inherited from them through Cicero and the early Christian Church Fathers, especially Saint Augustine. In my view, question 1 does not really exist in this form. The really pertinent question is Diller’s third question: “What do these words designate apart from ‘emotion’?”<sup>90</sup> It should be added that Diller’s answers to this question at the end of his paper (pp. 185-187) are revealing of his modernist bias in looking for a term like modern ‘emotion’ to capture fear, hope, joy, sadness in Medieval English. The point is precisely that the generic term is there but it is predicated on a completely different conceptual plane than modern ‘emotion’.<sup>91</sup> But even in this form, the question invites a note: while it is perfectly legitimate to trace the antecedents of ‘emotion’, it has to be borne in mind (and I take Diller to be aware of this) that this enterprise is slightly

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<sup>87</sup> I am aware from his 2005 article that Diller published two more papers on the same issue, one in 2002, and another in 2005 but I must confess that I could not get access to these publications.

<sup>88</sup> Diller, *Ibid.* p. 156.

<sup>89</sup> “[W]eyve thow joie, / dryf fro the drede, fleme thow hope, / ne lat no sorwe aproche = [avoid joy, / drive away fear, / put hope to flight, do not let sorrow approach] (*that is to seyn, lat not thise foure passious overcomen the or blended* [blind] *the*). = [avoid joy, / drive away fear, / put hope to flight, do not let sorrow approach] Quoted by Diller, *Ibid.* p. 164 from Boëthius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, Book I, m 7 (Chaucer’s translation). It should be noted that four passions listed are roughly those of the Stoic-Ciceronian tetrachord, cf. chapter II.1.3.

<sup>90</sup> Diller, *Ibid.* p. 156.

<sup>91</sup> As a consequence, I am also inclined to disagree with the upshot of the answer Diller gives to his concomitant second question: “If so, which words were used to satisfy that need?”

anachronistic. It is looking for something in history the conceptual bases of which had not existed yet: Diller's "unashamedly modern" definition<sup>92</sup> taken from the *Trésor de la langue française* (1994) is of course heavily laid with assumptions about the human mind and action and concerns ethical issues as well. Thus it is no wonder that Diller can find collective words, "superordinate categories"<sup>93</sup> designating joy, fear, hope, sorrow, etc. in a collective sense such as *passioun* and *affection* but that, at the end of his paper, he is forced to conclude, in the form of another question, that there is no such collective word as 'emotion' in Middle English.

Finally, we may ask why there was so little need for a term covering pleasant as well as unpleasant, morally approved as well as disapproved, active as well as passive emotions. A medievalist attempting an answer should be aware that he is skating on very thin ice indeed, but the risk seems worth taking. [...] I would submit that when the human soul becomes a phenomenon to be studied and observed for its own sake (not only for the sake of its salvation), *a new metaphorical vehicle becomes necessary which assimilates it to the category of natural phenomena*. Perhaps the most telling contrast between the Middle Ages and the modern age is captured in the contrast between *stirring* and *emotion*: from movement caused by an external agent to movement coming 'out of' the moved object itself.<sup>94</sup>

This is perhaps another way of saying that 'passion' and 'affection' do not qualify for being 'emotion' because the perspective in which they function as hyperonyms is completely different from the modern sense of 'emotion': they bring with themselves the Classical heritage of *pathē* and *passiones* and the ethical connotations implicit in them and which is altogether different from those of the morally and ontologically more neutral 'emotion'. In my view, and I think Diller's conclusion points to this direction as well, a 'pre-history of emotion' can only reveal that there is *no* transhistorical continuity of 'emotion': neither of the word, nor of the concept implied in this metaphorical vehicle. Of course, people always had the kind of involuntary, evaluative reactions experienced simultaneously at the physical and the affective level and typically communicated by physical symptoms given in the definition cited by

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<sup>92</sup> "An involuntary, evaluative reaction which is experienced simultaneously at the physical and the affective level and which is typically communicated by physical symptoms." Diller, *Ibid.* p. 156.

<sup>93</sup> Diller, *Ibid.* p. 171.

<sup>94</sup> Diller, *Ibid.* p. 186-187. (my emphasis, G.S.)

Diller above.<sup>95</sup> But their designations and their metaphoric devices do have their history. And such a history is also decisive for the history of the *care for the self* partly because technologies of the self are mainly but not exclusively based on discursive acts and partly because the very words and names that are used to describe phenomena relating to the human soul or mind are also means of structuring and labelling them and they entail decisions about whether they require or not control, whether they should become material of analysis and fields of application of precepts and maxims.<sup>96</sup> In a way, the objective of the current study is to trace the emergence of the need for such new metaphorical vehicle or, rather, to look at it from the perspective of the semantic change of ‘passion’ proper, to detect when and why the former metaphorical vehicle of ‘passion’ ceases to function in the way it had done more or less coherently and continuously for two thousand or so years. But the exposition of this change requires the presentation of what is to change in more detail therefore I shall expose the major steps of the conceptual baggage of ‘passion’ in the chapter II.

A point that is of particular relevance for the present study is – and Diller rightly calls attention to this fact<sup>97</sup> – that Michel de Montaigne may have been the first European writer to use ‘emotion’ in the psychological sense rather than a socio-political one. I think that this fact cannot be overestimated since it is here that – as I hope I will be able to show it in a chapter on Montaigne – the distinctively *modern* sense of ‘emotion’ is taking shape in the context of a highly original and epoch-making philosophical-literary introspection that is tinted with scepticism concerning the power of reason to regulate human affairs, whose author is informed by but also looks critically at Renaissance humanism and who has a somewhat laid-back liberal Catholic and even fideist-conformist outlook at matters religious. I shall return to

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<sup>95</sup> There are of course nuances in this field as well as the growing body of literature on the history of emotions shows, cf. also *Reading the Early Modern Passions. Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion*, edited by Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, in particular its “Introduction”; as well as *The Social Construction of Emotions*, edited by Rom Harré, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986; and “History of Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact” in *Handbook of Emotions* edited by Michael Lewis, Jeanette M. Haviland-Jones, New York, London: The Guilford Press, second ed. 2000.

<sup>96</sup> I am adapting here the late Michel Foucault’s studies about the *souci de soi* as presented above in Chapter I.1.2.

<sup>97</sup> Diller, *Ibid.* p. 155.

this moment of semantic accommodation and its relationship to the sense of ‘passion’ in the chapter on Montaigne (III.3.). but here I would wish to pursue Diller’s tentative claim about the originality of Montaigne’s use of ‘emotion’. The word entered the English context through John Florio’s 1603 translation of the *Essais* of Montaigne and Florio himself feels obliged to apologise for what he considers as an “uncouth term”.<sup>98</sup> His apology can be understood considering the fact that the word in English was brand new. There had been two prior recorded uses attested by the *Oxford English Dictionary*: one from 1579 and one from the same year as the publication of Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s *Essays*.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, his diagnosis of ‘emotion’ as an “uncouth term” and his subsequent apology for it is all the more understandable since neither of these uses of ‘emotion’ have the psychological sense that Florio, importing it from the French *émotion*, *emotion* and *esmotion*<sup>100</sup> gives to it: the meaning of the 1579 use is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as “political, social agitation; a tumult, popular disobedience”, the 1603 as “a moving out, migration, transference from one place to another”.<sup>101</sup>

Diller’s claim that Montaigne may have been the first European writer to have used ‘esmotion’ in the psychological sense can also be indirectly supported by the fact that John Florio’s own Italian-English dictionary *A Worlde of Wordes*<sup>102</sup> published first in 1598 and republished augmented and dedicated to Queen Anna<sup>103</sup> in 1611 (both in London) does *not* have an

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<sup>98</sup> Michel Montaigne. *The Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne, 1580, 1597*. translated by John Florio, 1603. World’s Classics edition, 3 volumes, London: Frowde, 1904, “To the Curteous Reader”

<sup>99</sup> Of course, theoretically speaking, John Florio might have been familiar with the 1579 use of ‘emotion’ (Fenton Guicciard. ii.: “There were... great stirres and emociions in Lombardye.”) when preparing his translation. He is unlikely to have known the 1603 occurrence in Knolles *Hist. Turks* (1621) 3 “The divers emotions of that people [the Turks].”

<sup>100</sup> The spelling varies in the *Essais* as usual in Early Modern texts.

<sup>101</sup> Quoted also by Hans-Jürgen Diller, *Ibid.* p. 155. Cf. also the slightly archaic-sounding Hungarian word *felindulás* that captures precisely this double sense of social agitation as well as individual psychological state.

<sup>102</sup> *A Worlde of Wordes, Or Most copious, and exact Dictionarie in Italian and English*

<sup>103</sup> *Queen Anna’s New World of Words or Dictionarie of the Italian and English Tongues collected and newly much augmented by John Florio*

entry for *emozione* (Italian).<sup>104</sup> Had it existed in Italian at the time, and particularly in the new sense Montaigne was giving to it, Florio would probably have recorded it in his dictionary. The *Worlde of Wordes* does have an entry for (Italian) *commotione* that is defined by Florio as “commotion, an insurrection” which is the equivalent of the social-political sense of ‘emotion’. I assume that Florio, who had translated Montaigne’s *Essays* in between the two editions of his Italian-English dictionary and he himself indicated the new sense of ‘emotion’ in his preface to the *Essays* (“To the curteous Reader”) would have been sensitive enough to detect in Italian *emozione*. Also, Florio recapitulates the Classical idiom about the ‘passions’ when he defines ‘Passio’ (Italian) as used for Christ’s passion; ‘Passionato’ (It.) as “passionate, perturbed in minde. Also given to some passion”; and ‘Passione’ (It.) as “a passion or perturbation of minde, a passion, a sufferance, a feeling, an accident or symptome concurring with some disease to distemper the minde or bodie”. All these sense are perfectly in line with the Classical heritage of ‘passion’.

It does seem to be the case that Montaigne is indeed the first to use *émotion* in the psychological sense and it is then translated into English by John Florio in his 1603 publication of Montaigne’s *Essays*. However, one should not expect that such an innovation takes place very quickly, due to the publication of a single book. It is but one thing that certain ideas are gaining ground in the age and are expressed in certain books and – as we shall see in the subsequent chapters – in philosophical and theological debates of the period: they signal the emergence of “the need for such new metaphorical vehicle”<sup>105</sup> to describe mental-affective phenomena. But the taking root of such innovations, the translation of such a need into concrete words that imply semantic


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<sup>104</sup> Modern edition: John Florio, *A Worlde of Wordes* (1598). Anglistica & Americana 114. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1972. – I had access to the online version of the 1611 edition dedicated to Queen Anna: <http://www.pbm.com/~lindahl/florio/all.pdf>

<sup>105</sup> I am adapting the expression used by Diller (2005) cited above. I wish to add, however, that the metaphorical vehicle itself was not entirely new: it is true that *e-motion* referring to movements within the soul (as opposed to the perspective of *pathos* that put the soul and body in a passive, “suffering” position, (cf. the etymology of *pascho* discussed in the chapter “‘Passion’: the Story of the OED”) entails a new metaphorical vehicle. But this vehicle itself *was* used by Latin authors in referring to the passions: *animi motibus* (‘mental emotions’ or ‘motions of the mind’) in Augustine, *City of God*, IX. 4 and *motus* (‘motions’) *City of God*, XIV. 9. as well as *passim* cf. Chapter II.2.1. on St. Augustine. In my opinion, the real issue is why and when this metaphorical vehicle of ‘emotion’ did partly replace that other one implied in ‘passion’...



changes takes longer time. Add to this the fact that the Early Modern period accommodated semantic indeterminacy fairly easily allowing for different senses to live side by side and to occasionally coalesce into each other. A proof of this is that the old, Classical sense of passion dies hard and that the new sense of ‘emotion’ takes about a century to get widespread. The chart in *Figure 2* below indicates the occurrences of ‘emotion’ in lexicons of the period. The fact that an entry ‘emotion’ starts to figure *after* 1600 indicates the need to define the word as its new meaning is taking shape.



**Figure 2:** ‘emotion’ in English 1450 – 1750

Source: LEME (Lexicons of early Modern English) <http://leme.library.utoronto.ca/>

Thus French *esmotion* is defined in Randle Cotgrave, *A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (London, 1611) as “An emotion, commotion, sudden, or turbulent stirring; an agitation of the spirit, violent motion of the thoughts, vehement inclination of the mind.” In Thomas Blount, *Glossographia or a Dictionary*<sup>106</sup> (London, 1656) *emotion* (Lat. *emotio*) is defined as “a stiring or moving forth.” In Edward Phillips, *The New World of English*

<sup>106</sup> *Glossographia: Or A Dictionary, Interpreting all such Hard Words, whether Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, French, Teutonic, Belgick, British or Saxon; as are now used in our refined English Tongue. Also the Terms of Divinity, Law, Physick, Mathematicks, Heraldry, Anatomy, War, Musick, Architecture; and of several other Arts and Sciences Explicated. With Etymologies, Definitions, and Historical Observations on the same. Very useful for all such as desire to understand what they read*

*Words*<sup>107</sup> (London, 1658) it is “a moving out, a stirring up, also trouble of mind”; in Elisha Coles, *An English Dictionary*<sup>108</sup> (London, 1676) it is “a moving out, a stirring up, also trouble of mind”; and in John Kersey the younger, *English Dictionary*<sup>109</sup> (London, 1702) ‘emotion’ is a “trouble of mind”. This enumeration of 17<sup>th</sup> century definition of ‘emotion’ shows that the sense is gradually shifting from a physiological sense (moving, stirring) closer to the Latin origin (*movere*) to what will become the psychological sense as (trouble of mind). I would rather not discuss such nuances as whether trouble of mind is fully psychological indeed or not (perhaps not yet), my point being rather that “trouble of mind” is, in fact, a synonym of ‘passion’ as defined in dictionaries of the same period, for example the definition of Italian *passione* in *A Worlde of Wordes* (1598) of John Florio cited above. But cf. also John Baret, *An Alveary or Triple Dictionary, in English, Latin, and French*<sup>110</sup> (London, 1574) where rage is a ‘trouble of minde’, a ‘passion’; cf. also Thomas Cooper, *Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et*

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<sup>107</sup> *The New World of English Words: Or, a Generall Dictionary: Containing the Interpretations of such hard words as are derived from other Languages; whether Hebrew, Arabick, Syriack, Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, British, Dutch, Saxon, &c. their Etymologies and perfect Definitions ...*

<sup>108</sup> *An English Dictionary: Explaining The difficult Terms that are used in Divinity, Husbandry, Physick, Phylosophy, Law, Navigation, Mathematicks, and other Arts and Sciences. Containing Many Thousands of Hard Words (and proper names of Places) more than are in any other English Dictionary or Expositor. Together With The Etymological Derivation of them from their proper Fountains, whether Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, or any other Language. In a Method more comprehensive, than any that is extant*

<sup>109</sup> *English Dictionary: Or, a Complete Collection Of the Most Proper and Significant Words, Commonly used in the Language; With a Short and Clear Exposition of Difficult Words and Terms of Art. The whole digested into Alphabetical Order; and chiefly designed for the benefit of Young Scholars, Tradesmen, Artificers, and the Female Sex, who would learn to spell truely; being so fitted to every Capacity, that it may be a continual help to all that want an Instructor*

<sup>110</sup> *An Alvearie Or Triple Dictionarie, in Englishe, Latin, and French: Very profitable for all such as be desirous of any of those three Languages. Also by the two Tables in the ende of this booke, they may contrariwise, finde the most necessary Latin or French wordes, placed after the order of an Alphabet, whatsoeuer are to be founde in any other Dictionarie: and so to turne them backwardes againe into Englishe when they reade any Latin or French Authours, & doubt of any harde worde therein*

*Britannicae*<sup>111</sup> (London, 1584) where Lat. *perturbatio* is defined as “A troublous passion, affection, or motion of mind: perturbation, trouble, disturbance, disquieting, vexation.”; also in Randall Cotgrave, *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues*:


“**Passion:** f. Passion, perturbation, trouble, or affliction; also, a motion, disposition, inclination, or affection, of the mind; also, an accident, or syptome concurring with some disease to th’offence, or distemperature, of the bodie.”

In Edward Phillips, *The New World of English Words* (London, 1658), the sense of ‘passion’ is both the Classical “suffering, also an affection of the mind,” but he also adds: “also in Poems and Romances *it is more peculiarly taken for the passion of love*” (italics mine) this latter sense reflecting already the meaning after the “semantic shift” of ‘passion’ towards ‘amorous love’. As we shall see below and in Chapter III.3 (on Montaigne), such parallel meanings are not at all exceptional. The increasing dominance of “amorous love” as the meaning of “passion” by the early 17<sup>th</sup> century (which is, of course, not to say, that “love” was not *part* of the meaning of “passion”, as a hyperonym, before) builds on the “lineage of love” as it evolved from the Platonic tradition of the love of the beautiful and the “ladder of love” (toward intellectual love), and Petrarchan patterns of yearning modulated by the English sonnet tradition.

The broad structure of my argument is the following: the meaning of the word ‘passion’ undergoes a significant change between the late 16<sup>th</sup> and the early 17<sup>th</sup> century (roughly from 1570s to 1610s). This is also a period that produces the highest density in the turnout of the word in Early Modern lexicons with the most sustained peak around 1590s-1610s. See the chart in *Figure 3* below.

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<sup>111</sup> *Thesaurus linguae Romanae & Britannicae tam accurate congestus, vt nihil penè in eo desyderari possit, quod vel Latinè complectatur amplissimus Stephani Thesaurus, vel Anglicè, toties aucta Eliotae Bibliotheca: opera & industria Thomae Cooperi Magdalenensis. ... Accessit dictionarium historicum & poëticum propria vocabula virorum, mulierum, sectarum, populorum, vrbium, montium, & caeterorum locorum complectens, & in his iucundissimas & omnium cognitione dignissimas historias.*



**Figure 3:** ‘passion’ in English 1450 – 1750

Source: LEME (Lexicons of Early Modern English) <http://leme.library.utoronto.ca/><sup>112</sup>

The definitions in these dictionaries still reflect the Classical sense of passion and the high number of occurrences in dictionaries of the period may be indicative of the general necessity to engage with such ‘passions’, to control them in a perspective of governance. This broad, technical sense of ‘passion’ denotes its rich Classical heritage both as

<sup>112</sup> I am aware that LEME by its focus on *lexicons* of Early Modern English does not give a full picture of the use of ‘passion’ in the period. I hope to compensate this partiality by complementing it with the findings of Tissari (2003) and by cross-checking it with the data given in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. However, the *advantage* of LEME is that Early Modern lexicons *characteristically* do not feel the need to define the Biblical sense of ‘passion’ as in ‘Passion of Christ’, although there are some exceptions. Thus the turnout of ‘Passion of Christ’, that is likely to be the most frequent and semantically unchanged usage of ‘passion’ in the period, does not, in a way, distort the picture. (The expression ‘distort’ in this sentence is meant in the sense that it does not detract attention from the *other* senses of ‘passion’ where semantic change *is* taking place.) Thus the biased statistics finds its merit and legitimacy. Another advantage of using lexicons for tracking changes in meaning that one is not reliant on interpreting the context (as in narrative or poetic texts) for determining the meaning of a given word. Such interpretations can be difficult and even unsure and have to cope with some vagueness in the meaning. (Cf. Diller’s remarks in this sense, *Ibid.* p. 160-161.)

- i. a *collective term* referring to the Aristotelian-Thomist eleven passions and/or the Ciceronian-Augustinian tetrachord of passions (where ‘passion’ is mostly meant as a condition of being acted upon or affected by external agency); and
- ii. involving – due especially to the Stoic and neo-Stoic influence – negative theologico-moral associations such as *perturbatio animi* (trouble/ vexation/ perturbation/ disturbance of the mind), *vitium*, (fault, defect, vice) and *morbi* (relating to disease).

This broad, technical sense started to gradually gave way from 1600 to a different sense of ‘passion’. This new sense did not exclude the broader, technical sense until the 19<sup>th</sup> century but the latter became increasingly confined to scholarly discourse<sup>113</sup> and rearrangements began to take place even there in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century. The new sense of ‘passion’ was partly more limited in the sense that it did not function any more as a collective term referring to the four or the eleven passions. It retained its characteristic reference to anger/choler with some changes in its moral evaluations<sup>114</sup> but, even more importantly, it came to refer to ‘amorous feeling’, ‘passionate love’, even ‘mutuall affection’ understood as sympathy, fellow-feeling<sup>115</sup>. But there is also another shift at work that could be described as a move away from a *substantive* (and collective) noun (a hyperonym) that refers to certain states of the mind or soul to an *adverbial* sense signifying a certain (excessive) level of any mental state. To put it briefly: from *what* to *very*. For example, this sense can be detected in Randall Cotgrave, *A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611) in the entry, ‘*Ardamment*’ (“Ardently, hotly, feruently; earnestly, eagearly, vehemently; with great heat; passion, or desire.”) where

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<sup>113</sup> Thus, for example, Thomas Wright, *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1601, 1604, 1620); Nicolas Coffeteau, *A table of humane passions* (1621) translated into English by Edmund Grimeston; Edward Reynold, *A Treaties of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man* (London, 1640)

<sup>114</sup> For a thorough consideration of this issue and its relationship to Renaissance drama cf. Gordon Braden, *Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition. Anger's Privilege*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985. The subtitle of the book refers to *King Lear* 2.2.69-70.: “CORNWALL: You beastly knave, know you no reverence? / KENT: Yes, Sir, but anger hath a priviledge.”

<sup>115</sup> Randle Cotgrave, *A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611) “*Sympathie*: f. Sympathie; a symbolizing; naturall consent, or combination; mutuall passion, affection, disposition; a fellow-feeling.”

‘passion’ is a quasi-synonym of ‘great heat’.<sup>116</sup> In his *Defence of Poesie* (1595), Sir Philip Sidney writes of “*passionat* Sonets”: “They say the Lirick is larded with passionat Sonets, the Elegiack weeps the want of his mistresse, and that even to the Heroical, Cupid hath ambitiously climed.” Similarly, the adverb ‘passionately’ is given in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as:

In a passionate manner. 1. With passion or intensity of feeling; enthusiastically, ardently; †zealously, with zealous attachment (obs.). [Earliest record in 1590] † 2. With sorrowful emotion, sadly. *Obs.* [Earliest record in 1599.] 3. With angry feeling, wrathfully; with heat. [Earliest record in 1665].

While the shift to ‘amorous love’ is a narrowing of the word, this “adverbial shift” could be characterized more as a loosening from the substantive meaning. The adverbial shift could be described as a *synecdoche-like change* where a part of the original substantive sense (and one that was marginal in the tradition), namely the *excessive character* of the mental states referred to came to predominate. The rhetoric figure best describing this change is a synecdoche (*pars pro toto*) whereas, the other change, of narrowing of the word could be seen as a *totum pro parte* synecdoche: one of the passions, namely ‘amorous love’, replacing the collective sense.

But of course this semantic shift did not mean that the Classical collective concept of the passion ceases to exist from the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In fact, there are numerous treatises on the passions in English as well as in French that continue in the same tradition concerning their taxonomy. As late as 1841, Frederick A. Rauch in his *Psychology* still uses the Stoic tetrachord of passions as pleasure, pain, hope and fear as the foundational emotions from which compound ones arise. The end of the traditional catalogues of the passions was signalled by William James in his *Principles of Psychology* (1890) when he argued that

...the merely descriptive literature of emotions is one of the most tedious parts of psychology. And not only is it tedious, but you feel that its subdivisions are to a

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<sup>116</sup> Similarly, in ‘*fouge*’, RANDALL, *Ibid.*

great extent either fictitious or unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are a sham.<sup>117</sup>

Parallel to this process, the new meaning of ‘emotion’ is emerging that will ultimately replace the substantive, collective sense of ‘passions’ as a hyperonym for the set of ‘troubles of the mind’ ‘passions’ referred to. The emergence of the need for the new metaphorical vehicle and its semantic realisation in ‘emotion’ was a relatively slow process taking about two hundred years from 1600 to the 19<sup>th</sup> century that allowed for different senses of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ to coexist side by side as the 17<sup>th</sup> century examples for ‘emotion’ given above demonstrate. I believe that this fact does not put in doubt the existence and the scope of the semantic shift (both of ‘passion’ and of ‘emotion’ since these are concomitant phenomena) but rather, it signals the importance of the change and its truly watershed character. In chapter III.3, on Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s *Essais*, I shall address the issue of this difficult transition by way of tracking part of its textual history and by evoking certain theoretical and methodological problems it raises such as the polysemy of words, the slightly anachronistic nature of fixed-sense word definitions, early modern lexicographers practice, etc.

This study is based on the premise that the semantic changes described above are *symptomatic* of underlying changes in ethical-moral as well as theological and mental attitudes that crystallise in the Early Modern context of late-Renaissance humanism as well as Protestantism with its Augustinian bent. In mapping this systematic pattern of beliefs and attitudes that determine and are intersected with changes in the ‘care for the self’ and semantic change, the intercultural context of Classical – Christian encounter has to be taken into account, with the Neo-Stoicism of the late 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> century being a particular case in point. Inevitably, my study will not be able to give a full account of the elements that contributed to and underpinned the semantic change in this sense. The reason for this is that practically everything in the period can be seen as a cause of or contributing to this change. There are, however, certain configurations, so to say, where elements of the very change can be traced (Montaigne and Montaigne/Florio) or the import of the ongoing debates hinges precisely on those issues that may determine the sense of the semantic change. Therefore, I shall seek to expose the possible motivations of these changes by referring it to theological-

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<sup>117</sup> William James, *Principles of Psychology*, XXV. “The Emotions” Cf. also his classic essay, “What is an Emotion?” (1884) various reprints, for e.g. *The Nature of Emotion* edited by Magda Arnold, London: Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968.

moral debates of the period (in particular the controversy among neo-Stoics and Christian-Humanists about the role of the passions) I shall try to detect the changes on the move in the 1603 Florio translation of Montaigne's *Essays* into English. Besides the evident originality of Montaigne, the polyglot background and acute sensibility of John Florio to semantic problems invites special attention to his English Montaigne and to the linguistic accommodations he offers as eminent markers of the period. As an English translation of a French author (by someone of Italian origins) the case of *The Essayes* is also another illustration to how *intercultural* contexts and transfers can trigger off and contribute to new developments. Rather than an ingredient of the semantic change proper, the Bacon's adaptation of the Ciceronian *cultura animi*, with some Aristotelian adjustments, shows how *care for the self* can receive its humanist adaptation.

I would like to emphasize however, that these explorations of the theme in different contexts and with different authors do not, either taken individually, or considered collectively, wish to give a full explanation to the phenomenon under consideration (namely the change of the meaning of 'passion') in terms of a strict cause-and-effect relationship. While my working assumption is that this semantic change is motivated by changes in moral, psychological, and theological assumptions and outlook in the period – and particularly around 1600 as the dates of first appearances of the word used in this sense as well as of first publications of the works under consideration indicate – these do not fully determine such change. Individual human inventions – for example that of Montaigne – that may not be fully reducible to historical cause-and-effect relationship add to this picture. For these reasons, I prefer to talk about Early Modern *configurations* in approaching the topic of the semantic change where configuration would suggest that the elements under consideration are the necessary conditions for the change but they do not fully explain it.

There is also another aspect of my study relevant to this point that has been mentioned before but it should be emphasized in this context as well. Since the direction of the change in the meaning of 'passion' is a move away from its technical, Classical sense (be it a narrowing of its semantic, a shift of focus or an accentuation of certain aspects), it is necessary to assess the elements and composition of this Classical sense and to look at major steps of its development. This will set the scene for the Early Modern debate on the 'passions'. Therefore I shall endeavour, in the next part of this study to present the major steps of the heritage of 'passion', starting with the initial thematisation of *pathē* in Ancient Greece (Plato and Aristotle), continuing with the radicalisation of the position in the Stoic teaching of the *apatheia* of the sage, (Chrysippus in particular), and Christian accommodations of the Stoic



ideal of *apatheia* (Augustine) in order to arrive, finally to the re-negotiation of these trends prompted by the neo-Stoic movement in the Early Modern context of Christian Humanism.

## **II. THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE OF ‘PASSION’**

‘Passion’ is not an innocent word but a term charged with a long and rich history already prior to the 16<sup>th</sup> century accumulating and connoting several layers of invested meaning of which the Early Modern authors were keenly aware. As the word could never become a purely descriptive concept, it carried a specific weight posing an anthropological and moral issue and calling for resolutions. The weight of authority and influence of the various Classical and Christian authors varied but familiarity with their teachings was widespread among the cultural elite and, to a lesser degree, among the less scholarly-minded readership with at least a grammar-school education. Therefore it is necessary to examine, even if in a rather summary fashion, the conceptual baggage ‘passion’ brings with it into Early Modern discourses. Of course, it is impossible to represent and assess within the confines of this study the full baggage involving the entire history of the concept. But the traditions that had the most weight and influence in the Early Modern period need to be presented briefly. This shall entail the exposition of the main tenets of Plato, of Aristotle, of the Stoics, and, from among Christian authors, Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas concerning the passions. As all these traditions are present, in some form or another, in the Early Modern context, this chapter proposes a panorama of the Early Modern intellectual landscape with regard to the passions. From the perspective of the intercultural approach, the Early Modern articulation of the passions emerges as the result of the ongoing interactions between different cultural and philosophical traditions both entailing and proposing to the individual different practices and forms of care for the self. The coexistence and integration of Classical and Christian traditions in the Early Modern period is a millennial process by then that had started in the Greek-Hellenistic and Roman context in which the New Testament had been produced. In their commentaries on the Bible and other doctrinal works, the Church Fathers also relied on elements of Stoic philosophy as they built on the authority of Virgil and Seneca. For a person who completed at least grammar-school education in the late 16th century the problems and vocabulary of both of these traditions made sense and contained relevant meaning for his or her moral action and spiritual life. Indeed, the interaction between these traditions in the moral reflection of the period is a key component in understanding the Early Modern senses of ‘passion’. The diversity of origins, as well as the need for integration, became more evident in the European Renaissance as the return to the works of the Greco-Latin Classical authors was confronting European culture with what was, in a way, outside it. This confrontation and self-interrogation lead to the formulation of new cultural codes and practices whose effects reach even to our own times. Therefore an assessment of the

developments taking place within the Early Modern context requires an overview of the period's *doxa* about the passions.

One of the most well-known cases of a literary character feeling passion in Classical literature is probably Achilles' wrath in the opening pages of the *Iliad*. As an epilogue to centuries of meditations and exercises on and against anger, this *début* of Greek epical literature announces a theme of millennial importance to the culture of antiquity, to Christianity and to the English Renaissance as well. George Chapman (1559?-1634), in his Dedicatory Epistle to his translation of *Homer's Odysseys* (1611) pairs the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in the following way:

And that your Lordship may in his face take view of his mind, the first words of his Iliads is [...] wrath; the first word of his Odysseys [...] man: contracting in either word his each work's proposition. In one predominant perturbation; in the other overruling wisdom. In one the body's fervour and fashion of outward fortitude to all possible height of heroical action; in the other the mind's inward, constant, and unconquered empire, unbroken, unaltered, with any most insolent and tyrannous infliction.<sup>118</sup>

The dying Achilles acknowledges that gall or anger is a source of strife among gods and mortals. Although it rises up in the soul of man as smoke, the taste of it is sweeter than honey:

I wish that strife would vanish away from among the gods and mortals,  
and gall, which makes a man grow angry for all his great mind,  
that gall of anger swarms like smoke inside of a man's heart  
and becomes a thing sweeter to him by far than the dripping of honey.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> From "The Epistle Dedicatory" to the Earl of Somerset in: *The Odysseys of Homer*, translated according to the Greek by George Chapman; with introduction and notes by Richard Hooper, London: J.R. Smith, (1857). Chapman's description of *predominant perturbation* is already tainted with the Platonic sense of the irascible (*thumos*) part of the soul, of which more below. Although the "Epistle Dedicatory" goes on to explain why Homer's *Odyssey* is "preferred to his *Iliads*", the heroic values of Achilles – his wrath notwithstanding or even included – are seen in positive terms by Chapman. The obvious proof of this is that his 1598 Preface to the "*Seaven Bookes of the Iliades of Homere, Prince of Poets, &c.*" both small 4tos. "*printed by John Windet, and are to be sold at the signe of the Crosse-eyes neare Paules Wharffe.*" dedicated to Lord Essex, addresses his patron as "the most honored now living instance of the Achilleian virtues."

<sup>119</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, XVIII. 107-110. translated by Richmond Lattimore in *The Iliad of Homer* translated with an Introduction by Richmond Lattimore, Chicago & London, 1951. Referred to also in Tad

For the development of anger already within the Homeric oeuvre it is interesting to see Ulysses as the symbol of a civilisation aspiring to self-mastery, returning to his own palace and feeling anger but imposing a self-discipline on himself: “Patience, my soul” only to carry out his vengeance, calculated and cold, with all the more efficiency. As the rather undifferentiated Homeric and pre-Classical senses of the word unfold, the pre-Socratic philosophers form a negative judgement on *pathos*/πάθος:

It is hard to contend against passion, for whatever it craves it buys with its life.  
(Heraclitus<sup>120</sup>)

Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from the passions.  
(Democritus<sup>121</sup>)

The concern about the passions or emotions (*pathē*) and on whether they should be moderated (*metropatheia*) or actually eradicated (*apatheia*) is already present with the Presocratics and the philosophy of both Plato and Aristotle have to come to terms with this issue. From Plato to Aristotle, from Theophrastus to Menander, but even more in Stoicism, the presence of reflections on self-mastery in face of anger becomes symptomatic. It has to be stated at the outset of the subsequent presentation of the theme of the passions in Plato, Aristotle and Stoicism, that, in the perspective of a history of ‘passion’, there is a marked contrast between Plato’s and Aristotle’s positions on the one hand and the Stoic position.

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Brennan, “Stoic Moral Psychology” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, edited by Brad Inwood, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 276.

<sup>120</sup> <http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/heraclitus02.htm>

<sup>121</sup> *The Presocratic Philosophers: a Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, by G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

## II. 1. 1. Platonic Containments: Alliances and Canalisations

Plato is often credited for a strict dualism of soul and body where soul is the thinking, rational self in direct opposition to the passions, pleasures and sensations associated with the body. But this extreme dualism, present in the *Phaedo*, is not his final word on the issue. In *The Republic* (Book IV)<sup>122</sup> Plato proceeds from the assumption that whenever there is a conflict of intentions arising in the subject, these differences are the result of different forces within the soul. Upon close examination, and as a response to the logical problem caused by the existence of the conflicts within the soul, Socrates and his interlocutor establish that there are three different forces each having its own object: the appetitive or concupiscible part (*epithumia*), the irascible part (*thumos*) and the rational part (*nous*). To its appetitive part are ascribed the bodily desires; the irascible part is the passionate element in virtue of which we feel anger, fear, etc. What distinguishes the irascible (*thumos*) part from the appetitive part (*epithumia*) is that it can be an ally of the rational, controlling part (*nous*) in subjugating the appetites, however, its impetuosity can also be a danger to the rule of reason. For Plato, passionate impulses are an occasion of conflict within the individual between different parts of the soul. The differentiation between the irrational part of the soul into *thumos* and *epithumia* opens the possibility of a positive affective force that can be the ally of reason. The problem of anger receives a theoretical disposition in Plato's philosophy: as anger belongs to the irascible part of the soul (*thumos*), it can be an ally of the higher, rational part when a conflict emerges with the lower, appetitive part. The tripartite division of the soul comes in to explain the existence of conflict between passion and appetite, for example, when a man is angry with that in himself which prompts him to do something shameful. This *thumos* is an inner force that rouses Homeric warriors to action and is synonymous with being ambitious, competitive<sup>123</sup>, living for victory and honour. It is distinguished from the merely physical,

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<sup>122</sup> For the following discussion cf. Plato, *The Republic*, Book IV. 436-444. Also *Republic*, 580d – 581b and *Timaios*, 69c-71e in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, with an English translation by R. G. Bury, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts; William Heinemann: London, 1984. Quotations from Plato are from this edition unless indicated otherwise.

<sup>123</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 9.7. 581a-b5. Cf. also Gordon Braden, *Ibid*, pp. 11ff

bodily appetites by its indifference to pain and death but it is in itself non-rational<sup>124</sup> and is concerned with being better rather than with being good. The combative instinct of the *thumos* can be an ally of reason in the party politics of the soul.<sup>125</sup> The radical dualism of the *Phaedo* gives way to a strategy of canalisations of psychic powers through alliances among the different parts of the soul and *within* the soul. Instead of a strict dualism between soul and body (where passions would be directly opposed to reason), there is the possibility of containment of passions. But since passions are not rational, the task of virtue is to lead passions towards the rational part. Also, by reinforcing the rationally-motivated desires, it is possible to consolidate the domination of the rational part of the soul by making the different forces coincide. This is why beauty can be a means to refine and purify the *thumos* of the guardians whose reason is capable of dominating their lower desires but whose reason is yet enmeshed in agonistic conflicts of honour and glory.<sup>126</sup>

This dichotomy and tension within the irrational part of the soul is also represented in the Platonic myth of the winged chariot where the two horses of the harness may evoke the irascible and the appetitive parts, while the coachman may represent reason. If the two horses are oriented towards the same goal, the coachman will certainly be taken away in the wrong direction. The passionate horse is a clean, upstanding creature which follows the guide of reason, whereas its fellow horse is a shaggy, recalcitrant beast which tries to drag the chariot down from its heavenly course.

Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him --these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.

True, he said.

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more. [...] *You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a*

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<sup>124</sup> *Republic*, 3.18. 411d. Cf. G. Braden, *ibidem*.

<sup>125</sup> *Republic*, 4.15. 440 b,e; 5.13, 465d. Cf. G. Braden, *ibidem*

<sup>126</sup> Cf. *Republic*, 3. 400e, 402a.

*kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.*<sup>127</sup>

Virtue is thus both a question of knowledge and a result of the balancing of the respective energies of the soul in order to orient them, under the supremacy of reason, towards the right action.

The tripartite structure as solution to these conflicts within the soul also indicates that there is a natural hierarchical relationship among the parts because what is at stake in this conflict is the mastery of the self and the recognition that the rational part is more worthy to command than any other. Thus the soul is divided into two main parts, one superior (*logisticon*), the other inferior (*alogisticon*). In the *Timaeus* a new aspect is given to this division within the perspective of the origin of the world and of human beings. Here too, *epithumia* and *thumos* form the lower parts of the soul and are qualified as mortal in strong opposition to the rational, eternal part that is located in the head. The inferior part is located in the chest (passion) and in the belly (appetite) and it has its own principle of movement with its own dynamic.<sup>128</sup> This gives a psychic visibility to passionate phenomena: they are not excluded from the *psyche* (as they will be in the case of the Stoics). Thus the assignment of

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<sup>127</sup> *Republic*, 440c-d (italics mine) Cf. also Plato, *Republic*, 439e – 440a (italics mine): “Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding? Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another; the one with which man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions? Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding? I should be inclined to say -- akin to desire. Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.

I have heard the story myself, he said. *The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.*”

<sup>128</sup> Cf. *Timaetus*, 70a-71b.



different parts of the soul to different parts of the body has more of a metaphorical function because the body is not the origin of any kind of soul. These correspondences between bodily parts and parts of the soul inaugurate a certain physiology of passions that will have a long career passing through Galen to Descartes and including also the theory of the humours so important in the Renaissance. The soul is defined in *Phaedrus* as a principle of movement<sup>129</sup> and it has the source of its own movement within it. The determination of an element of the soul as the principle of passions also implies that passions are not of bodily origin even if they arise on the occasion of the body. If they are left without the surveillance of the rational part they can cause disturbances both in the individual and in the *polis*. This double perspective or analogy between the individual psychic level and the public-political sphere inaugurates<sup>130</sup> and runs through Plato's discussion of the passions and their containment in *The Republic*. The respective parts of the soul correspond to respective layers of society with differing ways of life making up the *polis*. Just as harmony in the state is the result of a balance and hierarchy among the three classes (artisans, soldiers, and guardians), so it is with the categories of the psychology of the individual. Harmony and justice of both the soul and of the society are thus closely related:

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance

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<sup>129</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus*, 245c – 249b.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. *Republic*, 429b – 435d in particular 434d – 435a: “First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual – if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.”

to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in states and individuals.<sup>131</sup>

When such harmony is broken and there is disorder in the soul it leads to vices. A link is thereby established in the Platonic heritage between passions and vices on the one hand and health and disease on the other hand.

And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.

Clearly.

Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles --a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal, -- what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?

Exactly so.

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?

What do you mean? he said.

Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

How so? he said.

Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Yes.

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

True.

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?

True.

And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Assuredly.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> *Republic*, 432a

<sup>132</sup> *Republic*, 444b – 444e

The links between health and disease on the one hand and vices and virtues on the other hand, as well as the idea of governance within the soul in analogy with that of society will become key-words of both Stoic and Christian doctrines. As we shall see, these elements will have important developments and repercussions in both Stoicism and Christianity with differing ramifications. Plato's analogy between the psychic and the political make-up implies, however, that just as in society there can be different forms of life with differing objectives, in a similar fashion, the soul too can be home to contesting forces that may be at war but have, nevertheless, rights of citizenship – to stretch the political analogy a step further. There are two adjectives in particular that Plato uses in the *Timaeus* to characterise the passions: the *pathe* are δεινά / *deina* and ἀναγκαία / *anagkaia*: dreadful (or formidable) and inevitable. In the overall structure of the soul they can be canalised towards the higher, rational parts, their energy can be used as power, in particular that of the irascible part (*thumos*).

Plato gives a rather graphic account of such a situation in *Laws*, Book VI. The Athenian stranger describes how “with men [rather all humans] all things depend on a threefold need and desire”<sup>133</sup>. These are enumerated as food, drink and lust, the most vehement among them, and Plato characterizes the state in which one is when overcome by these needs as “three morbid states” (τρία νοσήματα). The word νόσημα / *noséma* and its derivative used by Plato here and also in the *Symposium*<sup>134</sup> means ‘disease’ on the first place and has the metaphoric sense of ‘passion, vice’ as well as of ‘any grievous affliction’<sup>135</sup> The

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<sup>133</sup> Plato, *Laws* 782E – 783A in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. X. with an English translation by R. G. Bury, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts; William Heinemann: London, 1984, p. 492-495.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Plato, *Symposium*, 207A, where the context is specifically the “disease of Love”, that “awful state” (δεινός διατίθεται) into which all animals fall. Being in the grip of this sexual desire is qualified as νοσούντρά. Here, I follow the translation of Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in Plato, *Complete Works*, edited, with Introduction and Notes by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1997, p. 490. “What do you think causes love and desire, Socrates? Don’t you see what an awful state a wild animal is in when it wants to reproduce? Footed and winged animals alike are plagued by the disease of Love.”

<sup>135</sup> Cf. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Clarendon Press: Oxford, New York, 1996 (1843<sup>1</sup>), entry “νόσημα” p. 1181.

Athenian stranger suggests how to check and canalise<sup>136</sup> these three desires, “morbid states” towards the supreme good: by “means of the three greatest forces - *fear, law and true reasoning* - reinforced by the *Muses* and the *Gods* of Games, so as to quench thereby their increase and inflow.”<sup>137</sup> Basically all the elements of a long tradition of Classical, Christian as well as Christian-Humanist tradition of checking and canalising of the passions are there: fear (of punishment), Law, and *logos* understood both as truth and as right reasoning, the role of the Arts and Humanities, and even of a divine help and possible intervention.

The hallmark of the Platonic conception of the passions is the idea that the soul is not a monolithic entity where the rule of only one force is possible or even desirable. There is an interior conflict within the soul that has to be handled by the higher faculties and according to a hierarchy. For Plato, the hierarchy of the three parts of the soul is also open to transversal forces such as love (*eros*) that can be canalised towards the higher rational part (*logisticon*). In the true philosopher, who is a *lover* of wisdom, all parts of the soul conspire together for a united good. Thus *eros*, inasmuch as it can link and bridge the rational and irrational parts, can become a unifying force.<sup>138</sup> Although love (*eros*) is closely connected with the body, this passion, because of its moving force, becomes an invaluable means for grasping the truth. Following the ascending path of *eros* one can reach the Ideas: from the love of physical beauty to the charm of more noble objects and then to the love of Beauty and the idea of Beauty itself. *Eros* can bridge the gap between mortality and immortality, between the sensible and the intelligible and it is retained and valorised as a psychic force that can have its place even in the rational part. This approval of passion inasmuch as it is oriented towards the desire of the absolute, intelligible good is one of the hallmarks of Platonic philosophy and has a great impact in the Augustinian understanding of Christian doctrine (see below in chapter II.2.1.) as well as in Neo-Platonic thought in the Renaissance.

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<sup>136</sup> Cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1951. Dodds claims that in the context of the *Republic*, “the passions are no longer seen [unlike in the *Phaedo*] as an infection of extraneous origin, but as a necessary part of the life of the mind as we know it, and even a source of energy, like Freud’s *libido*, which can be ‘canalised’ either towards sensuous or towards intellectual activity.” p. 213.

<sup>137</sup> *Laws*, 783A, p. 495. in R. G. Bury’s translation. Italics mine, G.S.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. *Banquet*, 191d where love (*eros*) is presented as a restoring, remedying power that heals human nature and as the desire for the original fullness.

In case of an open conflict between irrational and rational forces, Plato recommends temperance and a form of self-mastery to control the irrational parts.<sup>139</sup> This latter aspect will receive particular emphasis (even to the point of excluding the other, canalising model of treating the passions) in the Stoic approach to the passions.

## II. 1. 2. Aristotelian Adjustments

Aristotle discusses the passions in many different contexts. In the *Metaphysics*, *pathos* is defined

(1) as a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered [...] (2) The already actualized alterations. (3) Especially, injurious alterations and movements, and

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<sup>139</sup> “Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of ‘a man being his own master’ and other traces of the same notion may be found in language. No doubt, he said. There is something ridiculous in the expression ‘master of himself’; for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

Certainly. The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse -- in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

Yes, there is reason in that.

And now, I said, look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realised; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words ‘temperance’ and ‘self-mastery’ truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.”  
*Republic*, IV, 430e – 431b

above all, painful injuries. (4) Experiences on a large scale are called affections.<sup>140</sup>

In *On the Soul* and in biological works, he takes a scientist's interest in the emotions. In the *Rhetoric* and in the *Poetics* he is concerned with orators and poets who want to achieve an effect by capitalizing on the emotions of their audience. Rhetoric discourse addresses the judging capacity of the human being but, in order to be effective, the orator must know the passions (*pathos*) and morals (*ethos*) of the audience. Thus Book 2 of his *Rhetoric* gives an empirical description and analysis of fourteen passions the purpose of which is to provide a valuable tool in the tactics for persuasion. The study of the passions in this context is required because "[they] are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain and pleasure"<sup>141</sup> The good orator composes with the listeners' passions that he must be able to kindle or to appease in order to sway his audience. Also one has to know how to deal with an audience that feels hatred or anger: the arguments to be employed must take into account their psychic states. Aristotle's discussion relies on the prevailing *doxa* about the passions and thus the context of the *Rhetoric* does not require a theoretical treatment of the passions but are discussed rather as something well-known and only as an aspect of practical, applied anthropology and social psychology. Passions arise within the social and political framework of the *polis* as citizens are the subjects and objects of these feelings. For the ethical consideration of the passions and their respective place with regard to virtue one has to turn to the *Nichomachean Ethics*. While the *Rhetoric* concerns the arousal and management of *pathe* for efficient persuasion, the *Nichomachean Ethics* deals

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<sup>140</sup> *Metaphysics*, Δ, 1022 b 15-21 in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2. "Bollingen Series" LXXI, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, Chichester, West Sussex, <sup>6</sup>1995, p. 1615. (W. D. Ross translation) Prior to the Barnes edition cited here, the Ross-translation was as follows: "'Affection' means (1) a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the kind. -(2) The actualisation of these - the already accomplished alterations. - (3) Especially, injurious alterations and movements, and, above all painful injuries. -(4) Misfortunes and painful experiences when on a large scale are called affections." <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html>. The Internet Classics Archive by Daniel C. Stevenson, Web Atomics.

<sup>141</sup> *Rhetoric*, 1378 b 21-22. Barnes, vol. 1, p. 2195. (R. Kassel translation)

with the role of *pathe* within the economy of acting according to our habits and desires as moderated by reason. In both cases *pathe* are treated as susceptible to rational influence and voluntary action, although not directly subject to choice. Even in the context of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, however, the passions are not studied for themselves but in relationship to a definition of virtue. The perspective of the study of virtue and happiness is put in the context of politics understood both as political theory and as its application by the statesman who “wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws”. Therefore “[T]he true student of politics, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things”<sup>142</sup>. Furthermore, since virtue and happiness are an *activity of the soul*<sup>143</sup>, “the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body.”<sup>144</sup> The discussion of the passions enters the ethical domain proper inasmuch as passions are one of three kinds of things that are found in the soul.

As there are two parts of the soul (rational and irrational), there are two kinds of excellences or virtues such as intellectual or *dianoetical* virtues and moral virtues. Aristotle gives the following definition of excellence (virtue):

Excellence, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.<sup>145</sup>

Aristotle arrives at this conclusion by way of excluding two other options. As there are three kinds of things in the soul: passions (πάθος / *pathos*), faculties (δυνάμεις / *dunameis*) and dispositions (or “states of character” in W. D. Ross’s translation, ἐξεις), virtue must be one of these. If neither passions, nor faculties can be called virtues then what remains is the “dispositions”. A list of eleven passions<sup>146</sup> is given such as “appetite, anger, fear, confidence,

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<sup>142</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, I. 13. 1102a 5.

<sup>143</sup> “By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness also we call *an activity of soul*.” I. 13. 1102a 15 (my emphasis, G.S.)

<sup>144</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, I. 13. 1102a 15f

<sup>145</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, II. 6. 1106 b 36

<sup>146</sup> Whereas in the *Rhetoric* the list contained fourteen passions: love, hatred, fear, confidence, calm, anger, shame, impudence, compassion, emulation, envy, friendly feeling, indignation, and contempt.

envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain.” The faculties are “the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity”. Whereas “states of character [are] the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions.” It is important to have in mind this context for the definition of virtue because the definition has far-reaching implications for the ethical consideration of the passions. Aristotle himself makes it explicit when he claims that

*neither the virtues nor the vices are passions*, because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed. Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way. For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character.<sup>147</sup>

Aristotle’s ultimate claim for not considering the passions as object of praise or blame is that the soul is passive with regard to them as they affect the soul from outside.<sup>148</sup> “Since happiness is an *activity* of soul in accordance with perfect virtue”<sup>149</sup>, virtue cannot depend on a passive state. Instead, it is an “activity of the soul”, a certain way of being (state of character or disposition) reflected and realised in concrete situations and in concrete actions.

Aristotle’s definition of virtue also states that it is “a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean,” or in other words, it is also a matter of custom and habit. It is not sufficient than to know the good in order to do it because passions may interfere with this knowledge and hinder its realisation. Socratic intellectualism is thus ruled out since virtue is

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<sup>147</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, II. 5. 3-5. 1105b 29 – 1106a 12

<sup>148</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics*, Δ, 1022 b 15-21 cited above.

<sup>149</sup> *Eth. Nic.* I. 13. 1102a 5 (my emphasis, G.S.). Cf. also I. 13. 1102a 15f quoted above.



not only a matter of *logos* but of *pathos* and *ethos* as well implying the making of right choices. In a more modern idiom, we could say that moral education must introduce reason even in the affective domain by forming the right habits.

Another important element of the definition is the reference to the “rational principle” (*orthos logos*) that implies that virtue is rational. But there is also a contextual reference to “the man of practical wisdom” (*phronimos*) that indicates that a general definition of ethical conduct is not possible given the diversity and unpredictability of concrete situations in human life. In order to judge what is virtuous in each case, one needs prudence and discernment that can only be obtained by experience or based on counsel from a person with authority on this matter.<sup>150</sup>

Even more important from the point of view of the passions is Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean as a norm of ethical behaviour: virtue lies in the avoidance of two vices, of which one is excess, the other a defect or lack. Thus there is a moderate use of passions, for e.g. in the case of anger, it is virtuous to feel irritated when and how it is appropriate. Thus it is possible to feel passions *according to* reason, and prudence consists in feeling them “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, and the right way”. “[It] is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue.”<sup>151</sup> Aristotle also points out that not all passions admit such a mean

for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them.<sup>152</sup>

In summary, in Aristotle’s ethics, except for passions implying badness by their very name, passions *per se* do not come under ethical judgement: they are neither blamed nor

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<sup>150</sup> Cf. Chapter III. 3. on Bacon’s adaptation of *cultura animi* where I propose to further discuss this issue. For ‘prudence’ as a vantage point for understanding Aristotle’s moral philosophy cf. Pierre Aubenque, *La prudence chez Aristote*, Paris: Quadrige / Presse Universitaire de France, 1963. Aubenque demonstrated that for Aristotle, prudence (φρόνησις / *phronesis*) belongs to opinion (δόξα / *doxa*) and implies an opposition with the field of science proper (ἐπιστήμη / *episteme*) to which wisdom (σοφία / *sophia*) belongs.

<sup>151</sup> *Eth. Nic.* II. 5. 1106 b20ff

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.* II. 6. 1107 a5ff

praised. They provide opportunity for the rational faculty so that by deploying prudence, the right mean should be found and realised in all concrete situations. As the Aristotelian ethical framework is oriented toward happiness in the *polis*, in a society that forms a political community, it is necessary to persuade and temper the passions that are psychic states stemming from the irrational part of the soul. The success of this persuasion requires the acquisition of prudence and involves the forming of right habits through a process of education.

### II. 1. 3. The Stoic Programme of Extirpation

Presenting the Stoic conception of the passions in a summary fashion raises a number of difficulties. The teachings of Stoic philosophers spans six centuries and the doctrine concerning the passions grew, changed and was channelled in different directions at the hands of different exponents.<sup>153</sup> The present chapter will highlight the most important elements in the Stoic concept of passion, in particular, the ones that were most decisive for the history of the concept and most closely and directly attributed to the Stoic tradition by posterity. A separate chapter will be devoted to the Christian perception and accommodation of the Stoic teaching about the passions.

The most important elements of the main Stoic view of the passions are the following<sup>154</sup>:

1) The Stoics have a *determinist cosmology* according to which all events in the universe are permeated and governed by the divine *logos*. This means that the universe is

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<sup>153</sup> Cf. Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, 2 vols (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985) vol. 1. p. 21.

<sup>154</sup> I am distilling these elements of a synthetic summary mostly from the discussions found in M. Colish, *Ibid* (1985), as well as R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. The Gifford Lectures*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; and T. Brennan in Inwood, *Ibid* (2003).

reasonable and everything in it is organised according to the rational law of nature: events are bound by the strict rules of cause and effect.<sup>155</sup>

2) This determinist cosmology underpins their *psychological monism*: “just as the divine *logos* permeates and orders the whole universe, so the human *logos* or *pneuma* permeates man’s entire being and accounts for all his activities.”<sup>156</sup> Thus there is no mind-body split in this psychology and even the instincts are on a continuum with conscious rational behaviour. Neither instinctual, or sensuous behaviour is seen as arising from a body, as distinct from the *logos*. One and the same reason rules - or should rule - all human behaviour and neither is there a division within the soul as with Plato. (Cf. below, the idea of *hegemonikon*, *citadel*.) Such *monistic* view of the human soul leaves no room for the passions since all faculties of the soul are permeated by the rational *pneuma*: passions are thus not merely sub-natural but anti-natural in the sense that they should have no status at all. In the soul, reason should be the sole sovereign and “an ethics in which reason rules all human behaviour is a descriptive ethics as well as a normative one.”<sup>157</sup> Another commentator notes that for the Stoics, ethics and psychology are but one:

There is never an initial stage in which ethics sets up an ideal that is distinct from or in any conflict with the true nature of human psychology; rather, the two disciplines study the same object from different vantage points. This is why their results are guaranteed to agree, and this is why the discipline of moral psychology is coherent from the start. Or so the ancient view would have it.<sup>158</sup>

If life is to be lived in accordance with nature, and all events in the universe are governed by a cosmic rational order, then the ethical fulfilment of the individual life can only consist in conforming to the rational order of the universe. As Cicero writes in *De officiis* “moral rectitude (*honestatis*) is the one in which we find considerateness and self-control, which give, as it were a sort of polish to life (*ornatus vitae*); it embraces also temperance, *complete*

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<sup>155</sup> Colish, *Ibid.*, p. 22ff, 31-32.

<sup>156</sup> Colish, *Ibid.* p. 27. referring to *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. Hans von Arnim, 3 volumes, Stuttgart, 1903-5; vol. iv (indexes) by Maximilian Adler, Stuttgart, 1924. Abbreviated commonly as *SVF*, I, 134-143, 216-223, 518-526; 2, 773-789, 823-849; 3, 544-656.

<sup>157</sup> Marcia L. Colish, *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>158</sup> Tad Brennan, “Stoic Moral Psychology” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, edited by Brad Inwood, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 259.

*subjection of all the passions*, and moderation in all things.”<sup>159</sup> The only things that have ethical relevance are the things within our control, for all the rest, it is not appropriate to feel the slightest emotion or passion.

3) This explains also the intellectualist-cognitive stance of the Stoics: they insist that all motivations should be analyzed as forms of belief<sup>160</sup> or *judgements* concerning certain states of affairs and they are, in fact, *false* mental judgements. It has to be noted that not all Stoics agree on this point: this position is that of Chrysippus in contrast with the founder of the school, Zeno, who held that passions are a felt inner contraction or expansion. According to Chrysippus, however, such contractions and bodily changes *follow* the passions and are not their cause.<sup>161</sup>

4) Finally, as a corollary of these tenets, in their ethical teaching and practice, the Stoics limit the sphere of ethical relevance to those things within the subjective control of the individual: the ethical fulfilment of the individual and the rational law of the universe are fully integrated. The *summum bonum* is a life in accordance with nature, or life in accordance with reason, that is the same thing.<sup>162</sup> Since vice springs from the passions, it is necessary to achieve a state of *apatheia*.

This summary shows that is with Stoicism that we can see most clearly that the notion of passion was never a purely descriptive one: it always entailed value-judgements and conceptions about what it is to be human and what constitutes the good life. With the Stoics, passions will have a very bad reputation: instead of Platonic canalisations and Aristotelian adjustments but building partly on elements of both albeit in a new fashion, the Stoics radicalised the antagonism between reason and passion. First of all, the Aristotelian

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<sup>159</sup> (Italics mine, G.S.) The passage continues: “Under this head is further included what, in Latin, may be called *decorum* (propriety); for in Greek it is called *πρέπον*.” And Cicero goes on in the same paragraph to identify the employment of reason - moral rectitude – propriety with one another. Cicero, *On Duties*, with an English translation by Walter Miller, “Loeb Classical Library”; Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1997, (1913), I. xxvii, p. 94-97.

<sup>160</sup> Cf. Tad Brennan, *Ibid.* p. 259-260.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Richard Sorabji, *Ibid.* p. 2. The question of the causal/temporal sequence between error of judgement and the manifestation of passions will also be discussed below in connection with a passage from Francis BACON, *The Advancement of Learning*.

<sup>162</sup> Colish, p. 36.

understanding of passion as passivity is replaced by a sense of perturbation, loss of balance and disorder; hence passion receives a strong pejorative colouring. Passions are obstacles to wisdom: they are both an obstacle to and disturbance of the rational train of thought. The idea of being taken away by one's passion implies here less passivity than a form of activity that puts conscience outside itself.

Unlike Plato who related the passions to a domain of the soul having its own principle of operation, in Stoic thinking the *pathe* are expelled from the soul, from what constitutes the soul proper: there is no *dynamis*, power within the soul that would correspond to the passionate impulse. In contrast to Plato and Aristotle who made room for the manifestation of an irrational aspect of the soul, the Stoics regarded passions as perversion and not as the expression of a normal affective/pathetic function. But what, exactly, constitutes this perversion or disturbance? It is a question of the free use of our representation (*fantasia*): all movements in the soul are the result of the representations that it assimilates and gives its assent to. These representations themselves do not depend from us but the assent given to them involves an act of judgement and it is at this stage that the disorder or perturbation takes place. Passions repose on an erroneous opinion or judgement that takes place in the soul and as such they can only be bad: their origin makes them reprehensible as diseases of the soul. This is why Zenon holds passions “irrational mental contractions”<sup>163</sup>: movement of the soul contrary to nature. This definition, reiterated by Cicero<sup>164</sup>, is also the basis of the Stoic classification of the passions according to which there are four primary passions, pleasure, desire, pain and fear, of which all the other passions are species. The mixture of two dichotomies yields the following quadripartite structure: the movement of the soul contrary to nature may be provoked by an imaginary good or evil believed to exist in the present or in the future.

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<sup>163</sup> Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VII. 1. 111. in Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, with an English translation by R. D. Hicks, two vols, “Loeb Classical Library”; Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1972 (1925) p. 217

<sup>164</sup> Cf. also Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, IV, 6. in Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, with an English translation by J. E. King, “Loeb Classical Library”; Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1966 (1927, rev. 1945) vol. XVIII.

# OPINION

	<i>present</i>	<i>future</i>
<i>good</i>	excessive joy ( <i>laetitia</i> )	lust, desire ( <i>libido, cupiditas</i> )
<i>evil</i>	distress ( <i>aegritudo</i> )	fear ( <i>metus</i> )

Early modern authors derived their understanding of Stoicism mostly from Roman stoicism and, in particular, from the writings of Cicero and Seneca. It was Cicero, who in “teaching philosophy to speak Latin” translated the Greek word *pathe* as *perturbatio* – a translation that makes the Stoic teaching about the passions part of the very name. He gave the following explanation to his translation:

Moreover the emotions of the mind [*perturbationes animorum*], which harass and embitter the life of the foolish (the Greek term for these is *pathos*, and I might have rendered this literally and styled them ‘diseases’ [*morbos*], but the word ‘disease’ would not suit all instances; for example, no one speaks of pity, nor yet anger, as a disease, though the Greeks term these *pathos*. Let us then accept the term ‘emotion’ [*perturbatio*], the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural influence.<sup>165</sup>

The Stoic-Ciceronian equivalence between *perturbatio* and *pathos* is a token of their interpretation and appraisal of the passions. The Ciceronian translation of *pathe* as *perturbatio* is a biased transposition of the Greek word into Latin: it puts into the very word the evaluation the Stoics attach to it. Richard Sorabji notes that Cicero “overtranslates” the word and misguidedly makes part of the *meaning* of the word the Stoics’ substantive thesis about the emotions, namely that they are perturbing.<sup>166</sup> Following Cicero, Roman Stoics employ the term *perturbatio* with its negative connotation when speaking about the passions. The word suggests that passions are not a proper part of ourselves. Furthermore, Stoic ethics identifies the good life with virtue and both good life and virtue with self-sufficiency, i.e. that which is intrinsically good has to be proper to us and fully within our control. The passions are,

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<sup>165</sup> Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, with an English translation by H. Rackham, “Loeb Classical Library” Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1994 (1914), III. 10., pp. 254-255. It has to be added that the modern translator’s solution to translating *perturbatio* as ‘emotion’ does not help to clarify Cicero’s meaning. The word ‘disturbance’ or ‘perturbation’ would be closer to Cicero’s meaning.

<sup>166</sup> Richard Sorabji, *Ibid*, p. 208.

however, responses to external events, outside of our control and thus have no place in the life of the Stoic sage.

In Cicero's definition<sup>167</sup> of the four perturbations of the soul, distress (*aegritudo*) is a newly formed belief of present evil, inducing depression or shrinking of the soul; excessive delight (*laetitia*) is a newly formed belief of present good arousing rapture; fear (*metus*) is a conviction of threatening evil which to the affected person seems insupportable; lust (*libido*, *cupiditas*) is a belief in a prospective good, good in the sense that the individual considers its possession advantageous.<sup>168</sup> It must also be noted that the Stoic condemnation of passionate affectivity as a form of disorder leading to dependences and alienations makes room for three legitimate affections (*eupathia* or *tranquilitas animi*) that are considered non-passionate. The search of the good is natural and insofar as it is in conformity with reason it is legitimate. Thus simple joy (*gaudium*) is opposed to excessive delight (*laetitia*) that is the "transport of the soul deprived of reason", to disordered desire will (*voluntas*) is opposed which is a "tendency where desire accompanies reason", and circumspection (*cautio*) is opposed to fear.<sup>169</sup> (Distress has no positive pair since present evil is only in the imagination (*fantasia*) as a false representation to which no consent should be given. Thus the possibility of a rational grief is excluded.)

The soul is not home to the passions and they are the result of a false opinion in the soul to which it gives consent. All passions imply an act of judgement, an opinion concerning our representation of the world, or event of the world. It is interesting to take the classical case of Achilles' anger in this regard: according to Epictetus, the cause of his weeping is not the death of Patroclus but that he wanted to grieve, thus of an act of consent involving decision.

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<sup>167</sup> Cicero's definition and the quadripartite structure repeated the division of Chrysippus (3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C.) who was the principal systematizer of Stoic philosophy and its cofounder with Zeno. In Chrysippus' division the terms are pleasure (*hedoné*), pain (*lupé*), desire (*epithumia*), fear (*phobos*) cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Ibid.*, VII. 6.

<sup>168</sup> *Tusculan Disputations*, IV. 6-9. Cf. also the summary of Rolf Soellner, "The Four Primary Passions: A Renaissance Theory reflected in the Works of Shakespeare", in *Studies in Philology*, vol. 55 (1958) Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, p. 550. Cf. also Anthony Levi, S.J., *French Moralists. The Theory of the Passions from 1585 to 1649*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

<sup>169</sup> In Chrysippus' division: wish (*boulesis*), joy (*kara*), caution (*eulabeia*) cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Ibidem*.

[B]ut it is enough for us to be convinced that, if what the philosophers say is sound, we ought not to look for the motive anywhere outside ourselves, but that in all cases it is one and the same thing that is the cause of our doing a thing or of our not doing it, of our saying things, or of our not saying them, of our being elated, or of our being cast down, of our avoiding things, or of our pursuing them - the very thing, indeed, which has even now become a cause of my action and of yours; yours in coming to me and sitting here and listening, mine saying these things. And what is that? *Is it, indeed, anything else than that we wanted to do this? - Nothing.* And supposing that we had wanted to do something else, what else would we be doing than that which we wanted to do? *Surely, then, in the case of Achilles also, it was this that was the cause of his grief – not the death of Patroclus* (for other men do not act this way when their comrades die), *but that he wanted to grieve.*<sup>170</sup>

For Epictetus, passions involve an act of volition involving a decision. Since they are the result of a loss of the clear vision of the world, they have to be extirpated. The Stoic ideal of the sage entails impassivity: apathy that is the absence of and freedom from all passions, *apatheia*, must characterise the sage.<sup>171</sup> This state can be achieved, on the first place, by knowing what passions are and how they originate. Having understood that they depend from our opinion, it is a further step to eliminate them by means of a therapy consisting of the right use of the will and reason.<sup>172</sup> The wrong opinion has to be corrected: what gives birth to desire and pleasure are not real goods, neither are the evils that lead to fear and distress. The false opinion has to be separated from the correct one and the passion is extinguished. There is always an element of opinion involved in the process that can thus be arrested by the

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<sup>170</sup> Epictetus, *Discourses*, I, 21. 28-31. (italics mine, G.S.) in Epictetus, *The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments*, with an English translation by W. A. Oldfather, in two volumes, “Loeb Classical Library”, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1989 (1925), p. 87.

<sup>171</sup> It has to be noted that the ideal of *apatheia* was not shared by all Stoics, or rather, it did not mean the same for all Stoics. It meant different things to Chrysippus, Zeno and Posidonius to name only three of the main Stoic figures. But it was the Chrysippian radical position that became the canonical view and the one most well-known in the Renaissance. For Chrysippus, *apatheia* meant freedom from all emotions except a small range of *eupatheiai* that are enjoyed only by the sage. Cf. Richard Sorabji, *Ibid.*, (2000) p. 195-196.

<sup>172</sup> Cicero, *Tusc.*, IV, 38. 83.



exercise of the will and reason. It is an intellectualising conception of the passions and thus the remedy of the perturbations of the soul is a matter of the intellect as well. Philosophy thus becomes a medicine of the soul and leads to a form of self-mastery and ethical self-sufficiency. Cicero writes:

what bodily diseases can be more serious, pray, than these two diseases of distress (*aegritudo*) and desire (*cupiditas*)? [...] souls which have been ready to be cured and have obeyed the instructions of wise men, are undoubtedly cured? Assuredly, there is an art of healing the soul – I mean philosophy, whose aid must be sought not, as in bodily diseases, outside ourselves, and we must use our utmost endeavour, with all our resources and strengths, to have the power to be ourselves our physicians.<sup>173</sup>

The radicalism of the Stoic position concerning on the passions rests on two associated tenets, one may be called anthropological, the other ethical. The former concerns the nature of the soul that is seen as commanded by a central part (*hegemonikon*) and functions as a citadel of reason, a fortified acropolis wherein reason is the only native element. Since there is no room for the passions within the soul, it is not possible to deploy the canalisations in the Platonic way or the Aristotelian adjustments. Whereas with Plato, the structural analogy runs between the *psyche* and the *polis*, with the Stoics, this analogy can be established between *psyche* and a kind of *acropolis*. The Platonic structure, although hierarchical in its layers, was capable of horizontal negotiations between its parts. The Stoic system is strictly vertical and reason only must be in the soul and has to fully dominate it. This allows no mediation or canalisation of the *thumos* between the acropolis of reason and passions and desires. Their origin in a false judgement precludes the possibility of a middle ground (an Aristotelian *metropatheia*) or a graduation of the passions. All passions are failings of reason (*ratio lapsa*) and as such they cannot be tolerated because they constitute a perturbation and disease of the soul. This psychological-anthropological outlook sets the possibility of the extirpation of the passions and this is the second, ethical tenet. If passions are a question of reason's absolute supremacy then it is in our power to forestall the passions.

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<sup>173</sup> Cicero, *Tusc.*, III. 3. 5-6.

For my part I think that the whole train of reasoning which is concerned with the disorders of the soul turns upon the one fact that all disorders are within our control, are all acts of judgement, are all voluntary.<sup>174</sup>

The governing principles of this ethics of autarchy are power and control over the soul's operations. There is also an analogy between diseases of the body and diseases of the soul: one should not tolerate either:

For the Peripatetics, friends of ours as they are and unequalled in resourcefulness, in learning and in earnestness, do not quite succeed in convincing me of their 'mean' or moderate states either in disturbances or of diseases of the soul. *For every evil, even a moderate one, is an evil. But our object is that there should be no evil at all in the wise man. For as the body, even if moderately ailing, is not healthy; so in the soul the so-called mean or moderate state is without health.*<sup>175</sup>

The restriction of the desires establishes a zone of non-contradiction within which the agent has full control. "*Imperare sibi maximum imperium est*": "Self-command is the greatest command of all." (also: empire over yourself is the greatest empire) writes Seneca<sup>176</sup>. Similarly, following the Stoic tradition of distinguishing between things under our control and things not under our control, Epictetus writes:

Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control. Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing. Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; while the things not under our control are weal, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men; while if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your own to be, as it really is, not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, will find

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<sup>174</sup> Cicero, *Tusc.*, IV, 31, 65, (italics mine, G. S.)

<sup>175</sup> Cicero, *Tusc.*, III. 10. 22. (italics mine, G.S.)

<sup>176</sup> Seneca, *Epistles*, 113. 31 in Seneca in ten volumes, vol. VI *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales* with an English translation by Richard M. Gummere in three volumes, "Loeb Classical Library", Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1989 (1925), p. 299.

fault with no one, will do absolutely nothing against your will, you will have no personal enemy, no one will harm you, for neither is there any harm that can touch you.<sup>177</sup>

If the aim is such imperturbability, then it is a matter of defining the boundaries of the self: the narrower one defines what constitutes the self and human life, the more chances there are that perturbations, hindrances and the attendant turmoil cannot reach it. From the perspective of the passions it means that their very causes should be extirpated: by rightly defining what is under our control, one should not give ground and occasion for their very appearance.

It is plausible to argue that the concept of “passion” reached its richest, most complex sense in Antiquity with Stoicism: not only are passions seen as perturbations of the soul but all perturbations are assimilated to passions. The expression can be found in the writings of Stobaeus, doxographer of the 5<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>178</sup> This extensive concept of “passion” implies that all disruptive mental phenomena are conceived as passion and in need of control and even extirpation by the help of another instance, namely reason, which is considered hierarchically superior and more valuable. What differentiates Stoicism from the Aristotelian-Platonic traditions is its radical separation of this rational faculty as forming the citadel of the soul proper and allowing no room for an irrational force within the soul. Instead of a hierarchy of forces within the soul, Stoicism opted for a fortress of reason ruled or *hegemonikon* that is often translated as “ruling reason”.

Since this study is not aimed at exposing the origins and the reasons of the increasing popularity of Stoic thinking in the Hellenistic period, let it suffice to indicate broadly that most commentators and historians of Classical philosophy find the causes of this inward turn and the wish to eradicate the passions in the change of social structures from the Greek *polis* to Roman *imperium*.<sup>179</sup> Gordon Braden argues that the psychic structure of the *hegemonikon*

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<sup>177</sup> Epictetus, *The Encheiridion*, or Manual, 1-4 in *The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments*, with an English translation by A. O. Oldfather, in two volumes, “Loeb Classical Library”, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, II. 1989 (1928) p. 483.

<sup>178</sup> Quoted in Jean-Paul Dumont, *Elément d’histoire de la philosophie antique*, Paris: Nathan, 1993, p. 625.

<sup>179</sup> Cf. Rémo Bodei, *Géometrie des passions. Peur, espoir, bonheur : de la philosophie à l’usage politique*, traduit de l’italien par Marilène Raiola, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1997; cf.

that is at the basis of Stoic ethics reflects a process of internalisation of monarchic power in an attempt to recreate that power more securely within the self. The autarchic self-sufficiency of the Stoic ethical outlook is a calculus of adaptation to unchangeable realities. In A. A. Long's expression, it is a "revisionist" attitude about happiness: we want what we have instead of striving to have what we want and thus we revise our hopes to coincide with the given.<sup>180</sup> Criticism of the radicalism of the Stoic position about the passions will go hand in hand with the condemnation of this self-sufficient attitude in the Early Modern period.

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also Gordon Braden, *Ibid*; as well as Michel Meyer, *Le Philosophe et les passions. Esquisse d'une histoire de la nature humaine*, Paris : Livre de poche, Librairie Générale Française, 1991.

<sup>180</sup> This moral outlook is well described by A. A. Long as revisionism in the sense of internalising the goods of which happiness consists. Cf. A. A. Long, *Stoic Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

## II. 2. MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN ACCOMMODATIONS

In his seminal study on prudence in Aristotle<sup>181</sup>, Pierre Aubenque remarks that the original sense of the Delphic injunction of ‘Know thyself’ (γνώθι σεαυτόν) was taken to mean almost its contrary in Stoicism. The injunction originally called for getting to know one’s limitations as a mortal. With Stoicism, the ultimate aim of introspection is to make oneself invincible (*cf.* the ideal of the *hegemonikon* and of the *citadel*) that would have been a sacrilege for the Greeks of the Classical era. Thus Epictetus explicitly refers to the injunction of the ancients and (mis)uses to mean it as a tool and aid for becoming and invincible:

our losses and our pains have to do only with the things which we possess. ‘But the tyrant will chain ----’ What? Your leg. ‘But he will cut off ----’ What? Your neck. What, then, will he neither chain nor cut off? Your moral purpose. [προαίρεσιν / proairesin] This is why the ancients gave us the injunction, ‘Know thyself.’ [...] Who, then, is the invincible man? *He whom nothing that is outside the sphere of his moral purpose can dismay.* I then proceed to consider the circumstances one by one, as I would do in the case of the athlete. [...] The man who passes all these tests is what I mean the invincible athlete.<sup>182</sup>

Similarly, in Cicero’s *De republica*, Scipio in his dream hears the following advice: “Know, then, that you are god, [*deum te igitur scito esse*] if a god is that which lives, feels, remembers, and foresees, and which rules, governs, and moves the body over which it is set, just as the supreme God above us rules this universe. And just as the eternal God moves the universe, which is partly mortal, so an immortal spirit moves the frail body.”<sup>183</sup> I shall return to the globalism implicit in this kind of analogy and even isomorphism between the divine and the human governance of the world and of the body respectively. For the present argument, the salient point about the Stoic traits in Epictetus and Cicero is the fact that they both depict a god-like, invincible human being as their ideal. Christianity can be seen as a

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<sup>181</sup> Pierre Aubenque, *Ibid.*, p. 167. n. 1.

<sup>182</sup> Epictetus, *Discourses*, I. 18-26 (italics mine, G.S.) in Epictetus, *Ibid.*, vol. I. p. 1126-129.

<sup>183</sup> Cicero, *De re Publica*, VI. 24. in Cicero, *De re Publica. De legibus*, with an English translation by Clinton Walker Keyes, “Loeb Classical Library”, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1994 (1928) p. 279-280.

return to the restrictive sense of the Delphic injunction although in a different sense than that of the Classical Greeks. What's more, the debate over human limitations takes various forms within Christianity as well and Augustine's battle against what became the Pelagian heresy can also be seen as a case in point: Pelagianism is a form of denying human limitations inasmuch as for Pelagius, redemption is achievable by human effort and human acts.

An assessment of Christian adaptations of Greek philosophy and Stoic doctrine is naturally far beyond the scope of this study. Large volumes of the history of philosophy and of theology describe the conceptual and terminological translations and accommodations that Christian authors – starting already with Saint Paul's oration about the "unknown God" to the Athenians<sup>184</sup> - had to make in order to articulate the content of their faith in the context of

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<sup>184</sup> Cf. *Acts*, 17: 16 – 33 "Now while Paul waited for them at Athens, his spirit was stirred in him, when he saw the city wholly given to idolatry. Therefore disputed he in the synagogue with the Jews, and with the devout persons, and in the market daily with them that met with him. Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoicks, encountered him. And some said, What will this babbler say? other some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods: because he preached unto them Jesus, and the resurrection. And they took him, and brought him unto Areopagus, saying, May we know what this new doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is? For thou bringest certain strange things to our ears: we would know therefore what these things mean. (For all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing.) Then Paul stood in the midst of Mars' hill, and said, Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you. God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; Neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing, seeing he giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; And hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us: For in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring. Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device. And the times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth all men every where to repent: Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead. And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some

Hellenistic and Roman culture. The demonstration of such adaptations is often coloured with a critical tone towards Christianity, for example in the case of Nietzsche who claimed that Christianity was but “a form of vulgarised Platonism”<sup>185</sup>. While acknowledging that the case of the concept of ‘passion’ is part of this larger scheme of translating and negotiating elements of the Classical heritage that formed the surrounding culture to the Christian context, the present chapter will only focus on this single element and will do it primarily from a semantic-linguistic point of view. Moreover, as the early Christian teaching about the passions evolved primarily as a response to the Stoic legacy, my discussion will focus on this particular case of semantic adaptation and transfer. The reasons why Stoicism was a privileged source for Christian authors when dealing with practical ethical matters were briefly indicated in Chapter I. 2. Besides the enormous prestige of Virgil for Christian authors, one could also refer to the Christian veneration of Seneca and the forged correspondence between Seneca and Saint Paul<sup>186</sup> as well as to the adaptations of Senecan *propassio* / *propatheia* to interpreting Christian temptations<sup>187</sup>. But on a more general level, the reasons of the attraction of early Christian authors to the Stoics was probably the fact that the latter had a fairly elaborated set of moral teaching that, by virtue of its focus on human interiority and by its ideal of a moral autarchy could provide ready-made precepts to Christians - even if Christianity and Stoicism turned out to be *faux-amis* on the long run...

Although this study is not concerned with the history of interaction of Stoicism and Christianity, it seems necessary to signal, even if in a shorthand fashion, the general thrust of

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mocked: and others said, We will hear thee again of this matter. So Paul departed from among them.” (King James Version)

<sup>185</sup> “But the fight against Plato, or, to put the matter in a way more intelligible to ‘the people,’ the fight against the thousands of years of pressure from the Christian church — *for Christianity is Platonism for ‘the people’* — created in Europe a splendid tension in the spirit, something unlike anything existing before on earth before. With such a tensely arched bow, from now on we can shoot for the most distant targets.” (Italics mine, G.S.) in F. W. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), “Prologue” (of 1885).

<sup>186</sup> Cf. Colish, (1985) pp. 16ff.

<sup>187</sup> Cf. R. Sorabji, *ibid*, p. 8. and 343-419. Sorabji demonstrates how “the Stoic theory of how to avoid agitation was converted by early Christians into a theory of how to avoid temptations” through adaptation of the Senecan term of *propassio* by Philo, Origen, Didymus the Blind, Evagrius, St. Jerome and by St. Augustine.

this encounter *prior to* the Early Modern period. While continuities exist between Stoicism and Christianity there was also a trend within Christianity to oppose such infiltration of Stoic doctrines. Gordon Braden sums up the point in a shorthand way by saying that “the tradition of distinguishing Stoicism from Christianity is as durable as the wish to assimilate them.”<sup>188</sup>

When looking at it from a broad perspective, it appears that the general tendency of this influence was an infiltration by Stoicism of Christian ethical and, in some cases, spiritual practice - if not Christian doctrine itself. The impact of Stoicism on Christian culture well antedates Early Modern humanism: Seneca's works have found their way to the teachings of the early Church Fathers, a development that was both facilitated and is attested by the near-consecration of Seneca due to his supposed (and faked) correspondence with St. Paul. Furthermore, Stoic ethical precepts were often accommodated for Christian use by the Church fathers in their commentaries to the Bible. Jerome considered that of all philosophical schools the Stoics have the most in common with us.<sup>189</sup> Epictetus' *Encheiridion* was several times adapted for use as a monastic handbook for their psychological efficiency. In addition, certain passages of the Pauline letters seemed to point towards a Stoic ethical position and objective: the ideal of *autarcheia*. Thus in 2 Corinthians 9:8, in Philippians 4:11, and in 1 Timothy 6:6 *αὐταρκεια* / *autarcheia* / *sufficientia* is used in a positive sense. Also, the “inward man” *ἑσω ἄνθρωπος* / *eso anthropos* / *interiorem hominem* as the province of an inmost self radically separate from the externals of its conditions is referred to in Romans 7:22 and in Ephesians 3:16.

## II. 2. 1. Saint Augustine

The choice of Augustine among early Christian authors, while self-evident to some extent given his enormous influence on Christianity is also motivated by the fact that Early Modern authors and Protestants in particular, will refer to him and cite from his works in the debate with neo-Stoics about the passions. This is understandable given the vogue of Augustinianism in the 16<sup>th</sup> century that is also said to be one of the inspirational forces of

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<sup>188</sup> Gordon Braden, *Ibid*, p. 92.

<sup>189</sup> *In Isaiam* 4.11; *Patrologia latina* 24:147D quoted by Gordon Braden, *Ibid*, p. 70. I am taking the some of the following examples from this book.



Protestantism (and later of Jansenism<sup>190</sup> in France) as opposed to Rome's advocacy of the strands of pure Thomism of Saint Thomas Aquinas with its synthesis of theology and Aristotelian philosophy, of the modified dissent from Thomism of Duns Scotus (*via antiqua*), and of the Nominalism of William of Ockham (*via moderna*). The "rigorous tradition of St. Augustine [...] came to be the chief weapon of sixteenth-century Protestantism against the stultified scholasticism of the dying middle ages"<sup>191</sup> Therefore, the Augustinian position and his linguistic accommodations of *pathē* into (Christian) Latin merits special attention.

That the translation of *πάθος* into Latin and its adaptation to the specifically Christian context was an issue that merited special consideration for Augustine is evident from the fact that in *The City of God* he raises the issue of this translation and the uses to which *pathos* can be put several times. This in Book VIII, Chapter 17:

For *perturbatio* (disturbance) is what the Greeks call *pathos* [*πάθος*], and this is why he [Apuleius] chose to call the demons *passive* [...], because the word *passio* [*πάθος*] for the Greek word *pathos* means a mental movement which is contrary to reason.<sup>192</sup>

And, in a slightly different context again in Book IX, Chapter 4:

There are two opinions among philosophers as to those motions of the mind which the Greeks call *pathe*. (Some of our writers, such as Cicero, call disturbances [*perturbationes*], others call them affections [*affectiones*] or affects

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<sup>190</sup> Cf. Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638) whose *Augustinus* was published in 1640 and condemned by the Catholic Church.

<sup>191</sup> G. R. Elton, *Reformation Europe 1517-1559*, Oxford, and Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1999 (1963), second edition with an Afterword by Andrew Pettegree, "Blackwell Classic Histories of Europe", p. 134-135

<sup>192</sup> *City of God*, VIII. 17. in "The Loeb Classical Library", with an English translation by David S. Wiesen, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1988, p. 79. (Henceforth referred to as "Loeb") Translation slightly modified because, in my view, the Translator put his own gloss on the text, namely, the identification of *passio* with modern 'emotion' into Augustine's text. It also omits to reproduce the Greek spelling in Augustine's Latin in the English text.

[*affectus*], others again, like Apuleius, call them passions [*passiones*] which expresses the Greek word more closely.<sup>193</sup>

There are two opinions among the philosophers concerning the mental emotions (*animi motibus*), which the Greeks call *pathē*, while certain of our fellow countrymen, like Cicero, describe as disturbances [*perturbationes*], others as affections [*affectiones*] or affects [*affectus*], and others again, like Apuleius, as passions [*passiones*], which renders the Greek word more explicitly.<sup>194</sup>

As noted above, the Ciceronian translation of *pathe* as *perturbatio* is a biased transposition of the Greek word into Latin: it puts into the very word the evaluation the Stoics attach to it. Augustine opts for Latin *passio* as the translation of *pathē* and reserves *perturbatio* for the derogatory senses of *pathe*. *Passio* was, after all, the term applied to the “Passion of Christ” (on this issue see also below), which although a kind of suffering, could hardly be taken as vicious, or even as morally neutral, kind. It can be said in general, that Augustine did not disparage the passions as such, despite an increasingly tragic view of the human condition over the course of his career. What’s more, there is a subcategory of *passio* that is of particular importance for the Christian philosopher, namely ‘love’ in all its senses *amor*, *caritas*, and even *eros* and *cupiditas*. In considering this issue Augustine rewrites the Ciceronian tetrachord of passions as modifications of love which is both a passion and a form of will.

A right will is therefore good love and a wrong will is bad love. Hence the love that is bent on obtaining the object of its love is desire (*cupiditas*), while the love that possesses and enjoys its object is joy (*laetitia*); the love that avoids what confronts it is fear (*timor*), and the love that feels when it strikes is grief (*tristitia*). Accordingly, these emotions are bad if the love is bad, and good is love is good.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Augustine, *City of God*, IX. 4. in Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, edited and translated by R. W. Dyson, “Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought”, Cambridge, New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 361-362. The underlined phrase is the translators’ rendering of *animi motibus*, my underlining, G.S.

<sup>194</sup> Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, IX. 4. “Loeb”, p. 156-7.

<sup>195</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 7. “Loeb”, p. 290-291.

For Augustine, there are virtuous and vicious loves depending on their object and the way that object is loved: for its use or for its mere enjoyment. Without going into further details of Augustine's love theology, it is important to highlight that 'love' as a subcategory of passion (*passio*) does not by this very fact come under a negative judgement.

Coming back to the issue of passions more generally and in reviewing the teachings of the Platonist, Peripatetics, and Stoics about the passions, the major question, for Augustine, is whether such disturbances are admissible in the life of a Christian. At a certain stage of his argument, Augustine dismisses the Stoic *versus* Platonist-Aristotelian controversy about the admissibility of passions as a mere verbal debate that does not concern the heart of the matter.<sup>196</sup>

Hence it seems to me that here too, when the question is asked whether mental passions (*passiones animi*) affect the wise man, or whether he is a complete stranger to them, they [the Stoics] are again basing their argument on words rather than on facts. For I judge that the Stoics themselves hold exactly the same view as the Platonist and Peripatetics, in so far as the gist of the matter is concerned and not the mere jingle of words (*vocabulorum sonum*).<sup>197</sup>

Such sweeping remarks notwithstanding – which, by the way, refer not to the word *passiones* itself but to distinctions between “goods” and “advantages”<sup>198</sup> – Augustine seems rather preoccupied by the question of the passions. Besides his detailed attention to diverging Latin translations of *πάθος*, Augustine devotes several chapters in *The City of God* to develop his position about the passions and to assess them from a Christian perspective. A full account of his position and of how it is embedded in his teaching on Christian doctrine is far beyond the scope of this chapter and has already been done by Colish (1985) as well as Sorabji (2003) to mention only two of those who approached Augustine's handling of the theme with an emphasis on the Stoic legacy. In line with the overall framework of the present study, I shall limit my consideration of this issue to the semantic aspect, which, by the way, seems to preoccupy Augustine himself as well. Thus I would like to see how, in Augustine's Latin, modifications are introduced with regard to the scope of *passiones* and its internal divisions.

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<sup>196</sup> *City of God*, “Loeb”, IX. 4., p. 158-159.

<sup>197</sup> *City of God*, “Loeb”, IX. 4., p. 158-159.

<sup>198</sup> Augustine is in fact following Cicero who claimed that Stoic preferables were, in practice, the same as the bodily goods admitted by the Aristotelians. Cf. Colish (1985), II. p. 208

For Augustine, the overall criterion for judging mental states remains their conformity with reason in a regulating sense: “these *emotions* attend upon *right reason*” (*cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones*).<sup>199</sup> While he maintains the overall regulating sense of reason in judging the affections, Augustine introduces another distinction and thereby carries out a semantic re-arrangement: he distinguishes between “impulses and emotions that derive from love of the good and holy charity” (*Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate*) on the one hand, and “diseases and vicious passions” (*morbos seu vitiosas passiones*) on the other hand.<sup>200</sup> In order to ground his argument in the authority of the Holy Scripture and of St. Paul in particular, when demonstrating the goodness inhering in what he means by the former, Augustine gives a catalogue of the motions (*motus*) and affects (*affectus*) St. Paul, a Biblical exemplar of virtue, has had.<sup>201</sup>

Thus he keeps *motus* (motion) and *affectus* (affects) in a neutral and even positive sense for designating certain emotional states. By this semantic operation, Augustine begins to break up the unified collective sense of *passiones* and introduces a *qualitative distinction* within *perturbationes*.<sup>202</sup> There can be and, indeed, there *should be* affective states of the soul that are legitimate and are in conformity with Christian faith. His reference to Christ is revealing: even the Lord showed these human emotions (*humanus affectus*).<sup>203</sup> Augustine cites ample evidence from the Gospels to prove that Christ

was *grieved and angered* (*cum ira constriatus sit*) at the Jews’ hardness of heart (Mark 3:5); that he said: ‘For your sake I am *glad* (*gaudeo*), so that you may believe’ (John 11:15); that as he was about to rouse Lazarus, he even shed tears (*lacrimas fuerit*) (John 11:35); that he earnestly desired (*concupiverit*) to eat the Passover with his disciples (Luke 22:15); that as his passion drew near,

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<sup>199</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 9., “Loeb”, p. 310-11. italics mine. Cf. also “because their love is right, all these feelings of theirs are right.” (*quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent.*) XIV. 9, p. 304-305.

<sup>200</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 9., “Loeb”, p. 310-311, italics mine, translation slightly modified.

<sup>201</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 9., “Loeb”, 306-311.

<sup>202</sup> This does not change the fact that he keeps the Ciceronian *quadrivium* of passions on a more general level and even when he argues against the Stoic general condemnation of the passions, he keeps the quartet of pleasure, pain, desire and fear (*laetitia, tristitia, cupiditas* or *amor, metus* or *timor*) as will be the case below when enumerating the *affectus* Christ experienced.

<sup>203</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 9., “Loeb”, p. 310-311.

his soul was grieved (*tristis fuerit anima eius*) (Matthew 26:38), there is no falsehood in these reports. Rather, he assumed *these emotions* (*ille hos motus*) in his human mind for a definite providential purpose when he chose, just as he had become a man when he so chose.<sup>204</sup>

It should be added, however, that this passage, besides loosely following the Ciceronian quartet of passions, uses the formulation “when he chose” that further accentuates the Stoic resonances. I take it is meant to imply that the Lord was not impelled to have these emotions but consciously chose to do so. For the Stoic sage is capable withholding such assent to passion so that they should not inhibit the proper activity of mind and reason. Such a situation is explained in Book IX. 4. of the *City of God* when Augustine recalls the Attic Nights by Aulus Gellius that refers to the fifth (lost) *Discourse* of Epictetus.<sup>205</sup> But such nuances put aside, the relevance of this passage is in Augustine’s consistent use of *affectus* and *motus* to designate what the Stoic tradition would have named *pathē* (Greek), *passiones*, *perturbationes* (Cicero).

The Ciceronian “overtranslation” (Sorabji) of *pathos* as *perturbatio* does not mean for Augustine that they should be proscribed. The fact that they are disturbances does not immediately qualify them in an ethical sense: the mental phenomenon of affective agitation begins to be subdivided into the morally acceptable “impulses and emotions that derive from love of the good and holy charity” and the morally unacceptable “diseases and vicious passions” cited above.<sup>206</sup> It is the *teleology* of the passions that is the arbitrator about their righteousness: the Christian may rightly manifest even what the Stoics call passions if these passions are ordered to the love of God and neighbour. Thus the collective sense of *passiones* receives an inflection in Augustine’s usage of the word: although Augustine is credited for having mediated the Ciceronian tetrachord of passions to Medieval Christianity, we can see that he also meant to rewrite them as versions of love and, what’s more, he limited the negativity in the connotation of *passiones* as *perturbationes*: emotional disturbance itself is not the problem, it is the teleology of such disturbance that matters. Thus even if passions *are*

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<sup>204</sup> *City of God*, XIV, 9., “Loeb”, p. 310-311.

<sup>205</sup> *City of God*, IX, 4., “Loeb”, p. 158-163. The expression “give assent to the emotions or to yield to them” (*adprobari ista eique consentiri*) is on pp. 162-163.

<sup>206</sup> I am aware that the Stoics too made a distinction between *pathe* and *eupatheia* (good emotions). But they did not admit that the latter, too, were perturbations.

disturbances, they are not always and necessarily *vitiae* (faults) and *morbus* (diseases). Augustine objects to a blanket suppression and condemnation of the passions and affirms the potential appropriateness of *misericordia* (rejected by Seneca) and other feelings and affects as well:

Consequently, in our system we do not so much ask whether a religious mind will become angry, but rather what should make it angry, nor whether it will be sad, but what should make it sad, nor whether it will be afraid, but what should make it afraid. For instance, *anger* with a sinner in order to reform him, or *sadness* on behalf of one who is distressed in order to relieve him, or *fear* for one in danger, to save him from death – with such feelings I hardly suppose that anyone of sane and thoughtful mind would find fault. No doubt the stoic practice is to condemn even *pity*, but how much more honourable it would have been for the stoic [...] to be deeply moved by *pity* for a fellow-creature in order to save him than by fear of being shipwrecked.<sup>207</sup>

As Gordon Braden comments, refusal of the *perturbationes* can be a refusal of the chance and impulse to do something good, a rejection of God's purposes in using human emotions to his own end. Christian doctrine "subordinates the mind itself to God, to be governed and succoured by him, and puts the passions into the keeping of the mind, to be so regulated and restrained as to be converted into servants of righteousness."<sup>208</sup>

Augustine makes a further claim about *affectiones*: he states that, after all, "they belong to this present life, not to the one we hope will come, and we often yield to them even against our will. Thus at times, though we may be stirred not by blameworthy desire, but by praiseworthy charity, we weep even while we would not. It follows then that we possess these emotions by reason of the weakness of our human condition."<sup>209</sup> Thus, in his consideration of the *affectiones*, and, by the same token, of passions in general, Augustine introduces a localist perspective that allows for different regimes: there is our current fallen state, the weakness of the human condition and there is "that perfect wisdom which is promised us at the end, when we are freed from our present mortality"<sup>210</sup> His gesture makes room for emotional disturbances – they are not to be and cannot be, eradicated. He even adds that living without

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<sup>207</sup> *City of God*, IX.5 "Loeb" p. 167-168. italics mine

<sup>208</sup> *City of God*, IX.5. "Loeb" p. 167.

<sup>209</sup> *City of God*, XIV, 9, "Loeb", p. 312-313.

<sup>210</sup> *City of God*, VIII. 17. "Loeb", p. 78-79.

emotions (*sine affectione*) is not to live a proper life and refers again to St. Paul (Romans 1:31). But Augustine also reviews his position from the other perspective: from the Stoic ideal of *apatheia* which he translates as *impassibilitas* (impassibility).<sup>211</sup> The same localist gesture is at work here: although Augustine admits that it is a desirable state as long as it means “living without those emotions which come contrary to reason and agitate the mind”. However, this is not for our present state either: the Stoic ideal of *impassibilitas* is neither practical nor desirable<sup>212</sup>. And Augustine even goes further in his exegesis of the Gospel of John:

These are certainly four of what they call passions (*perturbationes*): fear and sorrow, love and joy (*timor et tristitia, amor et laetitia*). And the minds of the Christians have just cause for feeling them, if not the Stoic philosophers and whoever else like them agrees with this error. For they indeed enlarge their vanity to the extent that they deem it a verity, thus regarding insensibility as soundness (*stuporem deputant sanitatem*), ignoring that the soul of man, just as the members of his body, is the more gravely ill when it has lost even the capacity to feel pain.<sup>213</sup>

Augustine’s quarrel with the Stoic conception of virtue, vice and good life extended beyond terminology when and was explained in more detail when it came to his debate with Pelagius. For Augustine, the only true earthly happiness lies in the hope of salvation and the eternal life of the blessed, and that requires God’s grace as a gift. As such, the Stoic insistence on self-sufficiency and the ideal of the *apatheia* are wrong-headed from the start as it is a version of the primal sin of Adam, who “choosing to be sufficient unto himself suffers a deficiency in lapsing from the one who is truly sufficient for him.”<sup>214</sup>

If apathy is that condition in which there is neither fear to frighten nor pain to distress, we must avoid it in our present life if we wish to live in the right way, that is, according to God.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 9. “Loeb”, p. 312-313.

<sup>212</sup> Except for such *Schadenfreude* as lust and pride. These are discussed in detail by R. Sorabji (2003).

<sup>213</sup> *Tract. in Ioan.* 60.3. quoted by Colish, (1985) II. p. 223.

<sup>214</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 13. “Loeb”, p. 341.

<sup>215</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 9. “Loeb”, p. 315.

The good life is not a do-it-yourself project in which one can attain full control of his or her behaviour and dispositions. Even unhappy passions such as longing, pain, fear and mourning, have enormous value for us, for “if we were to feel no such emotions at all while we still bear the weakness of our present life, then rather should we not live a proper life. For the Apostle berated and denounced certain persons who, he also said, lacked natural affection [*sine affectione*].”<sup>216</sup>

*A note on ‘The Passion of Christ’ and human passions*

The Augustinian linguistic manoeuvres with *affectus*, *motus*, *passiones* can be rendered more plastic by contrasting “the passion of Christ” with human passions. The first meaning of ‘passion’ originating in Latin *passio* and arriving in Middle English through Old French mediation is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as “the sufferings of Jesus Christ on the Cross (also often including the Agony in Gethsemane)” (1.a) or the “narrative of the sufferings of Christ from the Gospels Passion of Christ as a set narrative told by the Gospels” (1.c). Clearly, it is a reserved and specific sense of the word, although the one that appears by far the most often in vernacular European languages until the Early Modern period.<sup>217</sup> These meanings are related, even if distantly but primarily, to that of Aristotle as defined in *Metaphysics*, Δ, 1022 b 18. where *pathos* is defined as “[e]specially, injurious alterations and movements, and above all, painful injuries.” The narrative of the Passion of Christ is a sequence of sufferings that happens to and is assumed by Christ but, unlike the Aristotelian (and, to some extent, the Thomist<sup>218</sup>) negative association of *pathē* / *passiones*, Christ’s passion is, for the Christian believer, far from being morally or ontologically negative. The narrative has its specific place in human history seen in a Christian perspective (Salvation history, *Heilsgeschichte*) and, as the act of Redemption of man, it is the ultimate source of joy. The passions of man are different...When ‘passions’ (mostly in Plural) are used in

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<sup>216</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 9. “Loeb”, p. 312-313.

<sup>217</sup> Diller, *Ibid* (2004), p. 176. notes that only one-sixth of the occurrences of ‘passion’ in Medieval English do not refer to the Passion of Christ or a martyr.

<sup>218</sup> For Aquinas, passions in the strict sense involve change for the worse and, more generally, they are ranked with the passive and not fully actualised entities existing on the lower, degraded rungs of the ontological ladder.



relationship to humans, they refer to certain affective states and go back to Classical psychology and ethics. Whereas the context of the *Passion of Christ* is always theological, liturgical and is related to Salvation history, the contexts of man's passions are psychological, moral, and anthropological and are often the subject of ethical and pastoral counsel. But there is an interesting development that takes place within Christianity that could perhaps be metaphorically described as the *Gethsemane turn* whereby these two, distinctive uses and senses of 'passion' are getting closer, at least on a conceptual-metaphoric level, although they never fully overlap. In the Garden of Gethsemane, Christ is beginning to experience painful human passions<sup>219</sup> (*tristitia*) as a human person and as part of his "Passion". Also, in Christian discussions of the passions, the actual passions/affections experienced by Christ (and not his *Passion* as such) are sometimes evoked: his affection for Lazarus (grief, sorrow), the fear in the Garden of Gethsemane, as well as the more apparent love for his disciples and for all humans. Even if the fixed sense of 'Passion of Christ' does not change and remains constant throughout the history of 'passion', there is, however, a conceptual/metaphoric level where the 'Passion of Christ' and the actual affections of Christ are getting closer. Considering that these are close to the very 'passions' proscribed by the Stoics and inherited from Virgil and Cicero (*quadrivium*), the Christian approval of such 'passions' in certain cases amounts to an anti-Stoic turn. The point is made with clarity and considerable vehemence by Augustine in his exegesis of the Gospel of John when exploring the unique and exemplary merits of the Passion of Christ. As Colish notes "Christ himself suffered in mind and body. This fact, says Augustine, makes vain the wisdom of the world, here typified as the Stoics: 'Down with the arguments of the philosophers who deny that the wise man can suffer perturbations of the soul.'"<sup>220</sup>

But leaving the actual doctrinal tenets aside – where, notwithstanding, ambiguities prevail – and focusing more on the semantic nuances of the word in the Christian context, it can be argued that a new field is being delimited within 'passions' that is different from the *eupatheia* enjoyed by the Stoic sage. *There can be affective perturbations that are legitimate.* And it is here that Saint Augustine's linguistic manoeuvres with *motus*, *passiones*, *perturbationes*, *affectus* are most revealing and where Augustine's debate with Pelagius is

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<sup>219</sup> Of course, there are other examples prior to it as sorrow, grief, anger, joy (*cf.* above) but the case in the Garden of Gethsemane is of a particularly important point in the history of redemption...

<sup>220</sup> Colish, (1985) II. p. 223. The passage quoted by Colish is from *Tract. in Ioan.* 60.3

decisive: if passions cannot be eradicated then to wish so would be not only inhuman but a rebellion against god. This entails that Pelagianism vindicates too much for man: to will someone's own salvation and justification is an act of self-pride that leaves no room for prevenient grace (*gracia preveniens*).

## II. 2. 2. St. Thomas Aquinas

As the Aquinian anthropology and anatomy of the passions was used or often implied in the passion treatises of the Early Modern period, I shall expose elements of it in Chapter III.1. I am focusing below on some of its basic elements and his taxonomy of the passions that I find most pertinent for assessing the Classical and medieval Christian legacy of the passions.

St. Thomas Aquinas' treatise on the passions in *Summa Theologiae*, II-1.22-48 is part of his monumental synthesis of Aristotelian and Christian thought in. In his treatise, he assimilated many features of the Aristotelian, Stoic and Augustinian accounts of the "passions of the soul". For him, in line with his faculty psychology approach, passions (*passiones*) are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite which are caused by external objects apprehended by the "estimative" or "cogitative" power. Passions of the soul also entail bodily changes for example changes in bodily temperature, alterations in the movements of the heart. Passions thus belong to the soul-body composite and they belong to the soul only "accidentally". *Passio* presupposes materiality and this is why it cannot be predicated of God.<sup>221</sup> Since human cogitative or estimative power is susceptible to reason, so are human passions, too. They are also subject to moral evaluation; they are good if they are in accord with reason, and are thus "moderate", and they are evil if they flout reason, or are excessive. This way, Aquinas adopted a fundamentally Aristotelian position with regard to the passions: moderate passions are good and can even be functional by spurring appropriate action, whereas excessive passions are bad. He elaborated a new classificatory scheme of the passions although using a distinction that was present already in Plato's *Timaeus*, suggested by Aristotle, and given physiological grounding by Galen. It is the distinction between

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<sup>221</sup> *Deus sine passione amat*, Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, 26.1 cf. also *Summa Theologiae*, I, xx, 1, ad 1.

concupiscible and irascible passions. He produced a taxonomy of eleven basic kinds of passions: six passions stemming from the concupiscible appetite and five from the irascible.

*Concupiscible*: (inclination away or toward an object; good/evil)

love	hate
desire	aversion
joy	pain

*Irascible*: (related to the circumstances surrounding concupiscible passions and their objects, caused by movement toward good or away from evil)

hope	despair
fear	daring
	anger

Aquinas's evaluation of the passions was mixed. On the one hand, moderate passions serve the ends of human and animal life. On the other hand, since he took passions to involve change for the worse, and more generally, ranked passions with the passive and not fully actualized entities existing on the lower level of the ontological ladder.

## II. 2. 3. Conclusion: Localism / Globalism

The title of this chapter was the Classical Heritage of 'Passion' and it sought to survey with a rather broad sweep the ancient and early Medieval senses of 'passion' taking into account the different ethical, anthropological and theological concerns implied. While it seems to be legitimate to talk about the a classical heritage of 'passion', such a designation is not meant to suggest, as I hope it became evident from the above discussions, that there had been a shared univocal meaning of the word among authors as diverse as Homer, Plato, Chrysippus or Saint Augustine. The "classical sense" itself is best understood as a certain richness of meaning in 'passion': the Classical heritage itself consists of multiple strands that are often in conflict with each other. Thus one can identify a Platonic-Aristotelian tradition on the one hand, and the radical Stoic tradition on the other hand.

I have been using the word-pair localism/globalism in this chapter in the very specific sense to distinguish between two ways of conceiving the world and the human condition. Thus, even at the cost of simplifying matters a bit, as a heuristic device, I suggest to set up a rough typology of anthropological, moral and, ultimately, ontological attitudes in order to

highlight the stakes behind changes in the meaning of ‘passion’. I used the word *globalism* to refer to a conception of the world that sees homogeneity, a deeply seated unity of mode of being and hence proposes a singular model to follow for all beings and in all contexts. Closest to the globalist attitude are the Stoics (in particular the Stoicism of Chrysippus) with their psychological monism, their advocacy of moral autarchy (*hegemonikon*), their insistence on the supremacy of reason, judgement and free will, and, underpinning these, a deterministic universe animated in all its parts by a singular *logos*.<sup>222</sup> This monolithic *globalist* view can be contrasted with the *localism* of heterogeneity, of diversity of mode of being, of different regimes of ethical concern that – in its Christian version – may even entail a renouncement to moral autarchy and considers it as blasphemous and contrary to the nature of the soul and to the workings of divine grace. The localist attitude regards being as heterogenous without seeking to unify the different modes of being. Rather it allows them to exist in a spatially and temporally displaced manner and seeks ways of transitions between them. Accordingly, it accepts that different ethical thrusts and psychic needs may prevail in different modes of being: in For Plato there is a dualism of body and soul and also room for the irrational *within* the human soul (*thymos*) and thus Plato can call for a canalisation of the irrational towards the rational. Furthermore, the tripartite human anthropology is analogous / isomorphic to the social-political make-up of society, of the *polis*. Both the human soul ‘within’ and the polis ‘out there’ makes room for non-rational, affective content. There is thus room for different regimes to exist both within man and within the universe.

The Aristotelian position is also closer to the *localist* perspective with its acknowledgement of human finitude and its cognitive consequences. Besides the obviously contextual nature of finding the mean in specific contexts and in any given situation, Aristotle’s distinction between ‘prudence’ *φρόνησις* / *phronēsis* and *σοφία* / *sophia* is illustrative and revealing in this regard. For the Stoics, judgement must be the result of and take part in *sophia* and should be based on knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη* / *epistēmē*) that is necessary and is related to the divine world. In the Stoic universe, animated in all its parts by the same *logos*, there is no place for a distinction within intellectual virtues as one contingent in a sublunary world and as one necessary in the divine world.<sup>223</sup> For Aristotle, prudence and the kind of knowledge it can provide (*δόξα* / *doxa*) is a human substitute of a wisdom that is

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<sup>222</sup> Cf. also the passage cited above from Cicero, *De republica* (*deum te igitur scito esse...*) VI. 24.

<sup>223</sup> Cf. Pierre Aubenque, *Ibid.*, p. 185.

unattainable in the ordinary sublunary world. Thus we can see that in contrast with the Aristotelian teaching about human knowledge and the kind of behaviour that can be based on it and which is a form of *localism* inasmuch as it allows for different types of knowledges to coexist, the *globalism* of Stoic teaching, based on the monolithic and homogeneous rule of the one and the same divine *logos* everywhere, does not allow for such distinctions. We shall see later, that Christians will refute this Stoic position on ethical as well as ontological grounds: man is not and cannot be fully master of himself (saving divine grace must intervene), and the human finitude forbids such aspirations.

Early Medieval Christianity, Saint Augustine in particular, is closer to the Platonic-Aristotelian strand but, given its historical position, it can assimilate and adapt to Christian use Stoic elements as well. But if one has to place it on the globalist / localist scale, it would certainly fall under the latter category. Augustine clearly delimits the *here* of human life from the hoped *there*: our fallen state versus the blessed, eternal life; life as *is* and life as *will be*: the human city and the City of God. Just as there are two worlds in the Platonic universe, one superlunary and one sublunary so are there two realms in the Christian universe (although the structure is perhaps even more important *temporally* than spatially) and, particularly, in Christian psychology and ethics: one before and one after Redemption and justification by grace.<sup>224</sup>

In a way, the diverging senses of ‘passion’ (implying the semantic shift as well as the appearance of ‘emotion’) are already present in Augustine in their embryonic form, sometimes explicitly thematized as in *City of God*, XIV. 9., but more often implicit in his uses of *motio* and *passio* (with different implications of perturbation and agitation). But it is the modern, *vernacular* (French as well as English) context that triggers the change from this

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<sup>224</sup> To further illustrate the localist attitude, Blaise Pascal could be evoked. He gives a full-fledged and philosophically seminal (*cf.* S. Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, E. Levinas) development of such kind of localism (albeit in a non-Platonic sense) in the 17<sup>th</sup> century in *Les Pensées* (first published 1670). He distinguishes among three orders: *l'ordre de la chair* (the order of the flesh), *l'ordre de l'esprit* (the order of the mind), and *l'ordre du coeur* (the order of the heart) with ethical regimes and outlooks corresponding to each of them. Although his existential-Christian philosophy cannot be reduced to a reception of Augustine, it may be worth noting that he was close to the Janzenist circles of the Port-Royal and Janzenism itself developed on the basis of a thorough re-reading of the works of Augustine in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

potential. And, as we shall see in chapter III.3 on Florio's Montaigne, the translation from one language to the other – which adds a further axis to contexts of interculturality: between vernaculars and between the Classics and the Early Moderns... Chapters III.1-3 will seek to explore the different configurations how linguistic innovations are symptoms of and are interlaced with conceptual changes and perhaps even *vice versa*. It is also the reason why I have dealt with Aquinas in an even more summarily fashion than with the other authors. Because the argument I wish to put forward in the subsequent chapters will situate the problem of the semantic change of 'passion' at the intersections of Augustinianism, Renaissance humanism, Neo-Stoicism and Protestantism, tendencies which, one might say, tend to replace the dominance of the Thomist tradition...

### **III. 'PASSIONS' IN THE EARLY MODERN CONTEXT**

### III. 1. The Passions in the Humanist Agenda

In England, the Early Modern period produced a large number of treatises and didactic poems dealing with the passions that were inspired both by a Classical wish for self-knowledge *Nosce Teipsum* ('Know Thyself'), and by Christian self-inspection for the purposes of moral and psychological therapy. Many of them were written in English (for e.g. T. Rogers, T. Bright, J. Davies, Davies of Hereford, A. Dixon, T. Wright, R. Burton) but there were also several translations from Latin (mainly Cicero and St. Thomas Aquinas) and French Neo-Stoics (La Primauday, Charron).<sup>225</sup> Although not written specifically as treatises on passions, the conduct-books of the period also spell out some of the implications of the place passions should occupy in appropriate behaviour. The keen interest of Elizabethan society for such kind of literature is also attested by the popularity of such conduct-books as Sir Thomas Elyot, *Book named the Governor* (1531) and Sir Thomas Hoby's translation of the Italian Baldassare Castiglione's *Il Corteggiano* (1528) published in 1561 as *The Book of the Courtier*. These conduct books can be taken as the Renaissance development of a medieval genre (the "mirror for princes"), which in turn goes back to ancient models.<sup>226</sup> The topic is also duly discussed in the age's most important programmatic work for science and philosophy, in Sir Francis Bacon's *The Advancement of Learning*. Of course, the English stage is no exception to the general preoccupation with man's and woman's passion: revenge plays, comedies and tragedies both ancient (cf. translations of Seneca's tragedies starting from 1560s<sup>227</sup>) and modern centre around and colour the understanding and experience of the

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<sup>225</sup> Cf. Appendix 2 and above.

<sup>226</sup> Cf. J. B. Trapp, "Education in the Renaissance" in *Background to the English Renaissance – Introductory Lectures*, foreword by J. B. Trapp, London: Gray-Mills Publishing, 1974, p. 87.

<sup>227</sup> At the Inns of Court, students and fellows (such as Jasper Heywood, Alexander Neville, John Studley) translated Seneca's dramas and performed a series of Senecan and neo-Senecan plays from 1559. In the 1580s and 1590s, after a decade-long break in the performance and publication of Seneca, Thomas Newton compiled the first English anthology of the *Tenne Tragedies* (1581). Seneca's Early Modern English reception has a rich critical literature recently re-assessed by Jessica Winston, "Seneca in Early Elizabethan England" in *Renaissance Quarterly*, Spring 2006. The critical literature includes, among others, T. S. Eliot, "Seneca in Elizabethan Translation." in *Selected Essays*, London, 1932; Lathrop, H. B. *Translations of the Classics into English from Caxton to Chapman, 1477-1620*



passions of the soul. The remark of the English scholar Anthony Levi, S.J. about French culture from 1585 to 1649 is also valid for England:

The theory of the passions was central to the moral debates of the period. The passions could be overcome, moderated, eradicated, or stimulated by reason, will, or grace.<sup>228</sup>

As some of the books on the passions mentioned above were translations from French, the interest in this issue was shared on the two sides of the Channel with perhaps a more accentuated theoretical interest in Early Modern French culture. As Levy suggests, the issues involved with regard to the passions concern not only their definition and nature but also and, perhaps even more importantly, the ways to pre-empt, to eradicate or to use them.

The importance of the theme of the passions in Early Modern culture can be explained on several grounds. As a broader context of this topic, Early Modern humanism has to be taken into account as the broader intellectual movement preparing and accompanying the Renaissance in Europe from the 15th to the 17th century. It is within the context of this movement that issues about the nature of man, about the exercise of his will, the uses of learning and the possibilities of education come into the forefront of debates. Compared to Medieval views of man that allowed relatively little room for the flexibility of the subject, the Early Modern period presented a more dynamic view of man and his place in the universe. In general, Medieval thinkers held human nature to be unalterably fixed: medieval doctrines of

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(New York, 1967, (reprint of 1933); Hunter, G. K. "Seneca and the Elizabethans: A Case-Study in 'Influence.'" in *Shakespeare Survey* 20 (1967): pp. 17-26.; Frederick Kiefer, "Seneca Speaks in English: What the Elizabethan Translators Wrought." *Comparative Literature Studies* 15 (1978b), pp. 372-87; Gordon Braden, *Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition: Anger's Privilege* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985). For a broader perspective on Stoicism and English Renaissance Literature cf. Gilles D. Monsarrat, *Light from the Porch. Stoicism and English Renaissance Literature* (Paris: Didier-Erudition, 1984).

<sup>228</sup> Anthony Levi, S.J., *French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions from 1585 to 1649*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 4. Cf. also Carole Talon-Hugon, *Descartes ou Les Passions rêvées par la raison – Essai sur la théorie des passions de Descartes et de quelques-uns de ses contemporains*, Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2002. By way of introduction to an analysis of Descartes's understanding of the passion, Talon-Hugon provides, in the first chapter of her book, an overview of the doxa on the passions in the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century in France.

personality attributed an unalterable *thisness* (*haecceitas*) to each separate creature, a *thisness* that the individual was unable to modify.<sup>229</sup> In contrast to Medieval scholasticism that regarded man's position in essentially static, hieratic terms, the Renaissance stressed man's dynamic, operative potential for restoration of the divine image as well as the possibility for irremediable bestialisation.<sup>230</sup> Intimately related to this conception of humanity is the idea of an almost chameleon-like indeterminacy and malleability of man where passions may lead towards degeneration. For perhaps the most famous exposition of this latter point in Renaissance philosophy can be found in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (1486). In his praise of man Pico shows the indeterminacy of his nature, his vertical flexibility and hence the prime importance of the free will in moulding himself in whatever shape he prefers: brutish or divine. (In the words of 20<sup>th</sup> century existentialists, man is distinguished by the fact that for him existence precedes essence.) Man may determine to fashion (*effingere*) himself into the form of life he prefers. This is Pico's version of the Creation of Adam:

At last the best of artisans ordained that that creature to whom He had been able to give nothing proper to himself should have joint possession of whatever had been peculiar to each of the different kinds of being. He therefore took man as a creature of indeterminate nature and, assigning him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus: 'neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and according to thy judgement thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt desire. The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. We have set thee at the world's center that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in the world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honour, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion (*effingere*) thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have

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<sup>229</sup> Cf. Thomas Greene, "The Flexibility of the Self in Renaissance Literature" in *The Disciplines of Criticism. Essays in Literary Theory, Interpretation and History*, ed. by Peter Demetz, Thomas Greene, and Lowry Nelson, Jr., New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 242-243.

<sup>230</sup> Cf. Charles Trinkaus, "Renaissance Idea of the Dignity of Man" article in *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 4, p. 140. Electronic version maintained by: The Electronic text Center at the University of Virginia Library, 2003, Gale Group.

the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgement, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.<sup>231</sup>

This Renaissance discourse about the dignity of man builds on a complex of notions inherited from ancient thought and literature such as the praise of man as the inventor of the arts and crafts, as a microcosm, as being distinguished by speech and reason. Pico's influential *Oration on the Dignity of Man* is also characteristic of subsequent humanist attitudes in that it gives to philosophy and to humanist learning more generally, a special place in man's ascent towards the higher forms of life. This conception of the human dignity has its roots in Cicero who defines the dignity of the human race in the following terms:

But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep before our eyes how far superior man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they have no thought except for sensual pleasure and this they are impelled by every instinct to seek; but *man's mind is nurtured by study and meditation; he is always either investigating or doing, and he is captivated by the pleasure of seeing and hearing.* [...] From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the *dignity of man* and that we ought to despise it and cast it from us.<sup>232</sup>

Human dignity resides in the possibility of developing man's mind by study and reflection. Thus for the humanist program, understood as the promotion of *studium humanitatis*, the quality of being most truly human is to be acquired through the study of liberal arts. As the nobility and dignity of man is grounded in his mind as the seat of reason, as the fountainhead of right action, and of improvement, the "passions of the mind" represent a particular danger.<sup>233</sup> Passions pose a threat, as they are potentially disruptive to this humanist wish to improve human life by applying the fruits of studies, of learning. Humanism

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<sup>231</sup> Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, trans. by E. L. Forbes in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, ed. by E. Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller, J. H. Randall, Jr., (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1948) pp. 224-225. (paragraph 3 of the *Oration*).

<sup>232</sup> Cicero, *De Officiis*, I. 30. (my emphasis, G.S.) in Cicero, *On Duties*, "Loeb" p. 107.

<sup>233</sup> For the idea that "the notion of man as mind is one of the hallmarks of Renaissance thought" Barbara L. Parker, *A Precious Seeing. Love and Reason in Shakespeare's Plays*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1987, pp. 44-49 who cites P. O. Kristeller (*Renaissance Thought and Its Sources*, ed. Michael Mooney, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) in support of this position.

must find a way to treat the passions also because it is predicated on a view of man that prizes human reason and intellect and sees it as the seat of human mind and as a means to moral improvement. Also, in the early modern encounter between Stoicism and Christianity humanist discourses on the dignity of man have to be refined and to be revised in order to better accommodate corporeal and affective aspects in human nature. I wish to argue that this will entail and, in fact, contribute to the semantic change of passion – a point to which I shall return further below.

A fine example, although presented *a contrario*, of the centrality of the mind and of reason as well as of the threat that passions pose to moral rectitude and spiritual well-being is Sir Philip Sidney's "Sonnet 18" in *Astrophil and Stella*.

With what sharp checkes I in myself am shent  
 When into Reason's audit I do go,  
 And by iust counts my selfe a banckrout know  
 Of all those goods, which heaven to me hath lent;  
 Unable quite to pay even Nature's rent,  
 Which unto it by birthright I do owe;  
 And which is worse no good excuse can show,  
 But that my wealth I have most idly spent.  
 My youth doth waste, my knowledge brings forth toys,  
 My wit doth striue those passions to defende,  
 Which for reward spoil it with vain annoys.  
 I see my course to lose myself doth bend:  
 I see and yet no greater sorrow take,  
 Than that I lose no more for *Stellas* sake.<sup>234</sup>

The poem presents a persona who, in a despondent state, and in a moment of self-inspection, registers his bankruptcy due to his inability to show forth the positive use of the talents Nature has lent him, namely, the use mental virtues of which the seat is the mind. The italicised line explicitly names the context where the (lost) battle with the passions is taking place. The final couplet of the sonnet aims to trivialise such loss when it suggests that all is bearable for Stella's sake provided that there is an exit from this state of loss toward her. Notwithstanding, the basic pattern of a battle within the mind, the use of "wit" (reason) as the source of a moral

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<sup>234</sup> Sir Philip Sidney, *Astrophil and Stella*, "Sonnet 18" in *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*, Volume 1, M. H. Abrams, (general editor), New York, London: W. W. Norton and Co., p. 18. (italics mine)

and mental faculty in combating the passions is there. In the same sequence, “Sonnet 64” goes much further in this direction of presenting the love of Stella as the remedy of his loss. Ultimately, it identifies Stella with wit and virtue and sacrifices everything for her by invoking a series of adversities upon himself:

No more, my deare, no more these counsels trie,  
     O give my passions leau to run their race:  
     Let Fortune lay on me her worst disgrace,  
 Let folke orecharg'd with braine against me crie,  
 Let clouds bedimme my face, breake in mine eye,  
     Let me no steps but of lost labour trace,  
     Let all the earth with scorne recount my case,  
 But do not will me from my Love to flie.  
     I do not enuie *Aristotle's* wit,  
 Nor do aspire to *Cæsars* bleeding fame;  
 Nor ought do care, though some aboue me sit,  
 Nor hope, nor wish another course to frame,  
     But that which once may win thy cruell hart:  
     Thou art my wit, and thou my vertue art.<sup>235</sup>

He is also ready to renounce the faculty and merit most prized in the humanist context: wit and fame. The sacrifice implied in the calamities invoked and in the faculty renounced increase the stakes of Stella as their renouncement further warrant the value of Stella, and ultimately of his own love toward her.

When considering lines two and eight, it is noticeable that “passions” are not referred to in the sense of ‘erotic love’ or ‘love’ but rather in the general sense of ‘disorder, disease; violent commotion of the mind’. In the series of calamities the speaker invokes in lines 2-7, the first item is passions running their race (line 2) but in line 8, love is retained: being close to his Love (Stella). (Even if “my Love” here means a person, Stella, and not love as such, the idea of loving is involved.)

As we shall see in Chapter III.3, Bacon’s “Georgics of the Mind” or *cultura animi* - of Ciceronian origin as well - can also be understood in terms of the humanist agenda to apply the fruits of studies to moral advancement. Even more emblematic is the image Bacon evokes by referring to the myth of Orpheus in the *Advancement of Learning* in the following terms:

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<sup>235</sup> Sir Philip Sidney, *Astrophil and Stella*, “Sonnet 64” in *The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney*, edited by William A. Ringler, Jr., Oxford University Press, 1962. (italics mine)

Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities which arise from nature; which merit was lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus' theatre, where all beasts and birds assembled; and, forgetting their several appetites, some of prey, some of game, some of quarrel, stood all sociably together listening to the airs and accords of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned to its own nature: wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained; but if these instruments be silent, or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion.<sup>236</sup>

Orpheus's theatre can be taken as a metaphor of the role humanism set for itself: to alter human behaviour by the force of learning, rhetoric, understood as "the eloquence and persuasion of books".

In a more succinct formulation, Erasmus' dictum about the importance of education and fashioning - *homines non nascuntur, sed figuntur*: men are not born, but made or fashioned - well expresses the centrality of education for the humanists. Erasmus' case helps to highlight the broadness of this humanist agenda insofar as the aspiration to human dignity (understood as an ascent) can encompass both secular and divine studies. As Thomas Greene notes: "Nothing is more typical of the Christian humanist in Erasmus than his faith in the moral fashioning of the self through sacred study, a fashioning which leads directly to moral transformation."<sup>237</sup> In his *Paraclesis* or Exhortation to his first edition of the two volumes of the *New Testament* (1516) Erasmus writes:

Let us all, therefore, with our whole heart covet this literature, let us embrace it, let us continually occupy ourselves with it, let us fondly kiss it, at length let us

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<sup>236</sup> *The Advancement of Learning in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the Major Works*, Edited by Brian Vickers, "The Oxford Authors" (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 154.

<sup>237</sup> Th. Greene, *Ibid.* p. 255.

die in its embrace, let us be transformed in it, *since studies are transmuted into morals*.<sup>238</sup>

Ultimately, for Erasmus, “a man without education has no humanity at all,”<sup>239</sup> since lacking the arts of good speech, a person’s affections cannot be educated into the patterns of feeling that sustain moral perception.

Education in a broad sense involving the humanist curriculum and propagating appropriate conduct in society (cf. books of conduct) was also a matter of prime importance for the Early Modern monarchic state which for the administrative consolidation of royal power relied on a pool of educated men who could serve as councillors, secretaries, clerks, Justices of Peace, and spies.<sup>240</sup>

The discourse about the dignity of man finds resonates throughout the Early Modern period; it is reassessed by various authors and receives different colourings. Pico’s Neo-Platonic conception of what is to be truly human is contested within humanism itself by such an author as Michel de Montaigne.

To this so religious conclusion of a heathen man I will only add this word, taken from a testimony of the same condition, for an end of this long and tedious discourse, which might well furnish me with endlesse matter. 'Oh, what a vile and abject thing is man (saith he) unlesse he raise himselfe above humanity!' Observe here a notable speech and a profitable desire; but likewise absurd. For to make the handfull greater than the hand, and the embraced greater than the arme, and to hope to straddle more than our legs length, is impossible and monstrous: nor that man should mount over and above himselfe or humanity; for he cannot see but with his owne eyes, nor take hold but with his owne armes. He shall raise himself up, if it please God to lend him his helping hand. He may elevate himselfe by forsaking and renouncing his owne meanes, and suffering himselfe to be elevated and raised by meere heavenly meanes. *It is for our*

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<sup>238</sup> Desiderius Erasmus, *Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings*, ed. John C. Olin, (New York, Evanston, and London, 1965) p. 105. quoted by Th. Greene, *Ibid*, p. 255-256. (italics mine, G.S.)

<sup>239</sup> Erasmus, *A Declamation on the Subject of Early Liberal Education for Children*, trans. by Beert C. Verstraete, in *The Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 26, ed. by J. K. Sowards (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) p. 298. quoted by Donald R. Wehrs, “Touching Words: Embodied Ethics in Erasmus, Shakespeare, and Contemporary Theory.” *Modern Philology* 104, 1 (2006) p. 10.

<sup>240</sup> Elizabeth Hanson, *Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 18.

*Christian faith, not for his Stoic virtue, to pretend or aspire to this divine Metamorphosis, or miraculous transmutation.*<sup>241</sup>

Although the quotation in Montaigne's text is from Seneca, Montaigne's opposition to human aspirations to go beyond what is genuinely human apply equally to Pico's program of vertical mobility. But the French philosopher's refusal pertains to the means of this ascent and not to its possibility as such: he acknowledges the possibility of superhuman metamorphosis but firmly maintains that such ascent is not in our capacity to attain but is only possible through "heavenly means". In fact, Pico's assertion about the indeterminacy of man gives an accrued importance to the will in human metamorphosis. Montaigne's refusal to adhere to such a doctrine can be taken as symptomatic of a Christian refusal to grant superhuman powers to man. It is at this point that the similarity between Pico's model and Stoic self-sufficiency can be gauged: the psychic autarchism (*hegemonikon*) or self-rule that Stoicism gives pre-eminence to the human will and advocates the blanket suppression of the passions. By refusing the Stoic aspirations to go beyond humanity, Montaigne refuses, by the same token, the radical optimism of a certain humanist agenda about the malleability of man and his capacity for vertical mobility. This does not mean, of course, that Montaigne would be opposed to change: his very activity of an essay-writer – and perhaps the most original in that for having established the genre – is based on his being in the "passage".<sup>242</sup>

Montaigne's self-exploration can also serve as a link to another issue to which the problem of the passion is closely linked in the period. The great popularity of Early Modern passion-treatises can be well inscribed in the practice proposed by the famous Delphic motto of γνῶθι σεαυτόν "Know thyself" or *Nosce teipsum* as it was more often referred to in the period. Treatises on the passions most often explicitly referred to this injunction that can perhaps be taken as the motto of popular philosophy in the Renaissance. For example, Thomas Rogers, in the preface of his *A philosophicall discourse, entitled, The anatomie of the minde* (1576) professes to be writing for those readers whose "chiefest though not only care is

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<sup>241</sup> Michel de Montaigne, "An Apologie of Raymond Sebond" in *The Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne, 1580, 1597*. Translated by John Florio, (1603) in 3 volumes, (London: Frowde, World's Classics Edition, 1904) Vol. 2. p. 367-368. (italics mine, G.S.)

<sup>242</sup> Michel Montaigne, "Of Repenting" in *The Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne, 1580, 1597*. Translated by John Florio, 1603. World's Classics edition. 3 volumes, Vol. 3. (London: Frowde, 1904) p. 20.



to know themselves". These exercises in self-knowledge can be related to forms of "care of the self" as presented above in Chapter I.3. And just as the ancient Delphic precept of 'Know thyself' was but one aspect and concrete application of taking care of one's self, similarly, we may assume that Early Modern passion-treatises were not only written with this perspective in mind but they were also received in such a way by the less scholarly-minded reading public. In the perspective of knowing oneself, reading moral treatises on the "anatomy of the mind" may be taken as a "practice of the self", as part of an exercise (*askesis*) aimed at understanding and transforming one's self and what we would term today as psychic behaviour. Of course, we must be aware that such a category as psychic behaviour implying purely psychic phenomena was not available in the period under consideration; all psychic phenomena were intimately linked to both moral categories and to interrelated elements of the world within (*microcosmos*) and without (*macrocosmos*). The work of Thomas Rogers shows the prevailing tendency in the period of presenting the passions in a moral framework. He was a scholar and divine of Christ Church, Oxford and his book is representative of a type of moral philosophy in the Renaissance that deals with passions as important elements in man's quest for virtue by becoming more rational. They can be either properly used for a good cause or improperly allowed to subvert virtue by hindering the process of reason. Thus he divided his book in two parts; the first part is of "Perturbations (and discourseth of that parte of the minde of man which is voide of reason)" and the second part treats of "Moral virtues (so called because it is of that parte of the minde which is endued with reason)".<sup>243</sup> The first part deals with man himself, his soul and physical nature and the passions are called "perturbations". Four passions are listed as primary following Cicero: pleasure, lust, fear, and sorrow. The second book concerns moral virtue and deals minutely with the preservation and exercises of goods of fortune, nature and the mind. Thus Rogers' treatise exhibits one of the current notions of moral virtue as having to do with the conflict between reason and unreason where the passions are denied rationality: a discussion of man's physical and animate nature (presenting man as a microcosm of the larger creation) is followed by another discussion of his moral nature and his exercise of moral virtue. The concern he and his readers have with the passions is fundamentally moral. While Thomas Rogers' approach to the problem of the passions with a moralistic bias is the more widespread in the period, it is not the exclusive

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<sup>243</sup> Thomas Rogers, *A philosophicall discourse, entitled, The anatomie of the minde* (1576) quoted by Lily B. Campbell, *Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes. Slaves of Passion*, London: Methuen, 1930.

bent of analysis. Similarly to Rogers, Bartholomaeus Anglicus (of Bartolomew of Glanville)<sup>244</sup>, Pierre La Primaudaye<sup>245</sup>, Sir John Davies<sup>246</sup>, Pierre Charron<sup>247</sup>, Anthony Dixon<sup>248</sup>, John Davies of Hereford<sup>249</sup>, Thomas Wright<sup>250</sup> Nicolas Coffeteau<sup>251</sup> approach the problem of the passions from the point of view of the soul and their main concern are moral issues. Physicians at some points in their careers such as Levius Lemnius<sup>252</sup>, Timothy Bright<sup>253</sup> and Juan Huarte<sup>254</sup> see human beings more in terms of humours, spirits, complexions, temperaments and natural heat as informed by Galenic medicine. They start the discussion of the nature of man from the physical basis. As Galenic medicine treats bodily phenomena and moral issues in a holistic manner, the moral questions and opinions are not neglected by Renaissance physicians either but their approach to passions usually reveals the physical bias of their calling. Their treatises answer to the basic dilemma and a probable cause of anxiety as to whether human passions are mechanistically determined by the flux of humours and blood, the motions of the vital spirits, bodily temperature and other physical factors. Thus Timothy Bright describes the government of the passions as essentially

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<sup>244</sup> He wrote *De proprietabus rerum* in the 14<sup>th</sup> century a popular medieval treatise that was many times published on the continent. It was published in English in 1582 as *Batman vypon Bartholome, his booke De proprietabus rerum*.

<sup>245</sup> *The French Academie* ((Books 1 and 2:1586, 1594) translated by Thomas Bowes. Five editions of Bowe's translation appeared by 1614 and three more editions, of different translators from later French editions were put out between 1594 and 1605; Book 3 was translated by Robert Dolman, (1601). Book 4 by W(illiam?), P(hilippe?) (1618) - the whole work was published in 1618.

<sup>246</sup> *Nosce Teipsum* (1599) – a didactic poem on the nature of man's soul. Four more editions appeared by 1622.

<sup>247</sup> *Of Wisdome*, translated into English by Sampson Lennard, 1606. (First published in Bordeaux, in 1601.)

<sup>248</sup> *The Dignitie of man*, (1612).

<sup>249</sup> *Microcosmos, the discovery of the little world*, (1603) – a didactic poem on the nature of man. It was reissued twice in 1611.

<sup>250</sup> *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1601) (1604) (1620).

<sup>251</sup> *A Table of Humane Passions* (1621) translated into English by Edmund Grimeston.

<sup>252</sup> *A Touchstone of Complexions*, translated into English by Thomas Newton in 1576.

<sup>253</sup> *A Treatise of Melancholie* (1586)

<sup>254</sup> *The Examination of Mens Wits*, translated by Richard Carew, 1596

rhetoical: “a civill subjection ruled by counsel and restraint”. In *The Passions of the Mind*, Thomas Wright attempts to tread a middle ground in order to achieve a comprehensive treatment. He keeps his readers informed of the physical processes that accompany and in some case initiate passions. Thus he allows the humours a natural role in moving the passions but only insofar as they are sympathetic with the soul’s operations. Movement of the soul arises from the “purer spirits” flowing from the brain, the residence of the imagination. Those spirits act upon the sympathetic responses of the heart. But at the same time he preserves a moral and religious stance commensurate with his ecclesiastical background as a Jesuit priest in stressing the sinfulness of passionate excess.

Early Modern authors base their work concerning the anatomy of the passions on a long-term synthesis of philosophical and theological thought culminating in the work of Thomas Aquinas. It is understood that only man has immortal soul that is created by God and soul is the very life of a human being. The human soul is the lowest form of immaterial spiritual substance; it is below the angels in the scale of existence which extends from man at the lower end to God at the highest point. The soul itself has three parts: the vegetative, sensory, and rational souls which are all components of the one indivisible entity. The vegetative part is the lowest form of soul, it is found in all living things: it drives and governs processes of nourishment, growth, and reproduction. The sensory part is common to animals and humans: it is the medium of sensation and empowers man to apprehend stimuli from within or without, and to desire. It acts under the control and guidance of reason, and the sensory soul's proper end is to apprehend and desire sensory good. Apprehending and desiring functions are further divided into two powers; the apprehending is composed of internal and external powers: the external one (“outer wits” or “utter wits” in Wright’s book) gather sense impressions from the network of the five senses, and deliver them to the brain where they are received by the “inner wits”. The four inner wits of the sensory soul are common sense, imagination or fantasy, instinct, memory. These reside in the brain that has four cavities: two in front (common sense, imagination), one in the middle (the judging powers: instinct and rationality) one in the rear (memory). They operate as common sense receives sense data from without and presents them simultaneously to imagination, which has the power to retain data for some time. Imagination presents data to judging faculties; the lower judging faculty reacts automatically, but is ruled by the higher judging faculty (*ratio particularis*). Imagination can also present data from memory; instinct stores data presented to it unselectively. Common sense, imagination, instinct, and memory are the inner wits or faculties belonging to the sensory soul. Particular reason is the important controlling faculty of the rational soul.

Rational judgement of man can control instinct; it can commit to memory and will, and can control sensory appetite and the passions that arise out of it.

The desiring soul is divided into two appetites: the concupiscible and the irascible. When an appetite is either the desire of some perceived good or the hatred of some perceived evil it is called concupiscence; when consists in a desire to attack or overcome whatever threatens or stands in the way of that good, it is an irascible appetite. Whereas the concupiscible appetite is directed toward the thing itself, the irascible appetite is aiming toward the circumstances surrounding the thing. Wright uses the terms “coveting” and “invading” to concupiscible/irascible.

Rational soul is common to humans and angels, the wit or intellective power understands and judges whereas the will desires the good. Wit seeks to know the highest and most perfect truth, while will desires metaphysical or moral goodness. Wit and will are true leaders of man's commonwealth - often impugned and corrupted by the effects of inordinate passions, to the increase of vice and fall of virtue.

Man is understood as a microcosm, a little world in which the components and hierarchical relationships of the larger universe were reflected. As God and lesser spiritual powers ruled over the world of matter, so the divine quality of reason is perceived as the rightful ruler over the lower sensory and vegetal functions, and the soul, captained by its rational part, rightfully exercises sovereignty over the body. The body itself is also a microcosm of physical nature and is composed of the four basic elements: earth, air, water, fire intermixed in delicate compounds. Each of these elements has well-defined qualities: *earth* is cold and dry; *air* is hot and moist; *water* is cold and moist, *fire* is hot and dry. The balance of these elemental properties is important in determining an individual's temperament. The chemical processes of the body are affected by fluids or humours in the blood. These humours are four in number: blood, phlegm, choler (or red bile), and melancholy (black bile). Blood is the purest and most life-giving humour, associated with air (heat, moisture). Phlegm and choler, identified with the cold and moist properties of water and the hot and dry properties of fire, are humours more neutral in themselves.

The spirits provide link with the soul through which the body itself or its various processes are activated. There was much disagreement as to exact nature and function of bodily spirits which is the highest and most refined state of matter. There are three types: natural (produced in liver), vital (produced in heart), animal (further refining of vital spirits in brain). The three types of spirits are associated with the three types of souls: natural spirits empower vegetative operations; vital spirits govern motions of blood and humour surrounding

the heart; animal spirits move the whole body and are the media of sensation, whose operations properly, but not necessarily, are under the control of reason. Animal spirits can be considered the most important link between body and soul; vital spirits figure in the motions of humours about the heart, where passions are produced. Passions, or affections, or emotions, are both the operations themselves of the sensory soul's appetitive or desiring faculties and the effects thereby produced in the body.

Writers on the passions are mainly concerned with the soul's sensory powers through which the body is moved and the rational power communicates with the physical world, and over which the rational power must exercise control to allow the progress of moral virtue. Although there are passions in the rational soul too but rational appetite, will, deals mainly in abstractions, affecting the body only through the sensory faculties. As they are the operations of our sensory appetite, we perceive passions almost every moment in our lives, when we love, hate, fear, enjoy, or desire anything; we feel them not only in our minds but in our bodies as well. The immediacy and the potential strength of passions pose a threat to the ordered working of the little worlds of our bodies and souls; the authority of our higher rational powers may be undermined and perverted from their proper roles as guardians of our spiritual nature. For these reasons Wright and others treat passions with the utmost seriousness, considering an understanding of their natures and tendencies as vital to preserving physical and spiritual health.

The location of the passions' influence in the body is agreed to be the heart. Ancient opinion differed over the question of whether this organ or the brain were the more important, but finally the proposition that the brain was the seat of sensation and the mental faculties, and the heart the seat of vital processes, gained acceptance.

The basis of analogy between microcosm and macrocosm that structures the anatomy of the soul is the exercise of power by a higher entity: God over the universe, reason over the body. Early Modern writers often use similar structures in a horizontal sense when describing human behaviour. The social model of governance is applied to the behaviour of the individual. This mode of governance applied to the soul, while it underpins all Renaissance discourse about the passions, is explicitly spelled out in Erasmus, *The Manual of the Christian Knight* (1501) and in Sir Thomas Elyot's manual for conduct, *The Governour* (1531).

In exposing the need for a concord between the soul and the body, Erasmus refers to the original sin and presents it in terms of a corrupted governance:

[...] but sin hath evil-corrupted and decayed that which was well created, sowing the poison of dissension between them that were honestly agreed, for before that time both the mind ruled the body without business, and the body obeyed without grudging. The order between them is so troubled, the affections or appetites of the body strive to go before reason, and reason is in a manner compelled to incline and follow the judgement of the body. Thou mayst compare therefore a man properly to a commonalty, where is debate and part taking among themselves. Which commonalty for as much as it is made of sundry kinds of men gathered together, which be of diverse and contrary appetites: it cannot be avoided that much strife shall arise therein, and parts taken often times, unless the chief rule and authority be in one. And he himself be such a fellow that will command nothing but that which shall be wholesome and profitable for the commonwealth.<sup>255</sup>

Erasmus further develops this theme by exposing the Platonic teaching about the different parts of the soul (“two kinds of souls, the one kind spiritual and immortal, the other as it were mortal”) and the Platonic topology of *logisticon*, *thymos* and *epithymia*.

Elyot’s parallel between interior and exterior governance is more straightforward:

It is to be noted that to hym that is a gouernoure of a publike weale belongeth a double gouernaunce, that Audacity and Timidity is to saye, an *interior or inwarde gouernaunce*, and an *exterior or outwarde gouernaunce*. The firste is of his affectes and passions, which do inhabite within his soule, and be subiectes to reason. The seconde is of his children, his seruantes, and other subiectes to his autoritie.<sup>256</sup>

This passage also shows the link that exists between governance of the self and governance of others and hence the isomorphism between the private mental sphere and the political. This idea of the relationship between the two spheres of life is reminiscent of the teleology of the care for the self analysed by Foucault with regard to *Alcibiades* (cf Chapter I.3.). In Elyot’s text too, the mastery over one’s own self is explicitly linked to the mastery over others as “interior or inward governance” is explicitly linked to “exterior or outward governance”. Although Elyot does not present his ideal of governance in an educational framework in the very passage quoted above, this scheme can be deduced from the overall structure of the book that is aimed as a guidebook on how to educate children for governance. Thus the title of

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<sup>255</sup> *The Manual of a Christian Knight* (1501) (London: Meuthen and Co., 1905) Chapter IV. p. 56-57. <http://oll.libertyfund.org>

<sup>256</sup> Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Boke named The Governour*, III. 8. Everyman edition. (London: J. M. Dent & Co; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1907) p. 225. (emphasis mine, G.S.)

Book One Chapter Four is “The education or fourme or bringing up of the childe of a gentelman, which is to haue authoritie in a publike weale” and the ensuing chapters elaborate on the various aspects required for such purpose. Comparing education to the “the policie of a wyse and counnyng gardener” Elyot writes:

Semblable ordre will I ensue in the fourmyng the gentill wittes of noble mennes children, who, from the wombes of their mother, shal be made propise or apte to the gouernaunce of a publike weale.<sup>257</sup>

Just as in the Alcibiadic type of relation to the governance of the self, for Elyot and Erasmus, too, governance of the self is linked to and is analogous with the governance of “a publike weale”. The underlying assumption behind the governance-model is that we can gain control over the passions that are linked mainly to the sensory part of the soul and to the flesh by addressing the rational, discursive power of the mind. Passions are interior phenomena that arise from one's material nature spontaneously or as a consequence of the material connection to externality. To tame and overcome such perturbations of the soul a certain education is needed to exercise control over them. The question is of course, how such control is possible. Classical heritage offered different models ranging from the Platonic channelling of the passionate (*alogos*) towards *logos*, the search for Aristotelian adjustments whereby the rational part of the soul persuades the irrational part. At the opposing end of the spectrum is the radical Stoic dualism between the fortress of reason and the assaults of passions. Elyot's reliance on Aristotle for his moral outlook is implied by the very title of the chapter within which the above passage on inward and outward governance occurs: “Of the noble vertue fortitude, and of the two extreme vices, Audacitie and Timerositie”. He frames the moral situation as consisting of extremes to be avoided and the search for a middle ground in the following terms:

To the one and the other is required the vertue morall called fortitude, whiche as moche as it is a vertue is a Mediocritie or meane betwene two, extremities, the one in surplusage, the other in lacke. The surplusage is called Audacitie the lacke Timorositie or feare. I name that Audacitie whiche is an excessiffe and inordinate truste to escape all daungers, and causeth a man to do suche actes as are nat to be ieoparded. Timorositie is as well whan a man feareth suche thinges as be nat to be feared, as also whan he feareth thinges to be feared more than

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<sup>257</sup> T. Elyot, *Ibid.*, I. 4. p. 19.

nedeth. For some thynges there be whiche be necessary and good to be feared, and nat to feare them it is but rebuke. Infamie and reproche be of all honest men to be dradde. And nat to feare thynges that be terrible, agayne whiche no powar or witte of man can resiste, is foole hardynesse, and worthy no praise, as erthe quakes, rages of great and sodayne flodes, whiche do bere downe before them mountaynes and great townes, also the horrible fury of sodayne fire, deuourynge all thing that it apprehendeth. Yet a man that is valiaunt, called in latyne Fortis, shall nat in suche terrible aduentures be resolued into waylinges or desperation. But where force constrayneth him to abide, and neither powar or wisdomed assayed may suffice to escape, but, will he or no, he must nedes perysshe, there dothe he paciently sustayne dethe, whiche is the ende of all euilles, And lyke as an excellent Phisitioun cureth moste daungerous diseases and dedely woundes, so dothe a man that is valiaunt auance himselfe as inuincible in thinges that do seme moste terrible, nat unadvisedly, and as it were in a bastely rage, but of a gentill courage, and with premeditation, either by victorie or by dethe, wyynnyng honour and perpetuall memory, the iuste rewarde of their vertue.<sup>258</sup>

The moral virtue of fortitude consists in avoiding audacity or fear that are both considered as affects or passions consisting in giving inappropriate responses to situations. Elyot's description of the behaviour of the valiant man who has "Fortis" receives a certain Stoic colouring as the passage evolves towards a sense of impassibility of the valiant man who "patiently sustains" even death amidst natural catastrophe. But the end of the passage brings back again the social context of moral action: just as for Aristotle ethics was bound up with life in the *polis* including the citizen's reputation, so too Elyot's last words are about honour and perpetual memory won by and the just reward of virtue.

Discourse about the passions in the 16<sup>th</sup> century builds on rather traditional themes that were developed in the Middle Ages and find their most complete expression in St. Thomas Aquinas' monumental synthesis of Aristotelian and Christian thought. More specifically, his treatise on the passions in *Summa Theologiae*, II-1.22-48. Aquinas assimilated many features of the Aristotelian, Stoic and Augustinian accounts of the "passions of the soul". Due to Cicero's influence and in particular by the mediation of Saint Augustine, the doctrine of the four passions as perturbations of the soul and of the three rational states of affectivity were transmitted to the Middle Ages and to the Renaissance. The psychological and physiological descriptions given in Early Modern passion-treatises derive from St. Thomas Aquinas even if the classification of passions themselves into four principal passions is Ciceronian in origin

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<sup>258</sup> T. Elyot, *Ibid.*, III. 8. p. 225-226.



often through the mediation of St. Augustine. The centrality of the rational faculty, its hierarchic pre-eminence is also a constant, historically continuous feature of these treatises. The role of reason is, in one way or another, to govern the passions so that human behaviour may conform to virtue and avoid vices, sins and sensual excesses. Passions require regulation in order to secure moral advancement. Although the passion-treatises in the Early Modern period continue to build on the Thomist idiom, these issues receive renewed importance in the perspectives opened by the humanist programme of moral and spiritual advancement. What may be seen as new in these passion-treatises can perhaps be better grasped from the side of their reception. Their great number and their popularity is indicative of a psychic, moral and cultural need in response to both social changes and, more generally, to the potentialities opened by humanism. Treatises on moral philosophy and on the passions more specifically were not written and read exclusively by highly educated people such as university men, the clergy, physicians and lawyers. The general populace, understood as the “less scholarly-minded reading public”, seemed to read and enjoy books on moral philosophy. This indicates the breadth of interest in the nature of man and self-exploration among Elizabethans and Jacobeans. The ubiquity of the issue of passion may reflect a concern with making personal behaviour more self-conscious in order to be able to better regulate and govern one’s action in a more and more centralised society that, in England, underwent several religious and political upheavals in the span of seventy years starting with the abrupt break with the Roman Catholic Church (1534), followed by adaptation to a radical form of Protestantism under Edward VI (1547-1553), then restoring Roman Catholicism by Mary I (1553-1558) and finally to a moderate (Anglican) Protestantism under Elisabeth I (1558-1603). On the social plane, it can be argued that the popularity of the theme of passions in Elizabethan and later in Jacobean England reflects a need for an appropriate self-governance and self-transformation in the stratified hierarchical social relations: efficient social interactions require the taming and the good use of the passions.<sup>259</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> Gilles D. Monsarrat (1984, p. 3.) sees the period of the reign of Elizabeth, James and Charles I as “One of peace and prosperity” especially compared to the bitter wars that ravaged France and the Netherlands during the second half of the sixteenth century.

The importance of passion-treatises in Early Modern culture can also be grasped from the perspective of Norbert Elias's influential theory of progressive emotional containment.<sup>260</sup> In his understanding of history, the domestication of human affectivity comes about in the course of regularisation of emotions. He sees the development of European civilisation in terms of a process of dissemination and interiorisation of "good manners" conducive to a more pacified society. The power and exercise of force is concentrated in the sovereign, in the initially absolute and then constitutional state. Accordingly, collective psychology undergoes a radical transformation: singular individuals in all social classes interiorise the "good manners" of members of the court, who were first to renounce force in the sovereign's favour. Thus the passions are no longer strong and open as in the Middle Ages, social control of behaviour increases as society models more and more the subjects' affective behaviour. Whereas in medieval times, despite all regional and social differences, the norms of good manners changes very little, Early Modern social upheavals induce changes in this field as subjects feel, much more than before, the need for imposing self-control on themselves leading to changes in norms of behaviour. According to Elias, the Renaissance is a transition period in a fluctuating process whereby existence loses its vivacity and colour but gains security and formalisation in the modern era and he regards it as a process accompanied by a lessening intensity of experience. The result is the interiorisation of constraints leading to the civilisation i.e. to the historical transformation and often to the repression of our affective culture.

On the individual level, the renewed popularity of the theme of self-knowledge (*Nosce teipsum*) is attested in the agenda of passion-treatises as *cura sui* or ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ / *epimeleia heautou* and *cultura animi*. The Delphic injunction and the techniques of self-care and self-exploration that it implies gain a new vibrancy in this context. Hence the importance also of a humanist education and of books of conduct in a society which for the administrative consolidation of royal power relies on a pool of educated men who could serve as councillors,

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<sup>260</sup> *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation* (1939, 1969) in English: *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners* (1939) – I had access to the French translation. Cf. in particular, *La civilisation des mœurs*, traduit de l'allemand par Pierre Kamnitzer, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1973), chapters « La mutation du comportement à la Renaissance » pp. 150-180. et « Les relations sexuelles » pp. 371-418. « Les modifications de l'agressivité » pp. 419-449.

secretaries, clerks, Justices of Peace, and spies.<sup>261</sup> Understanding the social relevance of books about the passions in these terms is also in line with Stephen Greenblatt's focus on self-fashioning in the Early Modern context. In the very first paragraph of his book *Renaissance Self-Fashioning From More to Shakespeare* in the perspective of a justification for the seeming boldness of the topic of 'self-fashioning', Greenblatt writes:

Moreover, there is a considerable empirical evidence that there may well have been less autonomy in self-fashioning in the sixteenth century than before, that family, state, and religious institutions impose a more rigid and far-reaching discipline upon their middle-class and aristocratic subjects. Autonomy is an issue but not the sole or even the central issue: the power to *impose a shape upon oneself is an aspect of the more general power to control identity - that of others at least as often as one's own.*<sup>262</sup>

Greenblatt also invokes the Classics of Renaissance historiography, namely Jacob Burckhardt and Jules Michelet to support his claim that "there is in the early modern period a change in the intellectual, social, psychological, and aesthetic structures that govern the generation of identities. This change is difficult to characterize in our usual ways because it is not only complex but resolutely dialectical."<sup>263</sup> As components of this change, Greenblatt singles out the new stress on the executive power of the will, the new social mobility, the new assertion of power by family and state to determine all movement within society, the awareness of the existence of alternative modes of social, theological, and psychological organization, and a renewed dedication to the imposition of control upon those modes.

Perhaps the simplest observation we can make is that in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process. Such self-consciousness had been widespread among the elite in the classical world, but Christianity brought growing suspicion of man's power to shape identity: 'Hands off yourself', Augustine declared. Try to build up yourself, and you build a ruin.'" (Sermon, 169) This view was not the only one available in succeeding centuries, but it was influential, and a powerful alternative began to be fully articulated only in the

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<sup>261</sup> Elizabeth Hanson, *Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 18.

<sup>262</sup> Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning From More to Shakespeare*, (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.) p. 1.; emphasis mine. G.S.

<sup>263</sup> S. Greenblatt, *Ibidem*.

early modern period. [...] As a term for the action or process of making, for particular features or appearance, for a distinct style or pattern, the word has long been in use, but it is in the sixteenth century that *fashion* seems to come into wide currency as a way of designating the forming of a self.<sup>264</sup>

Reading passages like this one may wonder what Foucault and Greenblatt would have to say to each other on the issue of self-fashioning and care for the self. That they were not completely unaware of each other's work can be deduced from the fact that they refer to each other albeit in very short footnotes. Thus in the context of a complex methodology for the examination and formal cleansing of conscience developing after the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 Greenblatt refers to the Foucault's *Histoire de la sexualité 1: La Volonté de savoir* (published in 1976) as "powerful speculations".<sup>265</sup> Michel Foucault, in the second volume of his *History of Sexuality, L'Usage des plaisirs* (published in 1984) writing about the arts of existence and practices of the self with a view to the transformation of the self in the Renaissance (as underlined also by Burckhardt), refers in a footnote to "an interesting analysis in the recent book of Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, (1980).<sup>266</sup> Greenblatt seems to have arrived at the ideas of control mechanism (such as plans, recipes, rules, instructions) and to the complex interactions of meaning in a given culture in the shaping of one's identity through Clifford Geertz.<sup>267</sup> What Foucault's and Greenblatt's versions of the early modern self have in common is the foregrounding of the practice of certain practices of the self - understood as forming an integral part of ethics for Foucault and, not independently of it, taken to form part of a cultural system of meanings that creates specific individuals by governing the passage from abstract potential to concrete historical embodiment for Greenblatt. What is most relevant here in their respective findings is the stress on the generation of identities and the power to control identity which, in Foucault's term, is part of care for the self. In this configuration, the semantic change of 'passion' may be a marker of the change in the ethical modes of how early modern subjects understood the need to impose shape upon their mental lives, as part of their ethical practice. From the intercultural

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<sup>264</sup> S. Greenblatt, *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>265</sup> S. Greenblatt, *Ibid.*, p. 85 and footnote.

<sup>266</sup> Michel Foucault, *L'Usage des plaisirs. Histoire de la sexualité 2*. Paris: Gallimard, 1984, p. 16 and footnote.

<sup>267</sup> Cf. Greenblatt, *Ibid.* p. 2-4.

perspective of the present study, understood as the encounter and interaction between Classical and Early Modern humanisms, our focus is on the way such ethical practices are modified in the course of this encounter and how this contributes to and takes part in the semantic change of 'passion'. Greenblatt's characterisation of medieval Christianity in the passage cited above – and quoting St. Augustine – seems to flatten the dialectic at work at the heart of Christian experience and of Christian techniques of the self. Certainly, Christianity, especially the way it was understood in medieval times, does not aggrandize individuality. But because faith and salvation are inherently personal, Christianity requires attention to the self. One is tempted to say, in Greenblatt's terms, that there is *a* Christian fashioning of the self – which is a version of the techniques of the self – but its orientation is towards salvation and not to worldly ends. But the relation to the self is there at its base and it involves minutely developed practices of the self in the Western monastic tradition for example. Foucault understood Christian spiritual practice as techniques of the self:

Everyone in Christianity has the duty to explore who he is, what is happening within himself, the faults he may have committed, the temptations to which he is exposed. Moreover everyone is obliged to tell these things to other people, and hence to bear witness against himself. These two ensembles of obligation - those regarding faith, the book, the dogma, and those regarding the self, the soul and the heart - are linked together. A Christian needs the light of faith when he wants to explore himself. Conversely, his access to the truth can't be conceived of without the purification of the soul. [...] I would like to underline that the Christian discovery of the self [unlike in Buddhism] does not reveal the self as an illusion. It gives place to a task which can't be anything else but undefined. This task has two objectives. First, there is the task of clearing up the illusions, temptations and seductions which can occur in the mind, and discovering the reality of what is going on within ourselves. Secondly, one has to get free from any attachment to this self, not because the self is an illusion, but because the self is much too real. The more we discover the truth about ourselves, the more we have to renounce ourselves; and the more we want to renounce to ourselves, the more we need to bring to light the reality of ourselves. That is what we could call the spiral of truth formulation and reality renouncement which is at the heart of Christian techniques of the self.<sup>268</sup>

Greenblatt's reference to the notion of fashioning (*effingere*) as a term receiving wider currency for designating the forming of the self in the 16<sup>th</sup> century is certainly valid (cf. also

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<sup>268</sup> Michel Foucault and Richard Sennett, "Sexuality and Solitude" in *London Review of Books*, Volume 3, Number 9, 21 May to 3 June 1981. p. 5.

Pico's *Oration* cited above) but it is questionable whether it was really a "powerful alternative" to earlier practices of the self. It could be argued that Christian practices of the self, such as the examination of conscience or confession, prepared the way for such a fashioning of the self.

### III. 2. The Role of the Stoic - Christian Humanist Encounter in the Semantic Shift of 'Passion'

The change in the understanding of 'passion' comes about at the junction of Stoic thought with Christianity and this development – that I termed as semantic shift – further contributes to the elaboration of interiority. The theological underpinnings of this encounter between a revived Stoicism in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century and Christianity contributes to the semantic transformation of the word 'passion'. This encounter can also be described as the contestation of different kinds of authorities: the one having traditional, religious grounds (the Bible and the Church as the context of its interpretation including the Church Fathers), the other having the authority of humanist discourse building on the writings of ancient philosophers regarded as capable of giving guidance to human behaviour. The conflict of these diverging authorities can be attested in several key writings of the period and they have their antecedents in patristic literature. I wish to contend that the relevance of this encounter for the semantic change of 'passion' is that the confrontation with the radical Stoic anthropology and model of self-control in the Early Modern Christian-Humanist context triggered off a demarcation from this anthropology and model of ethical behaviour. Therefore the Stoic movement (sometimes referred to as Neo-Stoicism) of the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, in particular the reactions against it, are of crucial importance in the bringing about the semantic change of 'passion'. It is neither to say that Stoicism did not interact with Christianity before (just to the contrary, cf. above Chapter II. 2.), nor to pretend that Stoicism did not persist in influencing and tainting Christian practice after this confrontation. However, it is in the intercultural context of early modern humanism and, in particular, in the Reformation tradition, that the attack on Stoicism is most advanced.<sup>269</sup> Adapting Foucault's terminology to this situation, it can be described as a change in what is considered as the "ethical substance"

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<sup>269</sup> For the same view, cf. William J. Bouwsma, "Renaissance and Reformation: An Essay on Their Affinities and Connections" in *A Usable Past. Essays in European Cultural History* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990) pp. 225-246. and R. Strier "Against the Rule of Reason: Praise of Passion from Petrarch to Luther to Shakespeare to Herbert" in *Reading the Early Modern Passions. Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion*, edited by Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 29.

in the relation to one's self. My claim is that the change in the "ethical substance" induced a change in the vocabulary. In the remaining part of this chapter, I shall present some textual instances of this Stoic – Early Modern Christian-Humanist encounter in order to show how the reaction to Stoic autarchy prepared the way for the semantic change of 'passion'. I shall also try to elicit, albeit briefly, their philosophical and theological underpinnings.

The vogue of Stoicism (sometimes referred to as Neo-Stoicism<sup>270</sup>) emerged in France and spread to England in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century and first of all it implies modern editions and translations of ancient Stoic authors. The most influential figures of this movement were continental writers: Justus Lipsius<sup>271</sup> and Guillaume du Vair<sup>272</sup>, and Pierre Charron<sup>273</sup> but some of the Stoic ideas were also taken by Michel de Montaigne. The reading public demanding such works was a wide one, not confined to those trained in the classical languages, thus translations of these ancient authors into the vernacular tongues were required. "Thomas James, the translator of Du Vair, was impressed by the way in which 'Christians may profit by the Stoicks', for he asserted that 'no kinde of philosophie is more profitable and neerer approaching unto Christianitie... then the philosophie of the Stoicks' and urged Christians to follow them as farre foorth as they have followed the trueth'."<sup>274</sup> In England, the movement is also attested by the vogue of Seneca in the literary circles and his growing influence in the school curriculum of the period (cf. the publication of translations of Seneca's prose by Robert Whytinton<sup>275</sup>, and of his tragedies<sup>276</sup>) and by translations of

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<sup>270</sup> For the problems with the terms such as "Neostoicism", "Neostoic" "Christian Stoicism" cf. Monsarrat (1984), pp. 77-80: lack of contours and no precise dogmatic content.

<sup>271</sup> Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) published *De Constantia* in 1584 and it was translated into all the major European languages (went through over eighty editions in the next three centuries). It was translated into English as *Two Books of Constancy Englished by Sir John Stradling* in 1594.

<sup>272</sup> *La Philosophie Morale des Stoïques*, (1585); *The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks*, (1598, London) Englished by Thomas James.

<sup>273</sup> *De la sagesse* (1601, Bordeaux); *Of Wisdome in three books*, London 1606 (with a dedication to Prince Henry) and 1612, translated into English by Sampson Lennard

<sup>274</sup> Rudolf Kirk in *The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks*, 1598 Englished by Thomas James, London, edited with Introduction and Notes by Rudolf Kirk, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1951, p. 3-4.

<sup>275</sup> *Lucii Annei Senacae ad Gallioneni de Remedis Fortuitorum. The remedies agaynst all casuall chaunces. Dialogue inter sensum et Rationem. A dialogue betwene Sensuylte and Reason.* Lately



Cicero<sup>277</sup>. In England, indeed, most of the Stoic works were available in the native language by the early 17<sup>th</sup> century and there was a “widespread awareness of Stoicism among the educated classes of early seventeenth-century England”.<sup>278</sup> This awareness is also reflected in and was responsive to the dramatic literature of late sixteenth – early seventeenth century as the plays of Shakespeare, Marston, Chapman, Ford and Massinger attest to it.

The basic motivation of this movement was, beside the obvious point of making available the Greek and Latin texts and translating these works into the modern languages, to explain Stoicism in Christian terms, to make it understood by and palatable to orthodox Christians, to create, in short, what is known to us as Neo-stoic philosophy.<sup>279</sup> Thomas James, the translator of Du Vair, was impressed by the way in which “Christians may profit by the Stoicks”, for he asserted that “no kinde of philosophie is more profitable and neerer approaching unto Christianitie ... Than the philosophie of the Stoicks,” and he urged

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translated out of Latyn into Englyshe by Robert Whytynnton poet Laureat and nowe newly Imprynted. Modern edition: *Seneca's De Remedis Fortuitorum and the Elizabethans. An essay on the influence of Seneca's ethical thought in the sixteenth century, together with the newly-edited Latin text and English translation of 1547*, by Ralph Graham Palmer, Chicago, Illinois: Institute of Elizabethan Studies, 1953.

<sup>276</sup> *Seneca His Tenne Tragedies*, translated into English between 1559-1581 by Jasper Heywood and others and edited by Thomas Newton, in 1581. Cf. also William Cornwallis, *Discourses upon Seneca the Tragedian* (1601) consisting of meditative commentaries on eleven sentences drawn from the tragedies.

<sup>277</sup> *De Amicitia* and *De Senectute* translated already in 1481 but *De Officiis* is translated in 1534 by Robert Whytynnton, and by Nicholas Grimald in 1553. *Tusculanae Disputationes* is translated by John Dolman in 1561.

<sup>278</sup> Monsarrat, (1984, p. 7.) According to Monsarrat (p. 45), there were two main periods for the translation of classical Stoic texts: 1560 to 1580 and 1610 to 1636. The main representatives of the Stoic revival on the Continent – Lipsius, Du Vair, and Charron – were translated into English between these two main periods.

<sup>279</sup> Guillaume du Vair, *La Philosophie Morale des Stoiques*, 1585 (France) *The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks*, 1598 Englished by Thomas James, London, edited with Introduction and Notes by Rudolf Kirk, New Brunswick, New Jersey : Rutgers University Press, 1951, p. 4.

Christians to “follow them as farre foorth as they have followed the trueth.”<sup>280</sup> For the Elizabethans faced with the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”<sup>281</sup>, the religious and political upheavals of the century, the particular appeal of Stoic precepts can also be explained by the kind of autarchic selfhood they promoted and presented as attainable.

The Stoic revival foregrounded a certain strain of Classical ethics that promoted a rigorous self-control of the self because what it valued the most was a certain impassibility achieved through rational self-control. The self could find its peace and freedom in its *hegemonikon*: the citadel of reason shielded from the vagaries of the external world. This model of self-sufficiency came under attack from various angles. In his ambivalent and changing attitude to Stoicism, Early Modern sceptics like Montaigne, questioned the power of reason to be the arbitrator in matters of human behaviour. Thus in his essay “How one ought to governe his will” Montaigne voices his sympathy for those, like himself, who cannot attain to the impassibility advocated by the Stoics.<sup>282</sup>

But Stoic self-sufficiency went against more orthodox Christian notions about human inwardness and the nature and motivations of ethical behaviour as well. As Chapter II.1.3. sought to demonstrate above, Stoicism put great emphasis on the power of the will in achieving self-control and following the rule of reason. It promoted an autarchic self that requires no external help for its spiritual advancement. In the Early Modern encounter between Christianity and Stoicism, when addressing the issue of passion and the Stoic ideal of the sage free from all passions, some Christian authors – often informed by Augustinian notions of *pathos*, grace and salvation and/or by Neo-Platonist notions of love as “a cosmic phenomenon informing the universe and apparent in nature”<sup>283</sup> - refute both the anthropology inherent in this ideal and its moral and theological implications. At this stage it may be helpful to employ Foucault’s terminology for describing the issues at stake in terms of differences in respective cares for the self. For the Stoics, the *telos* of the care for the self is self-rule and the

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<sup>280</sup> Thomas James’s “Preface” to Guillaume du Vair, *The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks*, in Du Vair, *Ibidem*.

<sup>281</sup> *Hamlet*, III. 1. 58.

<sup>282</sup> Michel de Montaigne, “How one ought to governe his will” Chapter 3.X in *Ibid.*, vol. 3. p. 308.

<sup>283</sup> Leonard Forster, *The Icy Fire: Five Studies in European Petrarchism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 21. quoted by Mary Beth Rose, *The Expense of Spirit. Love and Sexuality in English renaissance Drama*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 20.

attainment of self-sufficiency.<sup>284</sup> From a Christian perspective such self-sufficiency is sinful since it leaves no room for the workings of divine grace. The emphasis on inwardness and on care for the self in both Stoicism and Christianity leads to diverging ends although, historically, that emphasis was often taken as a mark of proximity between Christian and Stoic ethics and ethical practices.

This dialogue within early modern humanism is part and parcel of its intercultural nature as set out in the introduction of this study. For the historian W. J. Bouwsma, the “tension between Stoicism and Augustinianism was a perennial element in the career of Renaissance humanism” and he conceives these as ideological poles “designating antithetical visions of human existence” in complex interaction.<sup>285</sup> The Stoic vision places man in the rational order of nature determined by a rational cosmic order: a microcosm in the macrocosm. As the same laws pertain to both, the rational order of the universe extends to the notion of man and his link to God is his reason and rational capacity. Hence happiness is best achieved by the conquest of fear and desire through prudence, will and fortitude, basically, through man’s own powers. This elevation of reason implied the denigration of other dimensions of the personality, especially the passions and the body, which threatened to challenge the sovereignty of reason. This attitude can be traced, with variations in intensity in the writings of Petrarch, Vives, Lipsius, Calvin.<sup>286</sup>

But even before the vogue of Stoicism in late 16<sup>th</sup> century, the debate about the legitimacy and desirability of passions – covering a wide range of affects as understood in the Classical vocabulary - can be traced in Petrarch, *De Ignorantia (De sui ipsius et multorum*

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<sup>284</sup> A. A. Long describes the Stoics’ relationship to happiness as revisionism in the sense that they internalise the goods of which happiness consists. In this sense all the goods a person needs for happiness are internal and consist in a virtuous character. Cf. A. A. Long, *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>285</sup> W. J. Bouwsma, “Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought” in *A Usable Past*, p. 20-22.

<sup>286</sup> Cf. Bouwsma, *Ibid.* pp. 31ff. I am indebted also to Monsarrat (1984) in particular “Part I Stoicism and the Renaissance Christian” for a detailed presentation and assessment of the Stoic – Christian encounter in the context of English Renaissance. I shall single out some instances of this early modern encounter that, I wish to suggest contributed to the semantic shift of “passion” through a reassessment of ethical practice in light of Christian doctrine.

*ignorantia*)<sup>287</sup> in which he stresses the importance of the emotional and affective in life and in the exchange of letters between the Florentine Collucci Salutati and Peregrino Zambecari<sup>288</sup>. One of the leading motifs of subsequent discussions is formulated in this letter, namely the inhumanness of having no passions:

If there were such a person, and he related to other people like this [remaining unmoved and without grief and even anger at the news of destruction of his homeland] he would show himself not a man but a tree trunk, a useless piece of wood, a hard rock and obdurate stone.<sup>289</sup>

The stringent control over one's passions implies for the Renaissance imagination and for its received notions about the body a degree of physical control over one's humours (we would perhaps call it our vegetative system today) that is inhuman. Having passions becomes thus a mark of being human for Macilente in Ben Jonson's play, *Every Man out of his Humour* (1599), Macilente asks "but, Stoque, where (in the vast world) / Doth that man breathe, that can so much command his bloud, and his affection?"<sup>290</sup> Such Stoic practice is criticised if successful in wiping out the affections but it is also blamed when the *telos* of ethical behaviour is not achieved. In this case, the charge of ingenuity is levelled against it as in John Marston's *The Malcontent* (1604) when Pietro Jacomo dismisses of Seneca in these terms: "Out upon him! He writ of Temperance and Fortitude, / yet lived like a voluptuous epicure, and died like an / effeminate coward"<sup>291</sup>.

The argument that having no passions is a sign of lack of humanity was taken up later by several Renaissance authors as well, in particular by Erasmus. In *The Praise of Folly* (1511-16) he acerbically criticises that "double-strength Stoic, Seneca" who strips his wise man of every emotion:

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<sup>287</sup> Petrarch, *On His Own Ignorance, and That of Many Others*, trans. Hans Nachod, in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, ed. Erns Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, Jr, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1948.

<sup>288</sup> The letters are quoted and analysed in Richard Strier, "Against the Rule of Reason" in *Reading the Early Modern Passions*. pp. 24-26.

<sup>289</sup> Quoted by R. Strier, "Against the Rule of Reason" in *Reading the Early Modern Passions*. p. 25.

<sup>290</sup> Ben Jonson, *Every Man out of His Humour*, I.1.2-4.

<sup>291</sup> John Marston, *The Malcontent*, III.1. 26-28.

Yet in doing so he leaves him no man at all but rather a new kind of god, or demiurgos, who never existed and will never emerge. Nay, to speak more plainly, he creates a MARBLE SIMULACRUM OF MAN, A SENSELESS BLOCK, completely alien to every human feeling.<sup>292</sup>

The god-like self-sufficiency of the ideal Stoic sage leads to a godlessness because it dispenses with divine grace and leaves no room for its workings. Similarly, a common verbal pun in Renaissance English assimilates the Stoics with 'stocks': a wooden carving, an imitation of men, not the ones God made.<sup>293</sup> In humanist terms – to recall Pico's *Oration* – it is a parody of the vertical mobility of man<sup>294</sup>: instead of opening the self to vertical impulses and helping it ascend in the hierarchy of beings, it closes it up into one of its faculties (reason) that is certainly its precious but not the only gift from its Maker. I wish to present and comment on some instances of hostile reactions to this Stoic ideal of senselessness.

In the ironic context of the *Encomium* that employs multiple rhetorical modes, Dame Folly accepts the "Stoic definition" according to which "wisdom consists in nothing but being led by reason", and, conversely, that "folly is defined as being swept along at the whim of emotion".<sup>295</sup> Against this definition of wisdom, which limits human life to the non-affective,

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<sup>292</sup> Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly*, p. 39. Frankly, I lost track of the source of this translation but cf. the translation quoted by Strier, (*Ibid.* p. 28.), and Braden (1985) p. 94. "He [Seneca] is left with something that cannot be called human; he fabricates some new sort of divinity that never existed and never will ... he sets up a marble statue of a man, utterly unfeeling and quite imperious to all human emotion." Desiderius Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly*, trans. Clarence H. Miller (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979) p. 45.

<sup>293</sup> Cf. Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, I.1.31. Let's be no Stoickes, nor no stockes I pray" For the basic form of the pun cf. *Euphues*, in John Lyly, *Complete Works*, ed. R. Warwick Bond (Oxford, 1902) 1:190. Thomas Thorpe tries to turn the joke around in the preface to John Healey's translation of *Epictetus his Manuall* (London, 1610; STC 10424): "He is more senceles than a stocke, that hath no good sence of this Stoick." (sig. A4r) – quoted by Braden, 1985, p. 240 n69. cf. also Gilles D. Monsarrat, 1984, *passim*.

<sup>294</sup> For the Erasmian echo of Pico's *Oration* cf. *The Manual of a Christian Knight*, Chapter IV. "In our minds verily we be so celestial and of godly capacity that we may surmount above the nature of angels, and be unite, knit and made one with God."

<sup>295</sup> Desiderius Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly*, trans. Clarence H. Miller (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979) p. 28.

having passions becomes a sign of folly and thus Folly gains a considerable part of human life: *having the foolishness* necessary to overlook our friends faults, to be fond of babies, to surrender to the charm of youth, to be kind to one's wife, becomes a token of human sociability.<sup>296</sup> *Not having* this kind of foolishness would turn one into a monster:

Who would not flee in horror from such a man, as he would from a monster... a man who is completely deaf to all human sentiment ... no more moved by love or pity than a chunk of flint ... who never misses anything, never makes a mistake, who sees through everything ... never forgives anything, who is uniquely self-satisfied, who thinks he alone is rich, he alone is healthy, regal, free.<sup>297</sup>

In a similar vein and outside the ironic context of the *Encomium*, Erasmus – in the Augustinian tradition of resistance to Stoicism<sup>298</sup> – aligns himself rather with a position he attributes to the Peripatetics and “considers emotional impulses ... as tutors, attached to souls striving toward virtue”.<sup>299</sup> Aspiring to *inhuman* clear-sightedness and especially to the kind of emotional impassivity advocated by the Stoics blocks the self not only from fellow humans but from the workings of divine grace as well. It is for this reason that such senselessness of the Stoic sage is attacked also by Calvin and Luther<sup>300</sup>. Although before being a convert to Reformation, Calvin contributed to the renewed interest in Stoicism and published, in 1532, a

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<sup>296</sup> *The Praise of Folly*, Chapter XXX and passim.

<sup>297</sup> *The Praise of Folly*, p. 45-46.

<sup>298</sup> For the importance of Augustine for the Renaissance advocacy of affectivity cf. Deborah K. Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

<sup>299</sup> Erasmus, *Antibarbari*, translated by Margaret Mann Philips, in *The Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 23, ed. by Craig R. Thompson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 62. Similarly in *The Manual of a Christian Knight* (1501) Chapter V : “Peripatetics teach the affections not to be destroyed utterly, but to be refrained, and that the use of them is not utterly to be refused, for because they think them to be given of nature, as a prick or a spur to stir a man to virtue: as wrath maketh a man bold and hardy, and is a matter of fortitude.”

<sup>300</sup> The theme that Stoicks are blockish and senseless and that their philosophy is stone- or iron-like and hence should be refused is ubiquitous in the literature of the period. Monsarrat (1984) p. 74ff present instances from Heinrich Bullinger, *Decades*, (appeared in English, in 1577); Pierre de La Primaudaye, *French Academie* (in English 1586).

commentary on Seneca's *De Clementia* and pointed out certain similarities between Stoicism and Christianity but already at this time, he denounced the chimerical apathy of the Stoic sage.<sup>301</sup> In the *Institutes*, Calvin's hostility to Stoicism and in particular to its ideal of human nature as an imprint or replica of universal Reason is even more straightforward. Against the Stoic view of patience that is beyond all passions, Calvin suggests that

This conflict which believers maintain against the natural feeling of pain, while they study moderation and patience, Paul elegantly describes in these words: 'We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed,' (2 Cor. 4:8, 9). You see that to bear the cross patiently is not to have your feelings altogether blunted, and to be absolutely insensible to pain, according to the absurd description which *the Stoics of old gave of their hero as one who, divested of humanity, was affected in the same way by adversity and prosperity, grief and joy; or rather, like a stone, was not affected by anything.*<sup>302</sup>

Calvin goes on to further substantiate his point with texts taken from the New Testament and with examples of how Christ endured passions:

Now also we have among Christians a new kind of Stoics, *who hold it vicious not only to groan and weep, but even to be sad and anxious.* These paradoxes are usually started by indolent men who, employing themselves more in speculation than in action, can do nothing else for us than beget such paradoxes. But we have nothing to do with that *iron philosophy which our Lord and Master condemned*--not only in word, but also by his own example. For he both *grieved and shed tears for his own and others' woes.* Nor did he teach his disciples differently: 'Ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice,' (John 16:20). And lest any one should regard this as vicious, he expressly declares, 'Blessed are they that mourn,' (Mt. 5:4). And no wonder. If all tears are condemned, what shall we think of our Lord himself, whose 'sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground?' (Luke 22:44; Mt. 26:38). If every kind of fear is a mark of unbelief, what place shall we assign to the dread which, it is said, in no slight degree amazed him; if all sadness is condemned, how shall we justify him when he confesses, 'My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death?'<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Cf. G. D. Monsarrat (1984) p. 70-71. and the critical literature cited by Monsarrat as well as Braden (1985) p. 92.

<sup>302</sup> John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, A New Translation, by Henry Beveridge, Esq Printed at London by Arnold Hatfield, for Bonham Norton, (1599) III. 8. 9. (italics mine) (<http://www.reformed.org/master/index.html?mainframe=/books/institutes/>)

<sup>303</sup> Calvin, *Institutes*, III. 8. 9. (italics mine)

Being able to endure passions draws us nearer to Christ himself and may reinforce our faith. Unlike the Stoic sage who becomes virtuous by his reliance on his own reason alone (itself a replica of universal Reason) without any external aid, the Christian, having a corrupt intellect and will, must not block himself from the workings of divine grace.<sup>304</sup> Thus Christian practice ethical practice involves passionate, affective content. Moreover, such affective content that expresses itself in inter-human relationships has as its ultimate source, openness to the workings of divine grace.

Behold, from faith thus flows forth love and joy in the Lord, and from love a joyful, willing, and free mind that serves one's neighbour willingly and takes no account of gratitude and ingratitude.<sup>305</sup>

The “joyful, willing, and free mind” has its source in the love of God based on faith, and it is such a disposition that constitutes the freedom of a Christian.

It is not the place to go into the details of Luther's theology of grace but I would like to highlight a major element in his disagreement with Erasmus where Luther takes the anthropological consequences of his theology (and of his reading of the Bible) to their ultimate point. Although Erasmus accords affections woven of the intercourse of mind and body a pivotal role in engendering the capacities for love, ethics, and meaning that open the soul to grace,<sup>306</sup> he nevertheless retains a Platonic vocabulary when interpreting St. Paul. Thus in the *Enchiridion* he makes the following equivalences:

That the philosophers call reason, that calleth Paul, sometime the spirit, sometime the inner man, other wile the law of the mind. That they call affection, he calleth sometime flesh: sometime body: another time the outer man, and the law of the members. Walk (saith Paul) in the spirit, and ye shall not accomplish

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<sup>304</sup> Cf. *Institutes*, II. 3. “Every Thing Proceeding From The Corrupt Nature Of Man Damnable” and II. 3. 7-12. where Calvin explicitly refers to Augustine and to his theology of grace developed in his debate with Pelagius.

<sup>305</sup> Martin Luther, *The Freedom of a Christian*, trans. By W. A. Lambert, revised by Harold J. Grimm in *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings* edited by John Dillenberger (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961) p. 75-76.

<sup>306</sup> Cf. Erasmus, *A Discussion of Free Will* trans. Peter Macardle in *The Collected Works of Erasmus* vol. 76., ed. Charles Trinkaus (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 23-25 and *passim*.



the desires and lusts of the flesh, for the flesh desireth contrary to the spirit, and the spirit contrary to the flesh.<sup>307</sup>

Thus Erasmus interprets the Pauline letters through the lenses of a Platonic dualism. For Luther, however, “flesh” and “spirit” are not to be taken in the Platonic sense and are not equivalent to body and soul. His exegesis of *Letter to the Romans* brings out that both body and spirit can behave according to the “flesh”:

FLESH and SPIRIT must not be understood as if flesh had only to do with moral impurity, and spirit only with the state of our hearts. Rather, *flesh*, according to St. Paul, [...] means everything that is born from the flesh, i.e. the entire self, body and soul, including our reason and all our senses. This is because everything in us leans to the flesh. It is therefore appropriate to call a man ‘carnal’ when, not having yet received grace, he gibbers and jabbbers cheerfully about the high things of the spirit in the very way which Galatians 5 [:19f] depicts as the works of the flesh, and calls hypocrisy and hatred works of the flesh.<sup>308</sup>

Not having received grace, man is in a phase of total depravity including his mental faculties. Therefore neither the Platonic canalisation through the *logisticon*, nor (and even less!) the Stoic reliance on one’s rational faculty can lead to righteousness in the Christian sense. Luther further explores this point in his exegesis of Galatians 5:19 referred above:

As I have already indicated briefly, this passage provides us with the greatest possible comfort when it tells us that it is impossible to live without any desires and temptations of the flesh, in fact, without sin. It admonishes us not to act like the men of whom Gerson writes, who labored to rid themselves of any awareness of temptation or sin, in other words, to become nothing but stones. The sophists and monks had the notion about the saints that they were merely logs and blocks, utterly lacking in any feeling. Surely Mary felt a great sorrow in her mind when her Son was lost (Luke 2:48). Throughout the Psalms David complains that he is being almost swallowed up by the great sorrow that came from the magnitude of his temptations and sins. Paul also complains that he feels “fighting without and fear within” (2 Cor. 7:5), and that with his flesh he serves the law of sin (Rom. 7:25). He says that he suffers “anxiety for all the churches” (2 Cor. 11:28), and that God had mercy on him by restoring Epaphroditus to life when he was near to death, lest he should have sorrow upon sorrow (Phil. 2:25–27). And so the saint as defined by the sophists resembles the wise man as

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<sup>307</sup> Erasmus, *The Manual of a Christian Knight*, Chapter VI.

<sup>308</sup> Luther, “Preface to the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans” in *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings* (1961) p. 25. (italics mine)

defined by the Stoics, who invented a kind of wise man that has never existed in the universe. With this foolish and wicked notion, which was born of their ignorance of this Pauline doctrine, the sophists brought themselves and innumerable others to the brink of despair. [...] But now that the light of truth is shining, we see with utter clarity that Christ and the apostles designate as saints, not those who lead a celibate life, who are abstemious, or who perform other works that give the appearance of brilliance or grandeur but those who, being called by the Gospel and baptized, believe that they have been sanctified and cleansed by the blood and death of Christ. Thus whenever Paul writes to Christians, he calls them saints, sons and heirs of God, etc. Therefore saints are all those who believe in Christ, whether men or women, whether slaves or free. And they are saints, on the basis, not of their own works but of the works of God, which they accept by faith, such as the Word, the sacraments, the suffering, death, resurrection, and victory of Christ, the sending of the Holy Spirit, etc. In other words, they are saints, not by active holiness but by passive holiness.<sup>309</sup>

Given that the most advanced form of the theology of grace in the period is that of Martin Luther, it is no wonder that the most full-fledged criticism of the Stoic position and the most advanced praise of affectivity (although not of “passions” as such, see below) comes from him. As Strier puts it: “Luther gives Folly’s horror theological underpinnings.”<sup>310</sup> According to Luther, the “righteousness” that is required for salvation is imputed to the believer as a gift

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<sup>309</sup> Martin Luther, “Lectures on Galatians” trans. Jaroslav Pelikan, in *Luther's works*, vol. 27, edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter Hansen, (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1984) p. 81-82.

<sup>310</sup> Strier, *Ibid.*, p. 29. The question whether Stoicism and anti-Stoicism had more of a Catholic or Protestant bent in the Renaissance has been an issue of hot debate since the seminal study of Léontine Zanta, *La Renaissance du stoïcisme au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, (H. Champion, Paris, 1914, "Bibliothèque Littéraire de la Renaissance") who, despite claiming that Reformation and Stoicism were incompatible in spirit, saw rationalism as a common ground between the two and several points of convergence (deterministic pantheism and divine omnipotence, an identical formalism (faith and a correct will)). It was perhaps the seeming proximity of the two that prompted most Reformist thinkers, including their English disciples, readers and commentators, to distance themselves from Stoicism, their faux-ami. However, as Monsarrat notes (p. 70), Zanta’s analysis sometimes reads like a Catholic indictment of Reformation and her conclusions have invited further debate (for eg.M. Spanneut, *Permanence du Stoïcisme* (Gembloux, 1973) p. 231f). I agree with Monsarrat’s conclusion that although both Puritans and Stoics were called “precise”, “if we look beyond what may be called daily ethics, at the fundamental problems of salvation, merit, and the nature of man there is undoubtedly a radical opposition between the Porch and the Reformation.” (p. 77)

of God<sup>311</sup>: it is not by one's works, by one's merits that one can become righteous, nor is it by reliance on one's reason like the path to the bliss of the Stoic sage. Being righteous does not mean some kind of elimination of human affectivity as the examples of David, Mary, and Paul in the passage above show. Thus Luther too condemns the ideal of Stoic senseless:

Formerly the monks made senseless logs and stones out of men, and Satan wanted the special commendation to be published about his saints that they were not disturbed by affections of any kind, were stolid men, and Stoics seven times over. But grace and the Holy Spirit do not strip human nature of its emotions in such a way that Jacob, the father, does not lament the death of his son. For this would conflict with nature, which has been created in such a way by God that it has affections.

A few years ago we saw schismatic spirits trying to introduce apathy of this kind into the church. Münzer strove to express it in his life and ways as outstanding sanctity. For when the birth of a son was announced to him, he stood before the altar as if he were deaf and dumb. He did not rejoice, give thanks, or make any reply. It was his purpose to show that he was a log and a stock. Afterwards he had boasted that his nature was completely changed and slain. This was really fanaticism far worse than the delirium of the Stoics. For God wants nature to be preserved, not abolished. But He orders that it be corrected, in order that it may become purer and that the emotions may be adjusted better in the godly than in the heathen, who do not control them by the fear of God and by confidence in Him but are dragged along rashly by them and without the sure rule of God's Word.

Therefore you see described in this example the sanctity of the most saintly fathers, who had the same emotions, although these were fewer and more moderate. They also have the same passions and infirmities that other men have.<sup>312</sup>

However, for Luther, textually, "passion", unless it refers to the Passion of Christ, appears most often in negative contexts such as "our sinful passions" (Rom. 7:5)

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<sup>311</sup> "At last, by the mercy of God, meditating day and night, I gave heed to the context of the words, namely, 'In it the righteousness of God is revealed, as it is written, 'he who through faith is righteous shall live' There I began to understand that the righteousness of God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God, namely by faith." Luther, "Preface to Latin Writings" in *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings* (1961) p. 11.

<sup>312</sup> M. Luther, *Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 38-44* trans. Paul P. Dahl in *Luther's Works*, vol. 7 edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter Hansen, (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1965) p. 315.

*While we were living in the flesh, without grace, our sinful passions, our desires, inclinations, and drives toward evil, which make up our old man and man in his unconverted state, aroused by the Law,*<sup>313</sup>

Thus semantically, Luther subscribes to the Classical, negative sense of “passion”.

Of course, there remains also in the regenerated a resistance, of which the Scriptures say that the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and likewise that the passions of the flesh wage war against the soul, and the law in our members is at war with the law of our mind.<sup>314</sup>

Luther’s contribution to the semantic shift is therefore less in an explicit defense of the passions<sup>315</sup> but rather in his structural allowance for the possibility that different regimes may be at work at the same time even in the regenerated, redeemed person. In the overall design of regeneration by faith, the passions remain present in the members. His thesis of *simul justus et peccator* (at once righteous and a sinner) is particularly relevant here:

Therefore I am at the same time a sinner and a righteous man, for I do evil and I hate the evil which I do. *So then it is no longer I*, as a spiritual man in the Spirit, *that do it*, that is, lust, *but sin*, both the tinder of sin and concupiscence, *which dwells within me*, through my whole life.<sup>316</sup>

The Stoic ideal is that of a *hegemonikon* or *imperium*, itself modelled on a political formation: a process of internalisation of monarchic power within the individual and to gain *autarceia*, autonomy within that sphere. The Augustinian strain of Christianity refuses such

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<sup>313</sup> M. Luther, *Lectures on Romans Glosses and Scholia* in *Luther’s Works*, vol. 25 edited by Hilton. C. Oswald (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1972) trans. Jacob A. O. Preus (on Romans 7:5) p. 59.

<sup>314</sup> The Formula of Concord: 2, II, 84 in *The Book of Concord : The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* translated and edited by Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959)

<sup>315</sup> Beside exegetical reasons, one of the factors that may have prompted him not to go in this direction was perhaps that Luther himself was a passionate and vehement person as he himself relates his experiences.

<sup>316</sup> M. Luther, *Lectures on Romans* in *Ibid* p. 65.

self-sufficiency which it compares to the sin of Adam<sup>317</sup>, and Christian authors of the early modern period had the arguments of the Augustinian resistance to Stoicism at their hand. Indeed, a thorough exploration of Stoic influence on Christian ethical thought and resistance to this influence could bring to light unexploited dimensions of Christianity.

My overall claim with these examples of anti-Stoic reactions is that they help to bring about the semantic transformation of “passion”: the debate within humanism (between Augustinian Christianity and a revived Stoicism) problematised the role of affects in human life. The clashes brought to the surface that the classical idiom of “passion” can no longer serve as a collective term for all affects taken especially in a negative sense implying irrationality. In my view, given that the antagonism between the two poles in the debate cannot be reconciled or subsumed by any lasting synthesis<sup>318</sup>, the debate could not be definitely resolved by a rearrangement of the semantic field of “passion”. Nevertheless, the debate contributed to the process whereby “passion” gradually ceased to function as a *substantive* (and collective) noun (a hyperonym) covering all affective states and shifted to an *adverbial* sense of excess of any given mental state but especially that of love. (I tried to describe and document the overall process in Chapter I.4.)

The causes why these two poles of humanism cannot be reconciled have been formulated by many of the authors cited above (W. J. Bouwsma, G. Braden, etc.) but it can also be restated in a loosely adapted Foucauldian vocabulary. The Stoic and Christian inward turn is motivated by different ethical concerns. For Stoicism the ethical practice and *askesis* is deployed for securing an interiority for power and rule: the Stoic wants to find nothing else in the self but a zone of none of no contradiction (rational self-mastery). Gordon Braden notes that “throughout Stoicism the operative values are, time and again, power and control: we restrict our desires less because they are bad in themselves than in order to create a zone in which we know no contradiction.”<sup>319</sup> Christianity, in its early modern confrontation with this model of rational self-mastery, insisted on the irreducibility of the human soul to such a monolithic (globalist) entity. The debates brought to light that “passions” as a collective term cannot be taken as one side of the dualism opposed to “reason” where the latter has absolute primacy over former. If the aim of ethical practice is not the achievement of rational self-

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<sup>317</sup> *City of God*, XIV. 13. and its broader Augustinian context as discussed above in Chapter II.2.1

<sup>318</sup> Cf. Bouwsma, *Ibid.* p. 64.

<sup>319</sup> Gordon Braden, *Ibid.*, p. 20.

mastery whereby all passionate, affective aspects are to be eliminated, but on the contrary, affective elements are integrated into the potential realms of care for the self, then the vocabulary should match this constellation and make room for them as legitimate ethical substance by a semantic rearrangement of such affective contents. For the Christian, the inward turn is not an end in itself, it is not the *telos* of ethical practice although there may be similarities in the techniques of the self, in Christian and Stoic *askesis*. Whereas for the Stoic sage interiority is without exit, for the Christian believer the inward turn paves the way to spiritual ascent through self-abandonment by making room for the working of the spirit and divine salvation. Thus the self is not the *telos* of its care, the purpose of *askesis* is to make it permeable to divine intervention. Both Christian and Stoic *askesis* values self-discipline but for the Christian, the point is not to stop there, let alone to achieve a self-ruling state and value it for its own sake. Rather it is to lose oneself in order to find it, to surrender one's own self and will and let the Spirit occupy the space.

### III. 3. Vernacular Innovations: The Significance of Montaigne, *Les Essais* in John Florio's 1603 Translation

The relevance of discussing John Florio's translation of Montaigne's *Les Essais* in a study that concerns the semantic change of 'passion' around 1600 is twofold and the two points are interconnected.

1. Montaigne (1533-1592) has a special and sometimes ambiguous attitude to humanism. As we saw in the previous chapter, he maintained a sceptical position towards the aspirations and ideals of humanism. However, if one considers the humanist program as the promotion of *studium humanitatis* and bears in mind the Erasmian call to wholeheartedly "covet this literature, let us embrace it, let us continually occupy ourselves with it, let us fondly kiss it, at length let us die in its embrace, let us be transformed in it, since studies are transmuted into morals"<sup>320</sup> then Montaigne's biography and the very composition of the *Essais*, may well be an illustration of this ideal and a particular case in point. The *Essais* were composed over a span of eighteen years from 1570 when Montaigne quit his function of city counsellor of Bordeaux, retires to his castle and consecrates himself to studies. The first edition the *Essais* is published in 1580 containing the first two volumes. Then follows a travel to Italy<sup>321</sup> and two mandates as mayor of Bordeaux (1582-1585). He then retires definitively from public life and consecrates himself entirely to his studies and to the writing of his *Essais* that he publishes again with a third volume and with six hundred additions made to it in 1588. Between 1588 and his death in 1592 he continues to make additions<sup>322</sup>. These elements of his biography clearly show somebody for whom *studium humanitatis* was indeed a personal issue that went far beyond the mere study of ancient literature and Hugo Friedrich can rightly say

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<sup>320</sup> Desiderius Erasmus, *Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings*, ed. John C. Olin, (New York, Evanston, and London, 1965) p. 105. quoted by Th. Greene, *Ibid*, p. 255-256.

<sup>321</sup> Cf. Journal de voyage de Michel de Montaigne en Italie par la Suisse et l'Allemagne en 1580 et 1581 (Le Jay : Rome, Paris, 1774)

<sup>322</sup> These are almost all additions and not deletions as he himself says: "*J'ajoute, mais je ne corrige pas.*" (III. 9.)

that Montaigne belonged to what Friedrich calls “the second humanism”<sup>323</sup>. The “first humanism of the 14<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> centuries was the ideal of language and rhetoric as the depository of human dignity. The idea was that language is constitutive of civilization and of culture, law, morality, and state and it raises man above the animal state. Thus the study of ancient literature (*studium litterarum*) raises man to the level of culture adequate to his dignity. From the second half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century there was a reaction against and a shift away from this ideal and practice in the favour of personal human experience, and toward attention to language as *speculum animi*. (Friedrich cites Pico della Mirandola and Erasmus as the main figures of this orientation.) In this perspective, the Classics still hold their important place as sources for *studium humanitatis*. Montaigne makes his point clear in one of his essays and links immediately the issue of learning, the example of ancient authors and passion:

J'aymerois mieux m'entendre bien en moy, qu'en Ciceron. *De l'experience que j'ay de moy*, je trouve assez dequoy me faire sage, si j'estoy bon escholier. Qui remet en sa memoire l'excez de sa cholere passee, et jusques où ceste fievre l'emporta, voit la laideur de ceste passion, mieux que dans Aristote, et en conçoit une haine plus juste. Qui se souvient des maux qu'il a couru, de ceux qui l'ont menassé, des legeres occasions qui l'ont remué d'un estat à autre, se prepare par là, aux mutations futures, et à la recognoissance de sa condition. (III. 13. “De l'expérience”, - italics mine)

I had rather understand my selfe well in my selfe then in *Cicero*. *Out of the experience I have of my selfe* I finde sufficient ground to make my selfe wise were I but a good proficient scholler. Whosoever shall commit to memory the excesse or inconvenience of his rage or anger past, and how farre that fittransported him, may see the deformity of that passion better then in *Arisiotle*, and conceive a more just hatred against it. Whosoever calleth to minde the dangers he hath escaped, those which have threatned him, and the light occasions that have remooved him from one to another state, doth thereby the better prepare himselfe to future alterations and knowledge of his condition. (Florio, III. 13. “Of Experience” – italics mine)

So far for Montaigne's general attitude and the particular hindsight he offers to humanism and the humanist agenda.

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<sup>323</sup> Hugo Friedrich, *Montaigne*, traduit de l'allemand par Robert Rovini, Paris: Gallimard, 1968. pp. 94ff. The German original was published in 1949, rev. 1967 at A. Francke Verlag AG.



2. As regards the more specific question of the semantic change of ‘passion’, I wish to contend that the new psychological sense in which Montaigne used *émotion*<sup>324</sup> was both instrumental in and indicative of the change undergoing in the words referring to human affectivity<sup>325</sup>, ‘passion’ included of course. The first occurrence of this new sense of ‘emotion’ in English can be found in Florio’s translation of the *Essais*. As I noted in the broader historical argument chapter, it is the first attested occurrence in English (as well as in French) of the word in the psychological sense. (I shall go later into the finer nuances of its meaning.) My assumption is that there is a connection between the appearance of this new sense of the word and the synecdochic change of ‘passion’ as described above. This connection can tentatively be described in the following way: Given the evolution of the meaning of ‘passion’ in the adverbial and excessive sense (that, by the way, can also be observed in Montaigne/Florio), and given the ‘naturalisation’ of certain affective states, there was a need for another word that can occupy the space left by ‘passion’. Thus, in my view, the semantic shift of ‘passion’ and the appearance of the psychological sense of ‘emotion’ (which, by the way, is also a semantic shift: from social political to psychological) are concomitant phenomena or even two sides of the same phenomenon. Another way of putting it, building on a suggestion of Hans-Jürgen Diller in the context of the search for a pre-history of the category ‘emotion’<sup>326</sup>, is to say that the Montaigne/Florio provides the textual traces of that transition from one metaphorical device referring to affective states to another. Therefore I propose to investigate the most significant occurrences of these two words in Montaigne’s *Essais* (1595) and in Florio’s translation published in 1603 with special regard to those instances where both words appear in proximity. Before I carry out this comparative linguistic analysis, three introductory remarks have to be made concerning the texts, translation practice and the Montaignian oeuvre itself.

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<sup>324</sup> The spelling varies in *Les Essais*: it can be ‘esmotion’ or ‘émotion’ as well.

<sup>325</sup> Of course, these semantic changes and innovations are not limited to ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’; in a more inclusive and systematic study of the changes in early modern affectivity ‘appetite’, ‘movement’ should also be considered.

<sup>326</sup> Cf. Diller, (2006) cited above.

### Florio's translation of *Les Essais*

The first remark is textual and concerns the two texts to be compared. Florio's modern biographer, Frances A. Yates suggests that he began work on the translation of the *Essais* of Montaigne in 1598.<sup>327</sup> The dates of 1580 and 1597 on the title page of the modern World's Classics edition<sup>328</sup> confirms this assumption as well as the fact that Florio was translating the fullest available text of the *Essais*, namely the one based on the *Exemplaire de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux Copy). It was published in 1595 in Paris, for two different booksellers (Michel Sonnius and Abel L'Angelier). The edition was made with the help of Montaigne's adopted daughter, Marie de Gournay, who incorporated all the manuscript additions that Montaigne made (between the summer of 1588 and September 13 1592, the date of his death) to a printed copy of the last edition published during his lifetime (1588, Paris, L'Angelier). This part manuscript, part printed book contains about one third of manuscript additions when compared to the printed text of 1588 is called the Bordeaux Copy and is kept in the Bibliothèque municipale de Bordeaux. It should also be mentioned that the 1580 date refers to the first publication of the *Essais* in Bordeaux, having only the first two volumes of the *Essais*. So far for the textual history of Florio's source.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>327</sup> Frances A. Yates, *John Florio. The Life of an Italian in Shakespeare's England*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934; and New York: Octagon Books, 1968.

<sup>328</sup> I am using electronic versions of the modern edition of Florio's translation: Michel Montaigne, *The Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne*, 1580, 1597. Translated by John Florio, 1603. World's Classics edition. 3 volumes, London: Frowde, 1904. available at <http://www.stoics.com/index.html> and <http://www.uoregon.edu/~rbear/montaigne/#p1> I am also cross-checking it with an online digital facsimile of the 1603 edition. I will henceforth refer to Florio's translation as "Florio".

<sup>329</sup> The translator makes the following comment in his preface "To the courteous Reader" on the complicated textual setup he had to cope with: "Howsoever, the falsenesse of the French prints, the diversities of copies, editions and volumes (some whereof have more or lesse then others), and I in London having followed some, and in the countrie others; now those in folio, now those in octavo, yet in this last survey reconciled all." Warren Boutcher, in his PhD thesis demonstrated that Florio started to translate Montaigne from the 1588 edition (namely I.26. "Of the institution and education of children" possibly together with I. 25.) but that he squared this text more or less with the 1595, 1598 and 1600 editions.

The second remark concerns the general characteristics of Florio's translation as seen in the context of translation habits in the English Renaissance. That context consists of translations from the Classics and from 'dead languages' on the one hand, and from translations from other vernacular languages, mainly French and Italian. In the former case, translators "cheerfully translated translations of translations"<sup>330</sup> like in the case of Thomas Nicolls who translated Thucydides from the French of Claude de Seyssel who himself made his version not from the original Greek but from the Latin of Laurentius Valla. Similarly, between Thomas North and Plutarch stands the gracious figure of Jacques Amyot and the examples could be further enumerated... As for translation from other vernacular languages, direct translation from the original is more common than in the case of the classics but is far from being exclusive. For example, Sir Geoffrey Fenton's *Certaine Tragicall Discourses written out of Frenche and Latin* (1567) were drawn from Belleforest's French translation of Bandello. A more complex case of intercultural misunderstanding is Machiavelli's *Prince* that had a profound influence on the thought and policy of Tudor England and was referred to with fear and indignation although it was not translated until 1640. Those who did not read *Il Principe* in Italian derived their knowledge from the *Contre-Machiavel*, a hostile treatise in French<sup>331</sup> and the name of the Italian author was quickly assimilated to "much evil". But such exceptions apart, direct translation from the vernacular source language is most often the case especially with French that was better known in England than Italian. Florio's Montaigne was preceded by the translation of another French classic, Thomas Danett's *Historie de Commynes* (1596), the *Mémoires* of the French-speaking Fleming, Philippe de Commynes. *The Concise Cambridge History of English Literature* states that "translators of Elizabeth's age pursued their craft in the spirit of bold adventure which animated Drake and Hawkins. It was their ambition to discover new worlds of thought and beauty."<sup>332</sup> Moreover, translation was not an exclusive craft pursued in the narrow spirit of mere scholarship and many of the most

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<sup>330</sup> *The Concise Cambridge History of English Literature* by George Sampson, third edition revised by R.C. Churchill, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995 reprint, (1941 first edition, 1970 third edition) p. 145.

<sup>331</sup> Namely the *Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner et maintenir en bonne paix un Royaume ou autre Principauté...Contre Nicholas Machiavel Florentin* (1576) written by Innocent Gentillet, a French Huguenot, translated in 1602 by Simon Patericke.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibidem*.

ingenuous craftsmen were men of the world, who made their translations in the span of the leisure time snatched from the conduct of affairs. For example, Sir Thomas Hoby (translator of *Il Cortegiano* as *The Courtier*) and Danett were ambassador and diplomat respectively; Thomas North a magistrate, etc. John Florio is somewhat special in this regard: he is perhaps more akin to the scholarly Philemon Holland with his special interest in language and lexicography although Florio distances himself from “schollers” and from those who would want “Learning be wrapt in a learned mantle”.<sup>333</sup> He is also distinguished by his bilingual background, being the London-born son of an Italian Waldensian pastor who fled persecution in Italy and married an Englishwoman. Besides his translation from the French, he published an Italian-English dictionary, *A Worlde of Wordes* (1598) that was substantially expanded and published again in 1611 as *Queen Anna's New World of Words, or Dictionarie of the Italian and English tongues, Collected, and newly much augmented by Iohn Florio, Reader of the Italian vnto the Soueraigne Maestie of Anna, Crowned Queene of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, &c. And one of the Gentlemen of hir Royall Priuie Chamber. Whereunto are added certaine necessarie rules and short obseruations for the Italian tongue*. Thus I find it difficult to concur with the general assessment of *The Concise Cambridge History of English Literature* that translators of the age pursued their job without much reflection on what they were doing.<sup>334</sup> While this statement may be true of the first generation of translators in the Elizabethan period, the second generation looked more self-consciously and sometimes apologetically at what they were doing. Thus Chapman, in the preface to his “*Seauen Bookes of the Iliades of Homere, Prince of Poets, &c. Homer*” (1598) lucidly describes what should be the ambition of the translator:

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<sup>333</sup> Florio, “To the curteous Reader”

<sup>334</sup> In fact, the general tenor of *The Concise Cambridge History of English Literature* is but a tamed version of *The Cambridge History of English and American Literature*. An Encyclopaedia in Eighteen Volumes ed. by A.W. Ward, A.R. Waller, W.P. Trent, J. Erskine, S.P. Sherman, and C. Van Doren; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons; Cambridge, England: University Press, (1907–21). Which says: “As their interest lay chiefly in the matter of their originals, they professed little desire to illustrate a theory of translation. They had neither the knowledge nor the sense of criticism, which should measure accurately the niceties of their craft. They set about their work in a spirit of sublime unconsciousness. In their many prefaces, and they delighted in prefaces, there is scarce a hint that they are pursuing a delicate art.” (My italics)

The work of a skilfull and worthy translator is to observe the sentences, figures and formes of speech proposed in his author, his true sence and height, and to adorn them with figures and formes of oration fitted to the originall in the same tongue to which they are translated.<sup>335</sup>

That Florio, working on his translation at the same time<sup>336</sup> shares a similar ideal of translation can be inferred from his preface to his translation entitled "To the curteous Reader". This piece is also informative about the motivations why he set out to translate Montaigne and why translation is important for him in general. He puts forward a general apology of translation as the fountainhead of culture: the sciences having their origin in Greece and "the Greekes drew their baptizing water from the conduit-pipes of the Egiptians, and they from the well-springs of the Hebrews or Chaldees". Translation serves a democratic ideal of knowledge (*Translata proficit*) and asks "Why but the vulgar should not knowe at all" and "Why but Learning would not be made common" instead of having it as a privilege of some "Schollers". He invokes "that every language hath it's Genius and inseparable forme" in order to make allowance for the difficulties of translation. Such consciousness of the problem of translation is certainly not of someone who does translation in a "spirit of sublime unconsciousness" and, just as his argument proceeds ("let confession make half amends"), it indicates that he does have a standard of translation. He admits that "some errors are mine, and mine are by more then translation." Besides possible faults in grammar, orthography, syntax, he mentions the case of "*some uncouth termes*; as entraine, conscientious, endeare, tarnish, comporte, efface, facilitate, ammusung, debauching, regret, effort, *emotion*, and such like; if you like them not, take others more commonly set to make such likely French words familiar with our English, which well may beare them." (italics mine) Needless to say, all the words in the list are words of French origin just making their way into the English language. The further specificity of 'emotion' is - as noted in the chapter on the broader historical argument - that the new,

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<sup>335</sup> Preface to "Seaven Bookes of the Iliades of Homere, Prince of Poets, &c." both small 4tos. "printed by John Windet, and are to be sold at the signe of the Crosse-keyes neare Paules Wharffe." 1598

<sup>336</sup> Florio started his translation of Montaigne in 1598-99 after the publication of his Italian-English dictionary, *A Worlde of Wordes; The Essayes or Morall, Politike and Millitarie Discourses* were first published in London in 1603. For dating the debut of the translation, I am indebted to Warren Boutcher whose PhD thesis was on Florio's Montaigne. (His *The School of Montaigne: Enfranchising the Early Modern Reader* is foreseen for 2009)

psychological sense given to it by Montaigne was an *innovation in the French original as well*. As Diller notes, in the evolution of ‘emotion’, the same pattern of transfer from the socio-political to the psychological sense can be traced in French as well as German.<sup>337</sup> However, according to the entry in *Le Robert*, the use of ‘emotion’ by Montaigne is limited to the *physiological* sense as a movement that affects the individual and takes away his equilibrium. As much as I can concur with *Le Robert* that the first meaning of *émotion* in the *Essais* is social-political as in the phrase “l’émotion de Catilina” (I. 44. “Du Dormir”) translated, correctly and consistently by Florio as “the commotion of Catiline” (I. 44. “Of Sleeping”) I find it difficult to concur with *Le Robert* suggesting that Montaigne only uses *émotion* in the *physiological* sense. While I can admit that the in passage quoted from Montaigne in the French dictionary the sense of *émotion* may verge between the physiological and the psychological<sup>338</sup>, there are other cases of usage of *émotion* in the *Essais* where the

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<sup>337</sup> Diller (2005), *Ibid.* p. 155-156. Cf. Paul Robert, *Le Grand Robert de la langue française*, 2<sup>e</sup> édition par Alain Rey, Le Robert : Paris, 1994 and *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm*, Neubearbeitung ed. by Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften und Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Vol. 7: E – Empörer. Stuttgart and Leipzig: Hirzel, 1993.

<sup>338</sup> The passage quoted by *Le Robert* is as follows: “Nous mesmes, pour bien faire, ne devrions jamais mettre la main sur noz serviteurs, tandis que la *cholere* nous dure : Pendant que le poulx nous bat, et que nous sentons de l'*esmotion*, remettons la partie : les choses nous sembleront à la verité autres, quand nous serons r'accoisez et refroidis. C'est la *passion* qui commande lors, c'est la *passion* qui parle, ce n'est pas nous.” (*Essais*, II, 31. “De la colère”) Florio’s translation is as follows: “Our selves (did we well), during the time of our *anger*, should never lay hands on our servants. So long as our pulse panted, and we feele any *concitation*, so long remit we the partie: and things will seeme far otherwise unto us if we once come to our senses again, and shall better bethinke us. Then is it *passion* that commandes. It is *passion* that speaketh, and not we.” (Florio, II. 31. Italics mine) The full entry *émotion* of *Le Robert* is reproduced in Appendix 3. The reason why I would claim that it is a borderline case between the physiological and the psychological sense is that the textual context in which *émotion* is used here by Montaigne suggests that it is meant as a proxy for *colère* and *passion* – precisely those *psychological* senses the word is starting to take as a new hyperonym (of *colère* for example), or will partly replace (*passion*). But the translation of this passage by Florio actually supports more the claim of *Le Robert*: it is one of those rare occasions where Florio does not use ‘emotion’ for *émotion* but ‘concitation’ which, according to John Palsgrave’s *Lesclarissement de la Langue Francoyse* (1530) means the “Styrryng of ones mynde” which may be taken to be closer to a

meaning is certainly psychological as we shall see below. As I shall argue in more detail below, but already his apology for the “uncouth term” implies, Florio was well aware of the innovation he was making in English when he decided to introduce the new, modified sense into English. Prior to his translation, the word had meant “a political, social agitation; a tumult, popular disobedience” as recorded by the *Oxford English Dictionary*. The date of the first recorded occurrence of the word in this sense is 1579 in the *Oxford English Dictionary* under sense 3, in Sir Geoffrey Fenton, *The historie of Guicciardini, conteining the warres of Italie*, ii, “There were ... great stirres and *emocions* in Lombardye”.<sup>339</sup> It is notable that this first occurrence of the word in English in this social-political sense is (and thus the first shift of meaning from the physical to the social-political sense) was also in a translation from another vernacular language. It is all the more interesting since Fenton did not translate directly from the Italian original of Francesco Guicciardini. As Fenton was better versed in French, he did

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physiological sense. Robert Estienne’s *Les mots francoys selon l'ordre des lettres, ainsi qu'il les faut escrire, tournez en latin pour les enfans* (Lyon, 1567) defines French *emotion* as “*animi concitatio, agitatio spiritus, coagitatio, permotio*” that is roughly the equivalent of “Styrryng of ones mynde” and hence of ‘concitatio’. Cf. also Thomas Cooper, *Thesaurus linguae Romanae & Britannicae* (London, 1584) where *Furor* is defined as a “vehement concitatio or stirring of the minde”, as well as Randall Cotgrave, *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues*, (London, 1611) where French *concitation* is the equivalent of “concitation; inciting, vrging, prouoking; a raising, rousing, stirring, or quickning, vp vnto.” (For some reasons, there is no entry either *émotion* or *esmotion* in Montaigne’s contemporary’s, Jean Nicot’s (1530?-1600?) dictionary, *Thrésor de la langue françoise tant ancienne que moderne. Exact et très facile acheminement à la langue françoise* (Paris, 1606).

<sup>339</sup> As in Chapter I.4. and in Diller (2005) p. 155, the new usage by Florio is conspicuously missing in the *Oxford English Dictionary* which gives the first record of ‘emotion’ in the psychological sense in Jeremy Taylor, *Ductor Dubitantium* (R.), “The emotions of humanity... the meltings of a worthy disposition” in 1660. The *OED* defines it as “4.a. *fig.* Any agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion; any vehement or excited mental state”. In 1692 John Locke still uses ‘emotion’ in the sense defined as “† 2. A moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation (in physical sense). *Obs.*.” “When exercise has left any Emotion in his Blood or Pulse.” (in Locke, *Some thoughts concerning education*, 7). For ease of reference, the *Oxford English Dictionary* entry ‘emotion’ is reproduced in Appendix 1. The omission of the English Montaigne is all the more surprising because Florio’s translation had three editions (1603, 1613, 1632) and a new translation by Charles Cotton was published in 3 volumes in 1685-86 that, of course, also used ‘emotion’ in the psychological sense.

not use the 1561 Italian edition of *Storia d'Italia* for his translation but the French version of the *Storia* by Jérôme Chomedey<sup>340</sup>, just as he used Belleforest's translation for his *Certaine tragicall discourses* (1567). In any case, the Italian original does not have *emozione*, so the word was either suggested by the French translation of Guicciardini's work or was a genuine invention of Fenton. That the second transfer of the meaning from the socio-political to the psychological sense was truly an invention of the Montaigne/Florio, and hence an import from the French, can also be attested by the fact that, in the same year as the publication of Florio's *Montaigne*, Richard Knolles uses the word still in an "archaic", physical sense in his *History of the Turks* (1603) defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as "1. a moving out, migration, transference from one place to another. *Obs.*".<sup>341</sup> In apologising for the "uncouth term" Florio is making a conscious choice of introducing a modification in the sense of the word, moreover, a modification that he must have judged useful and desirable. (This is a point I advance here but will look at it in more detail when comparing the French and English text.) His sympathy for Montaigne and for his thoughts are evident not only from the mere fact of performing such an enormous task of translating three volumes of French into English but also from the apologetic stance he adopts in the preface "To the curteous Reader". Although he admits that Montaigne may have some faults, after all his is "but a French with ferdillant,

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<sup>340</sup> The French translation of *Storia* was first published in Paris, in 1568 (*L'Histoire d'Italie, de messire François Guicciardin,... tradlatée d'italien en françois... par Hiérosme Chomedey*, Paris : B. Turrisan, 1568) but was reedited with the new title *Histoire des guerres d'Italie* in 1577 (*Histoire des guerres d'Italie, écrite en italien par M. François Guicciardin et traduite en françois par Hierosme Chomedey, revue et corrigée de nouveau*, Paris: J. Kerner, 1577, there was also a publication at M. Sonnius in the same year.) Judging from Fenton's English title (*The historie of Guicciardini, containing the warres of Italie*), he must have used the 1577 or both French editions. For the European reception of Guicciardini's works cf. Vincenzo Luciani, *Francesco Guicciardini e la sua fortuna europea*, Firenze : Olschki, 1949; also « Lectures françaises de Guichardin : vérités de l'Histoire et ébauches d'une raison d'Etat à la française » in *La circulation des hommes et des oeuvres entre la France et l'Italie à la Renaissance*, Paris, CIRRI, 1992, p. 165-187, republished also as annex to F. Guicciardini, *Histoire d'Italie*, J.-L. Fournel and J.-C. Zancarini (eds), vol. II, p. 710-729. As well as Jean-Louis Fournel, "Guicciardini historien florentin, 'français' et européen" to be published as Proceedings of the conference, *Convegno sulla storiografia in Toscana tra Cinquecento e settecento*, (Pisa 2008) at Franco Angeli, Milan.

<sup>341</sup> Knolles' phrase cited in the *OED* is: "The divers emotions of that people [the Turks]."



legier, and extravagant.” Nevertheless, Florio invokes the authority of “that judicious Counsellor (honourable Sir Edward Wotton)” for affirming the merits of Montaigne. When it comes to concrete criticism that may be levelled against Montaigne, Florio sends them to the essay “Of Vanitie” “where he [Montaigne] himself preventeth their carping, and foreseeing their critique answereth them for me at full.”

The third remark concerns Florio’s translation as a whole. Without entering into a general assessment of Florio’s *Montaigne* – which is by far beyond the scope of this study – it should be mentioned that the translation, just as Chapman’s *Homer*,<sup>342</sup> stood the test of the time as can be seen from the fact that, three hundred years after its first publication, it was republished in England in 1904 in the World’s Classics series as well as in the Everyman’s Library (1910) and was also used for the publication of a selection of Montaigne’s *Essays* in 1907 in the United States. A reviewer of the latter book in the New York Times notes that “the translation is that of John Florio, edition of 1603 – all things considered, and allowance made for his many minor defects and its occasional audacious meddling with the original, distinctly the best for English readers, and *especially the readers of to-day*, to whom the flavour of Florio conveys some of the peculiar charm of Montaigne’s own style.”<sup>343</sup>

### **Montaigne and the passions / émotions, esmotions<sup>344</sup>**

I wish to argue that Montaigne’s linguistic innovation of ‘esmotion’ can be explained by and is consistent with the general thrust of his thought and with the nature of the enterprise he set out to do in his *Essays*. While it is beyond the scope of the present study to interpret

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<sup>342</sup> Praised two centuries later by John Keats, “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer” as well as Swinburne for its “romantic and sometimes barbaric grandeur,” its “freshness, strength, and inextinguishable fire.” George Saintsbury (1845-1933) wrote: “For more than two centuries they were the resort of all who, unable to read Greek, wished to know what Greek was. Chapman is far nearer Homer than any modern translator in any modern language.”

<sup>343</sup> Review in *The New York Times*, September 7, 1907 by Edward Cary of *Montaigne for English Readers* edited by Adolphe Cohn published in the “Putnam’s French Classics for English Readers” series. (Italics mine.)

<sup>344</sup> As noted above, there are variations in spelling. The spelling varies in *Les Essais*: it can be ‘esmotion’ or ‘émotion’ as well.

Montaigne's *Essays* and to give a general assessment of Montaigne, a brief summary of the most salient point underpinning his linguistic innovation is necessary. I shall provide more detailed analysis when discussing specific passages as translated by Florio.

First of all, his scepticism concerning the capacities of human judgement has to be taken into account. If, according to Montaigne, there are legitimate doubts concerning the use of reason (as demonstrated by the *Apologie de Raimond Sebond*, II. 12.), then the Stoic perspective of a *hegemonikon*, of moral autarchy cannot be a wished ideal. If the absolute supremacy of such higher faculty is put in doubt, it also follows that human affectivity has its legitimate space to deploy.

Le jugement tient chez moy un siege magistral, au moins il s'en efforce soigneusement : Il laisse mes appetis aller leur train : et la haine et l'amitié, voire et celle que je me porte à moy mesme, sans s'en alterer et corrompre. S'il ne peut reformer les autres parties selon soy, au moins ne se laisse il pas diffomer à elles : il faict son jeu à part. (III. 13. "De l'expérience")

Judgement holds in me a presidentiall seate, at least he carefully endeavours to hold it; He suffers my appetits to keep their course, both hatred and love, yea and that I beare unto my selfe, without feeling alteration or corruption. If he can not reforme other parts according to himselfe, at least he will not be deformed by them; he keepes his court apart. (Florio, III. 13. "Of Experience")

Right judgement is more a matter of custom<sup>345</sup> and of habituation that has to be exercised and kept in good health but it is not an absolute monarch or sovereign to which all others parts of the personality are or should be subordinated. Montaigne was sceptical not only about our faculties concerning knowledge and rational judgement but also about the very possibility of reforming human nature. He looked critically at those who wanted to transform human behaviour by precepts and he considered that education can at best reinforce and strengthen natural dispositions but it cannot radically change them:

Les inclinations naturelles s'aident et fortifient par institution : mais elles ne se changent gueres et surmontent. Mille natures, de mon temps, ont eschappé vers la vertu, ou vers le vice, au travers d'une discipline contraire. [...] On n'extirpe pas ces qualitez originelles, on les couvre, on les cache [...] Ceux qui ont essayé de raviser les moeurs du monde, de mon temps, par nouvelles opinions, reforment les vices de l'apparence, ceux de l'essence, ils les laissent là, s'ils ne

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<sup>345</sup> For custom in Montaigne cf. Zsolt Almási, *Angelic Monster – Custom in Early Modern Context*, (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003) pp. 71-99.

les augmentent : Et l'augmentation y est à craindre. [...] Regardez un peu, comment s'en porte nostre experience. Il n'est personne, s'il s'escoute, qui ne descouvre en soy, une forme sienne, une forme maistresse, qui lucte contre l'institution : et contre la tempeste des passions, qui luy sont contraires. De moy, je ne me sens gueres agiter par secousse : je me trouve quasi tousjours en ma place, comme font les corps lourds et poisons. Si je ne suis chez moy, j'en suis tousjours bien pres : [these italics mine] mes desbauches ne m'emportent pas fort loing : il n'y a rien d'extreme et d'estrange : et si ay des ravisemens sains et vigoureux. (III. 2. "De repentir")

*Naturall inclinations are by institution helped and strengthned, but they neither change nor exceed. A thousand natures in my time have a thwart, a contrary discipline escaped toward vertue or toward vice. [...] These originall qualities are not grubd out, they are but covered and hidden. [...] Those which in my time have attempted to correct the passions of the world by new opinions, reforme the vices of apparence; those of essence they leave untouched if they encrease them not. And their encrease is much to be feared. [...] Looke a little into the course of our experience. There is no man (if he listen to himselfe) that doth not discover in himselfe a peculiar forme of his, a swaying forme, which wrestleth against the institution, and against the tempests of passions, which are contrary unto him. As for me, I feele not my selfe much agitated by a shooke; I commonly finde my selfe in mine owne place, as are sluggish and lumpish bodies. If I am not close and neare unto my selfe, I am never farre-offe; [these italics are mine] My debauches or excesses transport me not much. There is nothing extreame and strange; yet have I sound fits and vigorous lusts. (Florio, III. 2. "Of Repenting")*

Endeavours to reform human nature are doomed to failure and are best to be avoided. One should rather stick to his own natural disposition, remain as close as possible to one's self, to his "peculiar" and "swaying forme" ("une forme sienne, une forme maistresse") that will always resist instruction but will also stand against "the tempests of passions". Being "close and neare unto [one's] selfe" (*chez soy*) is more reliable against extremities than setting out to reform oneself or others. It is also remarkable that this description takes on board the body as such, the body in its very specificity as his "sluggish and lumpish" body and its legitimate, "sound fits and vigorous lusts".<sup>346</sup>

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<sup>346</sup> It seems to me that the hendiadys-like "sound fits and vigorous lust" is an addition of Florio: Montaigne has only one noun, *ravissement*, at the end of that sentence. Also, Florio is accentuating the morally negative judgement about the 'passions' when he translates *raviser les moeurs du monde* in the passage above as "to correct the passions of the world".

Montaigne's passage is also interesting when considered in recent debates about the self, moral discipline and the place of the body. Much of recent work on the European Renaissance focuses on the links between the material and the intellectual, and on the interplay between body and identity has been a critical focus for much recent work on the European Renaissance.<sup>347</sup> Stephen Greenblatt claimed that "the self is at its most visible, most expressive ... at moments in which the moral will has ceded place to desires that constitute the deepest stratum of psychic experience".<sup>348</sup> Michael C. Schoenfeldt, in a discussion of the importance of the Galenic theory of the humours for English Renaissance literature, takes issue with this claim and argues that Renaissance selves are defined, not through moments of crisis, when the moral gives way to the physiological or sexual, but through the very strategies of discipline through which the body and the psyche are held in balance. As Schoenfeldt writes: "The Renaissance seems to have imagined selves as differentiated not by their desires, which all more or less share, but by their capacity to control these desires."<sup>349</sup> Timothy Hampton summarizes as follows: "For Schoenfeldt the Renaissance self is defined – pace Bakhtin – through careful control and monitoring of a self always in flux."<sup>350</sup> I would certainly not wish to extrapolate from Montaigne's case (after all, his *Essais* are indeed an innovation in the period and reflect more a deviation from standard practice than its endorsement) but it seems to me that the project of writing the *Essais* and the state of mind it reveals certainly *is* in a flux but that does not wish to control itself in the usual way:

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<sup>347</sup> Cf. Timothy Hampton, "Strange Alteration: Physiology and Psychology from Galen to Rabelais" in *Reading the Early Modern Passions. Essays in the History of Emotion* edited by Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 2004, pp. 272-293 for the evocation of this issue and the Greenblatt – Schoenfeldt debate (in particular pp. 274ff).

<sup>348</sup> Stephen Greenblatt, "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture" in *Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts*, edited by Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 215.

<sup>349</sup> Michael G. Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 17. also quoted by Timothy Hampton, *Ibid.* p. 275.

<sup>350</sup> Timothy Hampton, *Ibid.* p. 275.

Les autres forment l'homme, je le recite : et en represente un particulier, bien mal formé : et lequel si j'avoy à façonner de nouveau, je ferois vraiment bien autre qu'il n'est : mes-huy c'est fait. Or les traits de ma peinture, ne se fourvoyent point, quoy qu'ils se changent et diversifient. Le monde n'est qu'une branloire perenne : Toutes choses y branlent sans cesse, la terre, les rochers du Caucase, les pyramides d'Égypte : et du branle public, et du leur. La constance mesme n'est autre chose qu'un branle plus languissant. Je ne puis asseurer mon object : il va trouble et chancelant, d'une yvresse naturelle. Je le prens en ce point, comme il est, en l'instant que je m'amuse à luy. Je ne peinds pas l'estre, je peinds le passage : non un passage d'aage en autre, ou comme dict le peuple, de sept en sept ans, mais de jour en jour, de minute en minute. Il faut accommoder mon histoire à l'heure. Je pourray tantost changer, non de fortune seulement, mais aussi d'intention : C'est un contrerolle de divers et muables accidens, et d'imaginations irresoluës, et quand il y eschet, contraires : soit que je sois autre moy-mesme, soit que je saisisse les subjects, par autres circonstances, et considerations. Tant y a que je me contredis bien à l'avanture, mais la verité, comme disoit Demades, je ne la contredy point. Si mon ame pouvoit prendre pied, je ne m'essaierois pas, je me resoudrois : elle est tousjours en apprentissage, et en espreuve. (III. 2. "Du repentir" – italics mine)

Others fashion man, I repeat him; and represent a particular one, but ill made; and whom were I to forme a new, he should be far other than he is; but he is now made. And though the lines of my picture change and vary, yet loose they not themselves. The world runnes all on wheeles. All things therein moove without intermission; yea, the earth, the rockes of Caucasus, and the Pyramides of Aegypt, both with the publike and their own motion. Constancy it selfe is nothing but a languishing and wavering dance. I cannot settle my object; it goeth so unquietly and staggering, with a naturall drunkenness; I take it in this plight as it is at the instant I amuse my selfe about it, I describe not th' essence but the passage; not a passage from age to age, or as the people reckon, from seaven yeares to seaven, but from day to day, from minute to minute. My history must be fitted to the present. I may soone change, not onely fortune, but intention. It is a counter-roule of divers and variable accidents or irresolute imaginations, and sometimes contrary; whether it be that my selfe am other, or that I apprehend subjects by other circumstances and considerations. Howsoever, I may perhaps gaine-say my selfe, but truth (as Demades said) I never gaine-say. Were my mind settled, I would not essay, but resolve my selfe: It is still a Prentise and a probationer. (Florio, III. 2. "Of Repenting", Italics mine.)

Being "a prentise and a Probationer", "always in passage" is a state not to be regretted but to be candidly admitted and welcome by the author of the *Essais*. Being at home, *chez soy*<sup>351</sup>, near to oneself even in terms of his own body, is a human condition wished and celebrated by

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<sup>351</sup> I take there is a play on this French expression in the passage above in *chez moy* well-captured by Florio.

Montaigne and one that by itself is – according to him – a more efficient vanguard against vices than any conscious effort or discipline could provide:

Pour dire un mot de moy-mesme : J'ay veu quelque fois mes amis appeller prudence en moy, ce qui estoit fortune ; et estimer advantage de courage et de patience, ce qui estoit advantage de jugement et opinion ; et m'attribuer un tiltre pour autre ; tantost à mon gain, tantost à ma perte. Au demeurant, il s'en faut tant que je sois arrivé à ce premier et plus parfaict degré d'excellence, où de la vertu il se faict une habitude ; que du second mesme, je n'en ay faict guere de preuve. *Je ne me suis mis en grand effort, pour brider les desirs dequoy je me suis trouvé pressé. Ma vertu, c'est une vertu, ou innocence, pour mieux dire, accidentale et fortuite.* Si je fusse nay d'une complexion plus desreglée, je crains qu'il fust allé piteusement de mon faict : *car je n'ay essayé guere de fermeté en mon ame, pour soutenir des passions, si elles eussent esté tant soit peu vehementes.* Je ne sçay point nourrir des querelles, et du debat chez moy. Ainsi, je ne me puis dire nul grand-mercy, dequoy je me trouve exempt de plusieurs vices : [...]  
Je le doy plus à ma fortune qu'à ma raison : Elle m'a faict naistre d'une race fameuse en preud'hommie, et d'un tres-bon pere : je ne sçay s'il a escoulé en moy partie de ses humeurs, ou bien si les exemples domestiques, et la bonne institution de mon enfance, y ont insensiblement aydé ; ou si je suis autrement ainsi nay ; [...]  
Mais tant y a que la pluspart des vices je les ay de moy mesmes en horreur. (II. 11. “De la Cruauté”, italics mine.)

But to speake a word of my selfe: I have sometimes noted my friends to terme that wisdom in me which was but meere fortune, and to deeme that advantage of courage and patience that was advantage of judgement and opinion; and to attribute one title for another unto me, sometimes to my profit, and now and then to my losse. As for the rest, I am far from attaining unto that chiefe and most perfect degree of excellences, where a habitude is made of vertue, that even of the second I have made no great triall. *I have not greatly strived to bridle the desires wherewith I have found my selfe urged and pressed. My vertue is a vertue, or to say better innocencie, accidentall and casuall.* Had I been borne with a lesse regular complexion, I imagine my state had been verie pittifull, and it would have gon hard with me: for, *I could never perceive any great constancie in my soule, to resist and undergoe passions, had they been any thing violent.* I cannot foster quarels, or endure contentions in my house. So am I not greatly beholding unto my selfe, in that I am exempted from many vices:

[...]

I am more endebted to my fortune than to my reason for it: Shee hath made me to be borne of a race famous for integritie and honestie, and of a verie good father. I wot not well whether any part of his humours have descended into me, or whether the domestike examples and good institution of my infancie have insensibly set their helping hand unto it; or whether I were otherwise so borne:

[...]

But so it is, that naturally of my selfe I abhorre and detest all manner of vices. (Florio, II. 11. “Of Crueltie”, italics mine)

To refer back to Greenblatt's description of when the self is most visible, then Montaigne is not an Epicurean who identifies himself with his desires or one that contrasts such desires with a moral will and a self conscious following a moral code against his desires. In fact, such contradictions are pushed in the background by an insistence on the priority of inherited complexion and humours, of "domestike examples and good institution" that allow him to be and to behave in an "accidentall and casual" manner. Just as there is no "moral will" erected into a sovereign principle of the self, so is there not a "stratum of psychic experience" to be resisted or to be suppressed. Montaigne's perspective on human existence is not motivated by the will to instruct, by a desire to improve the deficiencies of human nature as if there was a higher order and ideal to which human existence had to conform. When it comes to judgment, the best source is one's own experience<sup>352</sup> anyway: experience is more faithful to the complexity of life than some conceptual structure deemed coherent on its own. Another important element beside his scepticism and the priority he gives to experience can perhaps be termed as Montaigne's human phenomenology<sup>353</sup>. The knowledge that he gains from what the ancients and Seneca in particular diagnosed as the moral diseases, Montaigne makes use to describe human nature, and his own first of all, *as such* in a perspective that is more psychological-anthropological than moralist. Montaigne's modern "moral science", is based

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<sup>352</sup> Cf. also above, as "second humanism".

<sup>353</sup> I am using 'phenomenology' of course in a broad sense of a description that seeks adherence to facts, to what is given to human perception both within the subject (in psychological introspection) and in society at large as observed by and from the vantage point of a particular subject anchored in its own idiosyncrasies – that is, of someone who has a rich experience of public life (cf. elements of Montaigne's biography mentioned above) but does not pretend to detain some universal omniscient knowledge about the state of affairs in society. Montaigne's project is also faithful to the exigencies of a phenomenological *epokhē* (ἐποχή) in suspending judgement: his adherence to what is given means that his descriptions are neither subordinated to tacitly posited ideals (as in forms of Platonism), nor are they projected towards a teleological perspective (as in Augustinian-Christian doctrine). There is, of course, another *epokhē*: that of the sceptics; but the scope of Montaigne's scepticism is a limited one and concerns primarily the power of human reason to reach truth unless it was aided by human grace cf. A. H. T. Levi, "The relationship of Stoicism and scepticism" in *Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by Jill Kraye and M. W. F. Stone, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, "London Studies in the History of Philosophy", pp. 98ff.

on his fideism and his criticism of knowledge aims to expose man as it is. For Montaigne the object of his description, himself, the human subject, does not have a predestined and fixed nature to which it should conform. If the perspective of redemption as well as that of a profane ethics put in brackets for the sake of knowing man as it is then a descriptive science may take the place to observe the antinomies, paradoxes and diversities that the human condition offers. Thus Montaigne will look at the richness of human existence inasmuch as it is problematic but he does it in a perspective of affirmation and not humiliation. While Augustine made room for the passions in a soteriological perspective because they were part of our human condition that had to be redeemed anyway, for Montaigne, in lack of such apparent teleological perspective, they form part of a descriptive science of man. But if there is no hierarchy of the kind that would distinguish and oppose, as in Classical and Christian anthropology and ethics, a higher, rational faculty to a lower affective layer, then the evaluative and conceptual grouping of the passions as *perturbationes animi* loses some of its significance. While the word can be maintained, it is necessary to introduce a more neutral term that does not entail value-judgements.

There are remnants of Stoic legacy of the *perturbationes animi* as errors of judgement in the first essays like “Of Sadness or Sorrow” (I. 2.) and “Of Fear” (I. 17.) But the development of the *Essays* goes rather in the direction of descriptive analysis and adherence to one man’s particularity rather than therapeutic domination of the passions by reason (as in Stoic teaching and practice).<sup>354</sup> In order to experience our humanity, we must experience and endure passions to the last.<sup>355</sup>

Les passions, me sont autant aisées à éviter, comme elles me sont difficiles à moderer. *Abscinduntur facilius animo, quam temperantur.* Qui ne peut atteindre à cette noble impassibilité Stoïque, qu'il se sauve au giron de cette miennne stupidité populaire. Ce que ceux-là faisoient par vertu, je me duits à le faire par complexion. La moyenne region loge les tempestes ; les deux extremes, des hommes philosophes, et des hommes ruraux, concurrent en tranquillité et en bon heur. (III. 10. “De mesnager sa volonté”)

Passions are to me as easy to be avoyded as they are difficult to be moderated. *Excinduntur facilius animo, quam temperantur:* 'They are more easily rooted out of the minde than brought to good temper.' *He that cannot attaine to this noble*

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<sup>354</sup> Cf. Monsarrat (1984) p. 70. for a similar position.

<sup>355</sup> Montaigne also finds reinforcement of the idea of living in harmony with one’s passions in Plutarch, *De virtute morali*. Cf. H. Friedrich, *Montaigne* pp. 183ff.



*Stoicall impassibility let him shrowd himselfe in the bosome of this my popular stupidity. What they did by vertue I inure my selfe to doe by Nature. The middle region harboureth stormes; the two extreames containe Philosophers and rurall men, they concurre in tranquility and good hap. (Florio, III. 10. "How one ought to governe his will")*

For Montaigne, similarly to Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin a philosophy that suppresses emotions does not bring about grandeur but inhumanity, with its lies and pretension.

Although Montaigne implicitly employs the traditional classifications of passions, when he uses it in a collective sense he most often implies the Ciceronian tetrachord, but his whole enterprise is less conceptual but rather phenomenological. Even if he shares the general assessment of the passions as dangerous, he is ready to admit certain forms of them as part of his nature and, consciously or not, but, faithfully to what he observes, he introduces the new word *émotion* to refer to them in various contexts.

If I wanted to situate the Montaignian attitude to human existence with the terms I used in Chapter II.2.3. (globalist / localist) then it perhaps can be best described as a *radical localist* with his criticism of knowledge, with his affirmation of the human condition and with his happy egocentrism:

Je propose une vie basse, et sans lustre : C'est tout un, On attache aussi bien toute la philosophie morale, à une vie populaire et privée, qu'à une vie de plus riche estoffe : Chaque homme porte la forme entiere, de l'humaine condition. Les autheurs se communiquent au peuple par quelque marque speciale et estrangere : moy le premier, par mon estre universel : comme, Michel de Montaigne : non comme Grammairien ou Poëte, ou Jurisconsulte. Si le monde se plaint dequoy je parle trop de moy, je me plains dequoy il ne pense seulement pas à soy. (III. 2. "Du Repentir")

I propose a meane life and without luster; 'Tis all one. They fasten all Morall Philosophy as well to a popular and private life as to one of richer stuffe. *Every man beareth the whole stampe of humane condition.* Authors communicate themselves unto the world by some speciall and strange marke; I the first, by my generall disposition; as *Michel de Montaigne*, not as a Grammarian, or a Poet or a Lawyer. If the world complaine I speake too much of my selfe. I complaine it speakes no more of it selfe. (Florio, III. 2. "Of Repenting"<sup>356</sup>)

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<sup>356</sup> A. H. T. Levi (2000), p. 99-100. italics mine.

Rather than relating the details of human life to “some speciall and strange marke”, and to some wished (and debatable) ideal, Montaigne opts for describing his and the human condition on its own terms. Of course, these “own terms” are partly distilled from the teachings of Classical authors as their texts are tested against his own personal (and as I shall attempt to show below, his bodily) experience: the *corpus* of the ancients and of his own. This does not mean that his description would be *amoral* since he is aware of the moral standards and ethical precepts both of the ancients and of the (early) moderns but his moral and psychological insight comes to serve not a prescriptive ethics but a moral science anchored in the Classical texts and observation. If *globalism* wants to surrender everything to one single force (*logos*, ruling reason, etc.), and *localism* was ready to acknowledge the existence of separate realms with different laws corresponding to them and with mediation among them, then Montaigne’s *radical localism* is distinguished by the fact that it admits the existence of different realms but does *not* wish to mediate among them.

According to A. H. T. Levi, “When, in 1580, Montaigne did allow elements of Stoic ethics and a strong relativist outlook on cultural values to permeate at least the earlier chapters of *Les Essais*, he *felt impelled to present his work as a self-portrait, which in 1588 it scarcely even pretended to be.*” (italics mine) I would slightly disagree with this claim. While Levi is probably right in claiming that the famous preface “Au Lecteur” of 1580, claiming that “je suis moy-mesmes la matiere de mon livre” may be a kind of excuse for the highly subjective observations and nonchalant tone, his claim that the 1588 edition would have done away with this program does not seem to be warranted by the text. The quotation above is from the third volume contained in the 1588 edition, and it can hardly be said that it plays down the card of the self-portrait: the ostentatious reference to “I the first, by my generall disposition; as *Michel de Montaigne*, not as a Grammarian, or a Poet or a Lawyer” accentuates the self-portrait character of the work. Montaigne’s avowedly first-person singular focus, and the idea that his self, as communicated in writing, is willed as it is in its eccentricities, must have been a source of confirmation for F. Nietzsche in formulating his central slogan “How one becomes what one is”, the subtitle of his intellectual autobiography *Ecce Homo*. This may explain his enthusiasm for the French author when, in the context of the “Third Untimely Meditation: Schopenhauer as Educator”, where the phrase “Be what you are!” (*werde der du bist*) first occurs, he writes about Montaigne:

I know of only one writer whom I would compare with Schopenhauer, indeed set above him, in respect of honesty: Montaigne. That such a man wrote has truly augmented the joy of living on this earth.<sup>357</sup>

In an interesting meditation on the figure of Socrates in Western culture, Alexander Nehamas<sup>358</sup> considers the references to and possible echoes of Montaigne in Nietzsche's oeuvre.<sup>359</sup> According to Nehamas, Nietzsche makes a lot of the idea of the Socratic<sup>360</sup>-Montaignian inward turn and care for the self. Thus Montaigne's focus on the "smallest and most everyday things", our own habits and needs found a sympathetic echo in Nietzsche who regretted that the world teaches us to turn away from these and ultimately, from ourselves.<sup>361</sup> Montaigne's insistence on being *chez moy*, "in mine owne place", "close and neare unto my selfe" and his "sluggish and lumpish body (!)" found an echo in Nietzsche's anti-universalist

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<sup>357</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, (1874) edited by Daniel Breazeale, translated by R.J. Hollingdale; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

<sup>358</sup> Alexander Nehamas, *The Art of Living. Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1998. and for a perspective on Nietzsche's work as a mode of self-fashioning cf. also A. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985. For a criticism of Nehamas's position cf. Váradi Péter, "Barátság és önértelmezés Nietzsche-nél" in *Lábjegyzetek Platónhoz 4. A barátság szerk.* Dékány András és Laczkó Sándor, Szeged: Pro Philosophia Szegediensi Alapítvány, Librarius, 2005. pp. 132-141.

<sup>359</sup> As in *Ecce Homo*: "I have in my spirit – who knows? perhaps also in my body – something of Montaigne's sportiveness." (Quoted by Nehamas, *Ibid.* p. 237 n.8) It is also revealing to see the reference to his own body as in Montaigne above.

<sup>360</sup> As Nehamas notes, Nietzsche's description of that inward turn in the case of Socrates differs significantly from that of Xenophon's inasmuch as Nietzsche's Socrates does not attend to "the benefit of the human race", as Xenophon's did. Nehamas, *Ibid.* p. 130.

<sup>361</sup> Cf. "Priests and teachers, and the sublime lust for power of idealists of every description, the cruder and the more refined, hammer even into children that what matters is something quite different; the salvation of the soul, the service of the state, the advancement of science, or the accumulation of reputation and possessions, all as the means of doing service to mankind as a whole; while the requirements of the individual, its great and small needs within the twenty-four hours of the day, are to be regarded as something contemptible or a matter of indifference." Nietzsche, *Human All-Too-Human*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, quoted by Nehamas, *Ibid.*, p. 130.

outlook. A key passage in Montaigne, “Of Experience” (III. 13.) must have deeply resonated in the German philosopher:

C'est une absoluë perfection, et comme divine, de sçavoir jouyr loyallement de son estre : Nous cherchons d'autres conditions, pour n'entendre l'usage des nostres : et sortons hors de nous, pour ne sçavoir quel il y faict. Si avons nous beau monter sur des eschasses, car sur des eschasses encores faut-il marcher de nos jambes. Et au plus eslevé throne du monde, si ne sommes nous assis, que sus nostre cul. (III. 13. “De l'expérience”)

*It is an absolute perfection, and as it were divine for a man to know how to enjoy his being loyally. We seeke for other conditions because we understand not the use of ours, and goe out of our selves forsomuch as we know not what abiding there is. Wee may long enough get upon stilts, for be wee upon them, yet must we goe with our owne legges. And sit we upon the highest throne of the World, yet sit we upon our owne taile. (Floiro, III. 13. “Of Experience”)*

The elements I have highlighted of Montaigne's *Essays*, his focus on the diverse states of the self in its specific needs and including the body in a descriptive-phenomenological rather than moralistic attitude, point towards and call for a rearrangement of the very terms of care for the self. I agree with Diller that Montaigne is probably the first European writer to have used ‘emotion’ in the psychological sense – a claim that is contested by the entry of *Le Robert* inasmuch as it traces only the social-political and the physiological senses of *émotion* in Montaigne, cf. above. However, a few words of precaution are necessary concerning the scope of Montaigne's originality. First of all, the different senses of *émotion* still coexist in *Les Essais* and Montaigne does not want to erect his linguistic innovation into a conceptual paradigm say by replacing ‘passions’ with ‘emotions’. In fact, such a gesture would be most alien to his phenomenological enterprise that aims to describe what the human condition is in all its diversity and with the so-called passions and emotions included. Even though he progressively distances himself from the positions of the Stoics<sup>362</sup> he retains the humanist

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<sup>362</sup> I agree with H. Friedrich that the famous Stoic period of Montaigne does not exist. There is, in the first essays, some pastiches of Stoic maxims and it happens also that some late additions complement this picture. But the ‘Stoicism’ of Montaigne is more literary than personal. It is a misunderstanding of his contemporaries, of Justus Lipsius in particular, to see in him a Stoic. By turning Seneca's moral philosophy into a descriptive moral science, Montaigne distances himself from the neo/Stoic movement of the 16th and 17th century. This line of neo-Stoic trend is continued by Du Vair,

*ethos* infused with the knowledge of the ancients. This *ethos* does not encourage the discarding of the accumulated knowledge and vocabulary of the Classical authors whose psychological insights remain valid for Montaigne even if their moralistic and teleological approach is sometimes bypassed. This synthetic *and* innovative attitude results in a richness of vocabulary and meanings that is also a characteristic of both Early Modern French and English, and which, among other things, resembles the language of that playwright across the Channel... He can thus comfortably use both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’: the former both in the old senses and associations of the Classical heritage<sup>363</sup>, the latter in the old physical sense, the relatively recent social-political<sup>364</sup> sense as well as the new physiological<sup>365</sup> and psychological senses given to it by himself. Montaigne’s *Essais* thus provide rich material to study the transition from one metaphorical device referring to affective states to another.

There is, however, an important caveat that has to be borne in mind when approaching Early Modern texts with a view to the polysemous character of the words employed in them. Ian Lancashire put into doubt the very concept of a fixed-sense referential definition of word sense. In substantiating his claim, he refers to both the practice of early modern dictionary-writers who typically composed bilingual or polyglot dictionaries and to the late appearance of the word ‘definition’ as referring to words and of the practice of giving fixed-sense definition of words (as popularised by Samuel Johnson in 1755). Thus Early Modern speakers

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Quevedo, Descartes and Corneille. See Hugo Friedrich, *Ibid.* p. 78. For the confirmation of Friedrich’s point cf. also A. H. T. Levi (2000) in Jill Kraye and M. W. F. Stone (2000), *Ibid.*, p. 98-99.

<sup>363</sup> Thus Montaigne can refer to anger as a passion in II. 31. “De la colère”: “Il n’est passion qui esbranle tant la sincerité des jugements, que la cholere.” Florio II. 31. “Of Anger and Choler” “There is no passion so much transports the sinceritie of judgement as doth anger.”

<sup>364</sup> Like in the phrase “l’*émotion* de Catilina” (I. 44. “Du Dormir”) translated by Florio as “the *commotion* of Catiline” (I. 44. “Of Sleeping”).

<sup>365</sup> Like in the phrase « et s’estant laissé surprendre aux esmotions premières des passions, s’armer et se bander pour arrester leur course, et les vaincre » (II. 11. “De la cruauté”) where *esmotions* probably means the first movements of the passions (both in the mind and the body). The phrase is correctly translated by John Florio as “And having suffred himselfe to be surprised by the first assaults of passions, to arme and bandie himselfe, to stay their course and to suppress them” (II. 11. “Of Crueltie”) where the English translator is consistent again in not translating *esmotion* by ‘emotion’ when the sense is not the new psychological. Cf. the case of “l’*émotion* de Catilina” (I. 44. “Du Dormir”) translated by Florio as “the *commotion* of Catiline” (I. 44. “Of Sleeping”) cited above.

must have understood the question ‘what does this word *mean*?’ as a request for a translation, an etymology, or a gesture pointing to something in the world denoted by that word.<sup>366</sup> Lancashire’s findings have repercussions concerning not only the indeterminacy of meaning and the polysemy of certain words but also concerning legitimate methods for re-establishing their meaning. As for the former issue, chapter I.4 presented a comparison of the meanings of ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ and showed that as ‘emotion’ started to occupy the semantic space of ‘passion’ these two words (and possible others as well) were in a kind of limbo: they referred to affective states from different vantage points paralleling systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes.

Concerning legitimate methods for re-establishing meaning (and I admit that my method of establishing the meanings of these words slightly err, even if for heuristic purposes, on the side referential, fixed sense definitions – after all, one must start from somewhere and the *OED* even with its rigid categories and eventual shortcomings *is* a useful tool for crystallising one’s initial hypothesis even if only for *starting* research...) I take that there are two, interrelated consequences: one is to understand meaning as the rule of its usage, i.e. the word or even sentence means something *in a given context*, situated among other words and other significations. While this concept of meaning is modern, we cannot but employ it given our historical position in time: even if could fully reconstitute the early modern understanding

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<sup>366</sup> Ian Lancashire, “An Early Modern English Dictionaries Corpus 1499-1659” in *CH Working Papers* [Online], September 1996, [Online] 1:1. Available:

<http://journals.sfu.ca/chwp/index.php/chwp/article/view/B.17/87> p. 7-10 passim, in particular 8-9. I think, however, that the picture is more complex than the way it is presented by Ian Lancashire in this article. In fact, Francis Bacon *does* talk about definition of words when, exposing the “Idols of the Market Place” he suggests a corrective to the dead-end of certain disputes: “Whence it comes to pass that the high and formal discussions of learned men end oftentimes *in disputes about words and names*; with which (according to the use and wisdom of the mathematicians) *it would be more prudent to begin, and so by means of definitions reduce them to order.*” Although it is true that Bacon himself is somewhat sceptical about the use of such definitions because he continues: “Yet even definitions cannot cure this evil in dealing with natural and material things, *since the definitions themselves consist of words, and those words beget others.* (Novum Organum, XLIII, italics mine). Bacon’s scepticism notwithstanding, the very idea of the *definition of a word* does *not* sound alien to his thought about language and meaning. It is the ultimate *utility* of such definitions that he casts doubt on.

of meaning, I am not sure it would have much relevance for us. The meaning of ‘meaning’ developed in this sense over the last four hundred years and this is the lens (or at least one of the possible lenses) through which we look back in time. Lancashire’s conclusion seems to point in this direction as well when, in putting up with linguistic untidiness, semantic indeterminacy (I would rather say instability or – in a more positive tone - flexibility) and the lack of early modern referential word definition, he concludes:

If there are no fixed senses in the first place, there is nothing lexical in the word that is determinable. The lexical problem gives away to one of understanding human purpose and the world in which it operates.<sup>367</sup>

The other, more practical consequence for establishing the meanings of an early modern English word for the kind of “prototype Renaissance monolingual dictionary that never actually existed” (suggested by Lancashire<sup>368</sup>) is, probably, to proceed by early modern translations of preferably other early modern texts and to see how the translator implicitly assigns meaning to English words (and, retroactively, to the words in the text of his source language) in the course of relating them to the words of his source language.<sup>369</sup>

These conceptual and methodological insights and considerations prompt me to turn to Florio’s translation of Montaigne. Of course, when doing such a comparative “meaning search” one is exposing himself to multiple dangers: if, after all, meaning can be determined from contexts within a language and the best further guide to meaning is translation from one language into another, then one has to consider the contexts in both the source text/language *and* in the target text/language. I am also aware that such a back and forth zigzag between contexts and languages for establishing the meaning of ‘emotion’ / *émotion* may, in fact, lead to a *mis-en-abîme*<sup>370</sup>...

Therefore bearing the richness of Montaigne’s text in mind, and the possible dangers of ‘getting lost in translation’ I shall look at Florio’s translation in order:

1. to examine how consistent is Florio in translating *passion* and *émotion*;

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<sup>367</sup> Lancashire, *Ibid.* p. 17.

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.* p. 3.

<sup>369</sup> The suggestion is that of Ian Lancashire (1996) *Ibid.* p. 3. but it is amended and adapted to my perspective.

<sup>370</sup> Such a back and forth reference between contexts and languages may account for a *mis-en-abîme*

2. to assess more concretely whether Florio, in making his translation, is aware of the Montaignian idiolect in the usage of *émotion* and of the ramifications and underpinnings the new sense of *émotion* and of ‘emotion’ entail
3. and to see to what extent is Florio’s English text engages in that transition between systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes on the one hand, and between metaphorical devices (‘passion’ → ‘emotion’) used to express affective states on the other hand.

Of course, the three questions are closely interrelated and even presuppose each other and it is somewhat artificial to separate them. I must also admit that the analysis of the *Essais* and of the Florio/Montaigne I am offering is far from being complete. A mere count of the number of instances ‘passion’/*passion*, ‘emotion’/*emotion*, *emotion*, *émotion* appear in the two bodies of texts shows that such an enterprise can be subject of a whole book. There are **171** occurrences of ‘passion’ in Florio’s text (27 ‘passionate’ included, 15 ‘compassion’ not counted;) and **13** occurrences of ‘emotion’ (not counting the one in “To the Curteous Reader”) in a total of cca. **516000** words. In Montaigne’s original, there are **29** occurrences of *émotion* (in various forms such as *esmotion* (14), *emotion* (10), and *émotion* (5)) and **175** occurrences of *passion* (not counting *compassion* (16)) in a total of cca. **438000** words. This turnout of ‘passion’ is comparable to the occurrences of the word in Bacon, *The Essays or Counsels Civill and Morall* (1601) which has 14 occurrences of ‘passion’, (including two ‘compassionate’) in a total of cca. 53500 words but, volumes borne in mind, significantly surpasses that of *The Advancement of Learning* (1605) which has 13 occurrences of ‘passion’ (including one ‘passionate’) in cca. 84700 words. However, neither *The Essays* nor *The Advancement* has ‘emotion’ – a fact that further highlights the originality and idiolect of Montaigne and of the Montaigne/Florio.

Given Montaigne’s aim to give a portrait of himself (“myselfe am the groundworke of my booke”<sup>371</sup>) and through himself of the human condition (“Every man beareth the whole stampe of humane condition.”<sup>372</sup>) in all its peculiarities implies that the stuff of which ‘Human, All-Too Human’ life is made, namely our affective states, will occupy a major part. In this sense, as we shall see, Montaigne is more attentive to subjective states of minds,

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<sup>371</sup> Florio, “The Author to the Reader”

<sup>372</sup> Florio, III. 2. “Of Repenting”



idiosyncrasies than Bacon in either his programmatic attitude to science and learning (*The Advancement*) or in his more generalist approach to moral issues in *The Essays*. Of course, given the specificity of Montaigne's use of *émotion* I shall therefore focus mainly on occurrences of 'emotion' in the Montaigne/Florio and will select a number of passages I deem crucial and symptomatic in order to address the issues raised above.

**Analysis of some loci with passion / émotion / esmotion / emotion  
in *Les essais* / *The Essayes***

1) From II. 11. "De la cruauté"/ "Of Crueltie"

Comme ont bien d'autres, que je trouve avoir surpassé par effect les regles mesmes de leur discipline : Tesmoing le jeune Caton : Quand je le voy mourir et se deschirer les entrailles, je ne me puis contenter, de croire simplement, qu'il eust lors son ame exempte totalement de trouble et d'effroy : je ne puis croire, qu'il se maintint seulement en cette desmarche, que les regles de la secte Stoique luy ordonnoient, *rassise, sans esmotion et impassible* : il y avoit, ce me semble, en la vertu de cet homme, trop de gaillardise et de verueur, pour s'en arrester là.

As also others have, whom ill effect finde to have exceeded the verie rules of their discipline; witness *Cato* the younger; when I see him die, tearing and mangling his entrails, I cannot simply content my selfe to beleieve that at that time he had *his soule wholly exempted from all trouble or free from vexation*: I cannot imagine he did only maintaine himselfe in this march or course which the rule of the Stoike sect had ordained unto him, *settled, without alteration or emotion, and impassible*.

Given the Ciceronian-Stoic context and the explicit reference to "the rule of the Stoike sect", 'impassible' must mean 'to be immune from passions' (*ataraxia*) in accordance with the Stoic ideal. The three words *rassise, sans esmotion et impassible* are thus synonyms all denoting the state ordained by "the rule of the Stoike sect". *Sans esmotion* is just midway between *rassise* ('settled') and *impassible* and is an equivalent of *impassible*: without 'passion'. Florio's translation is interesting because he does not simply translate *sans esmotion* literally as 'without emotion' but interjects 'alteration': 'without alteration or emotion' i.e. Cato does not experience either alteration or emotion. I would suggest that Florio is not only translating but also *interpreting* the expression *sans esmotion* for the contemporary English reader who might have associated the social-political sense with 'emotion' (as in "There were ... great

stirres and *emocions* in Lombardye”).<sup>373</sup> Florio’s insertion ‘alteration’ anchors the sense of ‘emotion’ in the mental-psychological field. In fact, the three/four words *rassise, sans esmotion et impassible* / “without alteration or emotion, and impassible” mirror the earlier phrase in the sentence *eust lors son ame exempte totalement de trouble et d’effroy* / “his soule wholly exempted from all trouble or free from vexation”. In the latter phrase, the reference to Classical ‘passions’ is obvious: trouble, perturbation of the soul and *effroy* (“fright, fear, dread” according to Cotgrave (1611)) is one (*metus* or *timor*) of the four Ciceronian-Augustinian passions. Florio’s translation dramatizes the freedom from all trouble by spelling it out explicitly as both “exempt from trouble” and as “free from vexation”. It thus contrasts all the more apparently that, in the second part of the sentence, he takes *sans emotion* as ‘being without passion’. I conclude then that Florio registers that *emotion* can be a hyperonym for troubles/vexations of the soul that is the consecrated reference, at least since Cicero-Augustine, to the passions.

In further commenting on the death of Cato the younger, Montaigne remarks:

Il me semble lire en cette action, je ne sçay quelle esjouyssance de son ame, et une esmotion de plaisir extraordinaire,

In which action me thinks I read a kinde of unspeakable joy in his minde, and a motion of extraordinary pleasure,

Florio translates by ‘motion’ the *esmotion* of Montaigne; again the context contains references to Classical ‘passions’: *esjouyssance* is “joy, mirth, glee, reioycing, gladness” in Cotgrave (1611) as well as *plaisir* / pleasure (*laetitia* or *gaudium*). Florio’s avoidance of translating *esmotion* as ‘emotion’ may be due to the positive sense in which the word is used here. Cotgrave (1611) gives “An emotion, commotion, sudden, or turbulent stirring; an agitation of the spirit, violent motion of the thoughts, vehement inclination of the mind” for *esmotion*. Thus perhaps the translator of the *Essais* is diverging from the Cotgravean sense by his implication that ‘emotion’ is either a hyperonym for certain passions or, when the reference is

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<sup>373</sup> In a similar way, Florio also interjects “march or course” in the same sentence when the French only has *desmarche*.

more to the experience of a particular emotion (such as pleasure), then the physiological connotation of ‘motion’ (as bodily experience) is more appropriate.

2) From II. 12. « Apologie de Raimond de Sebonde” / “An Apologie of *Raymond Sebond*”

Les Prescheurs sçavent, que *l’emotion qui leur vient en parlant, les anime vers la creance* : et qu’en cholere nous nous addonnons plus à la deffence de nostre proposition, l’imprimons en nous, et l’embrassons avec plus de vehemence et d’approbation, que nous ne faisons estans en nostre sens froid et reposé.

Preachers know that the *emotion which surpriseth them whilst they are in their earnest speech doth animate them towards belief*, and that being angrie we more violently give our selves to defend our proposition, imprint it in our selves, and embrace the same with more vehemencie and approbation than we did being in our temperate and reposed sense.

The context of “emotion” here is that of preaching, oration and the focus is not on the audience as in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (discussed above, chapter II.1.2) but on the orator, preacher himself. “Emotion” here functions as a synonym for a classic example of passion, anger. Its use may be motivated by the neutrality of the term compared to “passion” and the wish to focus on the energy that anger may provide rather than letting any moral valuations prevail. After all, anger while speaking is not anger directed against anybody concrete and the emotional impulse it furnishes may function, as it is suggested in the text, as an aid to faith, as reinforcement to stick to and advance one’s position in words. Although emotion “surprises” preachers, they do not passively endure it (as the classical sense of *pathos* suggests) but can manipulate it in linguistic, dramatic contexts and interhuman relations. The position that emotions can be spurs to virtue is also shared by Erasmus:

Peripatetics teach the affections not to be destroyed utterly, but to be refrained, and that the use of them is not utterly to be refused, for because they think them to be given of nature, as a prick or a spur to stir a man to virtue: as wrath maketh a man bold and hardy, and is a matter of fortitude.<sup>374</sup>

The crucial difference between “passion” and “emotion” and probably the underlying reason for the use of the latter is in the sense that one can take stock and ownership of such mental phenomena (here anger) rather than simply be a passive victim of it.

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<sup>374</sup> *The Manual of a Christian Knight* (1501) Chapter V


### 3) From III. 2. “De repentir” / “Of Repenting”

Le langage Latin m'est comme naturel : je l'entens mieux que le François : mais il y a quarante ans, que je ne m'en suis du tout point servy à parler, ny guere à escrire. Si est-ce qu'à des *extremes et soudaines esmotions*, où je suis tombé, deux ou trois fois en ma vie : et l'une, voyant mon pere tout sain, se renverser sur moy pasmé : j'ay tousjours eslané du fond des entrailles, les premieres paroles Latines : Nature se sourdant et s'exprimant à force, à l'encontre d'un si long usage : et cet exemple se dit d'assez d'autres.

The Latine tongue is to me in a manner naturall; I understand it better then French: but it is now fortie yeares I have not made use of it to speake, nor much to write; yet in some *extreame emotions and suddaine passions*, wherein I have twice or thrice falne, since my yeares of discretion, and namely once, when my father being in perfect health, fell all along upon me in a swoune, I have ever, even from my very hart uttered my first words in latine: nature rushing and by force expressing it selfe, against so long a custome; the like example is alleadged of divers others.

This passage is particularly interesting as Florio translation is a quasi gloss on Montaigne's text. He translates “*extremes et soudaines esmotions*” as “extreame emotions and suddaine passions” and thus adds a noun. This amendment of the French text creates a pair, a kind of hendiadys, in the English where “extreame emotions” come as synonyms of “suddaine passions”. The context of the emergence of such states of mind is described by Montaigne as being of such emotional intensity that self-control was not sustained despite several years of custom and practice (that is, the non-practice of his “naturall Latine”). It is notable that Florio feels the need to introduce “passions” to describe such an extreme situation and to qualify “emotions” as well as “extreame” – thus turning it into a synonym of passion as we would understand today, a matter of intensity and not only of content.

Conclusion of the textual analyses:



**Figure 4:** Evolution of semantic and associated fields of “passion” and “emotion”

I am proposing the above figure as a tentative (indeed, very tentative) illustration of the interlaced manner in which changes in semantic fields are reflected in the evolution of the meaning of “passion” and “emotion”. My understanding is that the Montaigne/Florio is at a crucial moment of this evolution. Montaigne raises ‘motion’ from the physical-physiological level to the psychological level. He turns ‘motion’ into the *vehicle* of the metaphor in which the emotions are the *tenor*<sup>375</sup>, or to put it in another way: motion becomes the vehicle for certain mental phenomena. The implicit leitmotif (it can hardly be said a metaphor) of ‘passions’ in the Classical sense and usage was being subject to, or exposed to something; both to grief and pleasure according to the etymology of *pathos*/*πάθος* as well as to the gods, fortune, injuries, needs and desires in the Classical Greek period. This leitmotif was slightly altered by Cicero when he translated the Greek term as *perturbatio animi* and it was later adopted (with some accommodations and changes) by Augustine, Boethius, etc. It can be argued, however, that in the Classical usage of ‘passion’, ‘motion’ was always implicit: in the Aristotelian tradition, passions are *motions* of the sensitive soul, for Aquinas they are acts or

<sup>375</sup> I am using the terms employed by I. A. Richards in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936).

movements of the sensitive appetite. It was also employed by Augustine when he referred to the passions as *animi motibus* ('mental emotions' or 'motions of the mind').<sup>376</sup> For Thomas Wright, an adherent of the Thomist tradition, "the inordinate motions of the passions" are "thorny briars sprung from the infected root of original sin".<sup>377</sup> In the medieval medical tradition deriving partly from Galen, these motions are humoural movements within the body: liquids heaving and frothing, eager to be let out.<sup>378</sup> Thus 'motion' is an important component in the Classical sense of 'passion' and, furthermore, even *perturbatio* could be seen as a form of *motio*. And yet the move from one to the other took some sixteen hundred years because of the systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes the slight difference between the two metaphors entail: a small step for word meaning yet a big and a long-time hesitant step for Western European languages and cultures... And, after all, there aren't that many *séma* that could be turned into metaphoric vehicle to describe mental phenomena – or so we think, at least... What really happens is that the direction of the 'motion' begins to change: in Classical 'passion', this movement is "suffered" (Aristotle), it is caused by external objects (Aquinas). In the modern perspective of 'emotion', the *movement comes from the subject itself*.<sup>379</sup>

It is a sort of irony of the semantic change that the metaphoric vehicle of 'motion' is in fact based on the Aristotelian-Thomist theories of motions of the sensitive soul or appetite, on the movement of animal spirits in the blood and Galenic psychology and physiology. It is beyond the scope of this study but it would be interesting to further trace whether 'motion' as the *vehicle* of the metaphor is not a trickle down effect of these theories. The process would

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<sup>376</sup> Augustine, *City of God*, IX. 4 and *motus* ('motions') *City of God*, XIV. 9.

<sup>377</sup> *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1601)

<sup>378</sup> For a summary, see Nancy G. Siriasi, *Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice*, Chicago, 1990, pp. 104ff. In the context of an overview of the historiography of emotions, Barbara H. Rosenwein qualifies this model of the emotions as "hydraulic" and suggests that it underpins the grand narrative of the history of emotions (Huizinga, Febvre, Bloch, Elias) as well as popular conceptions and our everyday language about the emotions. She considers that this model is no longer tenable because new, cognitive and social constructionist theories of the emotions since the 1960s have dethroned the hydraulic model. Cf. Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History" in *The American History Review* Vol. 107, Issue 3. As my study concerns the semantic evolution of "passion" and its partial replacement by "emotion", I am content to register the metaphoric changes and transfers that take place in this evolution.

<sup>379</sup> Cf. Diller (2005), p. 187.

then look like this: the theories invent the vehicle ('motion') but in Classical 'passion' it is used in a literal-physiological sense for the motions of the soul and, due to changes in systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes regarding mental phenomena, the physical sense is turned into a metaphor and its direction is reversed: from world to subject, to movement coming out of the subject itself.

### III. 4. Francis Bacon's Strategy of the 'Regiment of the Mind'

The purpose of this chapter is to assess Bacon's adaptation of the Ciceronian *cultura animi* as a humanist's adaptation of the care for the self. My focus here is not on presenting and analysing the semantic change of passion proper but rather to present the Baconian 'regiment of the mind' as a preoccupation that underpins the early modern understanding of the passions and the mainstream program of providing means for their treatment. Bacon is also emblematic in the sense of blending different philosophical and theological traditions (Stoics, Aristotelian, Christian) and thus illustrating the intercultural context of early modern humanism. It seems necessary to situate briefly the problem in Bacon's oeuvre and to see how his study of human nature fits into his overall program of the reform and advancement of knowledge. Bacon shares many of the major humanist assumptions about the nature of man and about the use of learning and erudition. His fundamental approach to the passions is that of a humanist working for the betterment of mankind, and advocating the use of learning to relieve man's estate and implying a close connection between moral culture and the rational faculties of the mind.

In the history of ideas Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is credited for his wholesale revaluation of knowledge and his restructuring of traditional learning resulting in his proposition of a new system based on induction supported by observation and experiments and gave an impetus to the active development of new arts and inventions. Bacon also put forward his ideal of a research centre and scientific community and ultimate goal of his system was the production of practical knowledge for "the use and benefit of men" and the "relief of man's estate" and "furthering "the advancement of the glory of God." His cultural legacy is usually taken to consist mostly of contributing to the foundation and triumph of technology and the progress of science in the modern world. But Bacon's program of science contains other dimensions that he deems essential to practical knowledge, which, however, do not fit into the outlook of modern positive science. His new approach to learning invited also



an alteration in the conception of the learned man: a new science for a new scientist.<sup>380</sup> He was also concerned with what could be called as the affective culture of man and with the development and culture of his ethical faculties. His seminal 1605 treatise *The Proficience and Advancement of Learning* makes room for the development of the ethical faculties in the program of science. In his assessment of learning there is an important subset under philosophy (answering to the faculty of reason according to the Galenic division) devoted to the human will. Its program of the progress of science and learning in general as set out in Book 2 proposes a “culture or regiment of the mind” the topics of which will be flashed out in the *Essayes or Counsels Civill and Moral*. This procedure of setting the ground for further work is very much the spirit of *The Advancement of Learning* as a whole as it is an “encyclopaedia of lacunae” that identifies “gaps in our knowledge to be filled, a list of desiderata that will demand much labour over many years”<sup>381</sup>.

“Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation [tour] of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste [uncultivated], and not improved and converted [transformed] by the industry of man; to the end that such a plot [plan, outline] made and recorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation, and also serve to excite voluntary endeavours [the generosity of private persons subsidising research]. Wherein nevertheless my purpose is at this time to note only omissions and deficiencies, and not to make any redargution [refutation] of errors or incomplete prosecutions [unfinished investigations]; for it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.”<sup>382</sup>

Bacon’s program for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge is part and parcel of his overall aim of using science and learning *pro bono publico*. In fact, these endeavours are motivated by the Renaissance ethos - Ciceronian in its origin - of combining

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<sup>380</sup> Cf. Moody E. Prior, “Bacon’s Man of Science” in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1954 (XV) pp. 348-370.

<sup>381</sup> Brian Vickers’ introduction to *The Advancement of Learning* in *Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the Major Works*, Edited by Brian Vickers, “The Oxford Authors”, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 581. Quotations from Bacon – unless otherwise indicated - are cited from this edition and will be henceforward referred to as *The Advancement*. Textual glosses between parentheses are those of B. Vickers.

<sup>382</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 174.

*vita contemplativa* and *vita activa*. Just as natural philosophy for Bacon must work for the "relief of man's estate" - one must look for the real transformation of the human condition through scientific progress - so it is with Moral Philosophy that should seek the reformation of man. Since moral knowledge cannot remain a theoretical knowledge, *cultura animi* occupies a central place in Bacon's strategy concerning the use of learning for moral improvement and hence for the treatment of the passions. The structural partition of Book Two of the *Advancement of Learning* answers to the various faculties of the mind according to the Galenic division such as History (memory), Poesy (imagination), and Philosophy (reason). Rather than erecting a science devoid of practical use for human beings, Bacon's very discussion of the different branches of learning are correlated to and engage the human mind's different faculties. Bacon's humanist conviction in the therapeutic capacity of learning and rhetoric for the treatment of the passions is given an emblematic image when he provides "human proofs" for the "evidence concerning the true dignity and value of learning". He evokes the myth of Orpheus in the following terms:

Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities which arise from nature; which merit was lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus' theatre, where all beasts and birds assembled; and, forgetting their several appetites, some of prey, some of game, some of quarrel, stood all sociably together listening to the airs and accords of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned to its own nature: wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained; but if these instruments be silent, or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion.<sup>383</sup>

Bacon establishes a parallel between human society and the assembly of animals and suggests that without the discipline and guidance of laws, books of learning and exercises of rhetoric human society would inevitably collapse into anarchy and confusion. It is because people in their natural condition are full of passions and it is learning that creates bonds of sociability among them. Learning here carries the sense of precepts, laws, and religion mediated by the "eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues" (that is rhetoric and dialectic).

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<sup>383</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 154.

Further on the enlightened king endued with learning is meant to have notions of “religion, policy and morality”. There is, however, a slight difference between this classical humanist conception of learning that is anchored in the power of language and rhetoric and Bacon’s “Georgics of the mind”. The former is grounded on the belief that *humaniores litterae*, symbolised here by Orpheus’ lyre, can domesticate human behaviour. Bacon’s method of *cultura animi* and Regiment of the Mind starts with the study of human nature, a catalogue of human dispositions somewhat in the manner of studying physical nature in an empirical manner. Whereas the former intervenes by rhetoric, the latter wishes to amend by pre-empting or medicining the mind’s diseases. Bearing in mind Bacon’s wish to advance the status of learning, his insistence on the moral and therapeutic capacities partakes of a strategy to increase learning’s credentials. If science is a moral undertaking, its patronage can be all the more appealing to the monarch.<sup>384</sup>

In summary Bacon’s argument is that passions can be best pre-empted by learning and eloquence: by increasing the power of the mind, the storm of passions can be prevented since they are caused by errors of judgement. In this optimistic humanist outlook, increase of knowledge is an increase of power over the self: we can rule over passions.

Bacon’s treatment of the passions is embedded in his “culture of the mind” that is itself part of his moral philosophy embedded in the revived Classical tradition of self-knowledge:

We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly.<sup>385</sup>

It is also a segment of what Bacon calls Human Philosophy or Humanity, the study of human nature and the study of “man segregate” and “man congregate”.

With this reservation therefore we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which hath two parts: *the one considereth man segregate or distributively; the other congregate or in society*. So as human philosophy is either *simple and*

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<sup>384</sup> For the idea of science as a moral undertaking, albeit in a different perspective, cf. Ian Box, “Bacon’s Moral Philosophy” in *The Cambridge Companion to Bacon*, edited by Markku Peltonen, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 260ff.

<sup>385</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 205.

*particular, or conjugate and civil. Humanity particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the body, and of knowledges which respect the mind. But before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I do take the consideration in general and at large of human nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself: not so much in regard of those delightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body, which being mixed cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either.*<sup>386</sup>

Bacon proposes to take the object of his inquiry human nature as such both in a descriptive way and by providing specific means for its improvement. In doing so Bacon makes an oblique critical remark concerning the familiar humanist discourses about the dignity of man. Although the remark is not fully developed in this context we may infer from Bacon's overall attitude that he probably found those discourses somewhat flamboyant and hanging in the air because lacking in methodical discussion and practical advice about how to proceed concretely. Bacon does not question the onto-theological underpinnings of such discourses about man (divine, angelical nature, etc.) Instead, he proposes to fledge out the knowledge necessary for achieving those high ends, to elaborate a knowledge or science of human nature. As it emerges from *The Advancement of Learning* and the *Essays* this knowledge concerns both the moral principles but even more the practical ways of how to achieve them and it calls for an individual practice: the culture of the mind.

Rather than taking a frontal approach to the passions, Bacon's culture of the mind engages with human nature as a whole both in its individual and social dimensions. The theme of the passions is enmeshed in a multitude of topics that thematise human existence and behaviour such as habit, custom, education, anger, etc. These issues all offer opportunities for a regiment of the mind.

The role of Baconian science with regard to the passions is first to provide help to diagnose the particularities of "the diversity of complexions and constitutions", second to identify the diseases and then propose the cures (*The Advancement*, p. 258-259.) It is in the perspective of such guidance and advice that Bacon could give the subtitle to his 1625 edition of the *Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral* and it apparently was very popular given the

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<sup>386</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 205-206. emphasis mine

Renaissance vogue of self-improvement. Bacon's essay "Of Counsel" gives his own understanding of this activity.

The greatest trust between man and man is the trust of giving counsel. For in other confidences men commit the parts of life; their lands, their goods, their child, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their counsellors, they commit the whole: by how much the more they are obliged to all faith and integrity. [...] Things will have their first or second agitation: if they be not tossed upon arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon waves of fortune; and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a drunken man.<sup>387</sup>

The function of the *Essays* as counsels forming part of the project of *cultura animi* suggests a reciprocal engagement from the reader. They bring observation to experience at the crossroads of psychology, ethics and politics and other sciences (broadly speaking at the intersections of private and public) inviting, as all counsels do, an engagement from their reader. Thus the practice they propose to the reader does not stop at their reading but is meant to resonate further.<sup>388</sup> As they are part of the "Regiment of the Mind", their intention is to help the reader achieve "health and good estate" in a certain way; not by merely putting forth, in a prescriptive manner, examples of virtue but to assist the reader in identifying his own state and assisting him or her in working on himself or herself. Of course, this is done in an oblique manner by putting forth personal experience at the intersection of psychology and ethics and combining it with observation. In this spirit the *Essays* invite personal meditation from the part of the reader in a context that Bacon himself compares to Seneca's *Epistles to Lucilius* in his dedication to Prince Henry. In this dedication Bacon compares the *Essays* to grains of salt giving appetite to the prince rather than offending him with satiety.<sup>389</sup> The

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<sup>387</sup> "Of Counsel" in Brian Vickers (ed.), p. 379-380.

<sup>388</sup> Bacon's recalling of the marriage of Jupiter and Metis (Counsel) – "a monstrous fable" – carries the metaphorical sense of pregnancy: being pregnant with counsel ("begetting, impregnation"), devouring counsel (Jupiter eating Metis). Cf. "Of Counsel", Vickers, ed. (1996) p. 380. We shall return later to the idea present also in this passage of the link between government ("empire") and the "Regiment of the Mind".

<sup>389</sup> "To write just treatises requireth leisure in the writer and leisure in the reader, and therefore are not so fit, neither in regard of your Highness' princely affairs, nor in regard of my continual services; which the cause that hath made me choose to write certain brief notes, set down rather significantly

comparison suggests the open-ended nature of their reading; the Renaissance reader, be it prince, courtier or simple subject is implicitly called to active engagement with his or her self. In this way, the *Essays* provide an accompaniment for the culture of the mind as they are “observances and exercises” for “fixing the good hours of the mind” in order to restore “the mind unto virtue and good estate” (*The Advancement*, p. 262.). And the effect of “medicining the mind” is not limited to the essays dealing specifically with a passion like “Of Revenge”, “Of Envy”, “Of Love”, “Of Ambition”, “Of Anger”. Inasmuch as “the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the passions” (*The Advancement*, p. 259.) may affect all spheres of social and private life, an adequate Regiment of the Mind must also take into account these diverse fields of experience. In this regard Bacon distinguishes himself on the one hand from Aristotle whom he considers as not having provided guidance for curing the diseases of the mind and, on the other hand, from the Stoics who are lacking “active and ample descriptions and observations” (p. 259). For Bacon, the Stoics are somewhat better in that they provide some discourses on the affections “as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other”.

As part of a culture of the mind, the act of reading considered as dispersed meditations, “grains of salt” furnishes the reader not with explicit precepts in the sense of giving ready-made answers on how to behave<sup>390</sup> but with an *askesis* in Foucault’s broad sense of a technique that agents practice on themselves to make themselves into the persons they want to be. I agree with Zsolt Almási’s analysis that this practice concerns not the internalisation of precepts but is rather a “phase of preparation” in that they address those very faculties which, if given training and kept in good condition, can yield “the excellencies of the mind”: Beauty (graceful behaviour), Health (freedom from the diseases of the mind) and Strength (the virtues of liberality, fortitude, magnanimity). Reading the *Essays* in the sense “grains of salt” and “dispersed meditations” are exercises for the individual to train himself or herself to become a certain sort of person. It is part of a certain fashioning of the self that in its

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than curiously, which I have called *Essays*. The word is late, but the thing is ancient, for Seneca’s *Epistles to Lucilius*, if one mark them well, are but *Essays*, that is dispersed meditations, though conveyed in the form of Epistles. These labours of mine I know cannot be worthy of your Highness, for what can be worthy of you? But my hope is, they may be as grains of salt, that will rather give you an appetite that offend you with satiety.” Quoted by Brian Vickers (1996), p. 677-678.

<sup>390</sup> On why “Bacon remains silent on specific moral instruction” cf. Zsolt Almási, *Ibid.* p. 117-119.

nature is similar to other practices like confession, keeping Lent but is a less orthodox method of self-care. The quotation from Proverbs 4:23 put at the beginning of the section on the “Will of man” strengthens this image of the heart/mind as the basis of all moral action. In Bacon’s handling, this ethical substance includes the background of shared understanding of what it is to belong to a particular community and to aspire in practice to being a good person there. In this sense, the socio-politico-institutional context provides the broader framework for the individual *askesis*.

Set against this background, Bacon’s objections to certain forms of learning can be better appreciated. In Book One of *The Advancement of learning* Bacon identifies “three vanities in studies, whereby learning hath been most traduced” (p. 138.) The three diseases (“distempers”) of learning are “fantastical [fanciful] learning”, “contentious [quarrelsome] learning”, and “delicate [affected, obsessed with style] learning”. In the present context, Bacon’s condemnation of “delicate learning” is most relevant because it brings out most pointedly his opposition to a kind of imitation of the ancients. Bacon reproaches to a number of Renaissance humanist authors lumped together for their stylistic imitation of Cicero that they suffer from the distemper of learning in “studying word and not matter”.<sup>391</sup> Therefore it is particularly noteworthy that Bacon takes up the effective side of the humanistic heritage, namely the “culture of the mind” from Cicero. Whereas others “hunted more after words than matter”, Bacon seizes on the practical aspect of the Ciceronian program (on the *verba*) and inserts it in his program of learning. Comparing the culture of the mind and the improvement of affective culture to the teaching of writing, Bacon also reproaches to previous authors that they “only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts, or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters”. (p. 244.) They do not provide mental tools and exercises for the attainment of “Good, Virtue, Felicity”:

how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and comfortable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably.<sup>392</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 139. On Bacon’s alleged “anti-humanism” cf. Brian Vickers, “The myth of Francis Bacon’s ‘anti-humanism’” in *Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by Jill Kraye and M. W. Stone, Routledge: London and New York, 2000

<sup>392</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 244.

He suggests that behind this omission is a reluctance to engage with the “ordinary and common matters” and he proposes his *Georgics of the Mind* which embraces ordinary matters and builds on a “husbandry and tillage” of the mind that is rooted in human relations. This expansion of the sphere of a culture of the mind, while retaining Bacon’s grandiose project concerning knowledge<sup>393</sup>, takes moral philosophy as a natural/positive science combined with guidance for self-care: ordinary matters providing subject-matter.

The passions enter the picture inasmuch as they are “diseases of the mind” affecting the Health of the Mind. In this chapter we shall consider in turn i) what does Bacon mean by the word “passion”; ii) what place does the “culture of the mind” (*cultura animi* or *cultus animi*<sup>394</sup>) occupy in his program for the advancement of learning.

### **i) Passion as disease of the mind**

Bacon’s definition of the passions is constant and fundamentally Stoico-Ciceronian in its inspiration even if in his proposed treatment does not adhere to the Stoic precepts. Thus he does not embrace the Stoics’ opinion about the necessity of their extirpation and the merits of *apatheia* and considers concurrent philosophical (mainly Aristotelian) treatments and a Christian approach in dealing with them.

The Stoics were of the opinion that there was no way to attain to this even temper of the mind but to be senseless [lacking feeling], and so they sold their goods to ransom themselves from their evils; but not only Divinity, our schoolmistress, doth teach us the effect of grace, but even Philosophy, her handmaid, doth condemn our want of care and industry if we do not win very much upon [get better of] ourselves.<sup>395</sup>

As this passage shows, Bacon is keenly aware of the theological underpinnings of different approaches in the treatment of the passions and separates the Stoic and Christian points of view. He disapproves of the Stoics’ voluntarism manifest in their attempt to suppress the passions and contrasts it with a theology of saving divine grace on the one hand and with a

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<sup>393</sup> Cf. his “Letter to Lord Burghley”: “Lastly, I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends as I have moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be my province;”. In Vickers (1996) p. 20.

<sup>394</sup> Cf. *The Advancement*, p. 255.ff and *Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his travels*, [henceforward *Advice*] in Vickers, *Ibid* (1996) Letter I, p. 69. respectively.

<sup>395</sup> *Advice*, p. 70.



philosophy of self-care and industry. The Baconian approach to the passions will be elaborated along such lines of self-care and industry as part of a broader strategy of a culture of the mind and advancement of learning. We shall come back to this point in more detail below.

In the same letter Bacon defines passions as "sicknesses of the mind".<sup>396</sup> Also, in various places in *The Advancement of Learning*, passions are described again and again as "diseases and infirmities of the mind" or "perturbations and distempers of the affections"<sup>397</sup>. As such they are associated to imperfections in kings (*The Advancement*, p. 155.) that lead to "continual mutinies and seditions" (*The Advancement*, p. 239) against reason. Even if this definition has a Stoic colouring, Bacon does not propose a blanket suppression of them. In his essay "Of Regiment of Health" he approaches the question from the aspect of health and although he advises the avoidance of certain passions (such as envy, anxious fears, anger fretting inwards,<sup>398</sup> etc.) he proposes other, one could say mellow passions such as hope, mirth, wonder and admiration.<sup>399</sup>

As for the passions and studies [concerns] of the mind: avoid envy; anxious fears; anger fretting inwards [suppressed, corrosive]; subtle and knotty [complicated] inquisitions [investigations]; joys and exhilarations in excess; sadness not communicated [released]. Entertain [cultivate] hopes; mirth rather than joy; variety of delights, rather than surfeit of them; wonder and admiration, and therefore novelties; studies that fill the mind with splendid and illustrious objects, as histories, fables and contemplations of nature.<sup>400</sup>

It is also worth noting that in the context of this essay by Bacon on the control or regiment of health, almost all passions, whether recommended or not, are qualified in one way or another. With the exception of 'envy', in order to judge about the healthiness of a given passion, it

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<sup>396</sup> "The gifts or excellencies of the mind are the same as those are of the body; Beauty, Health, and Strength. ... Health consisteth in an unmovable constancy and a *freedom from passions, which are indeed the sicknesses of the mind*." *Advice*, p. 69. (emphasis mine)

<sup>397</sup> For e.g. *Advancement*, p. 165, p. 258-9 and *passim*.

<sup>398</sup> Cf. the Aristotelian passions not admitting a mean in the discussion above on Aristotle, Chapter II.1.2. and *Eth. Nic. Ibid.* II. 6. 1107 a5ff.

<sup>399</sup> Where a *mean* according to Aristotle is possible.

<sup>400</sup> Bacon, "Of Regiment of Health", in Vickers (1996) p. 404.

must receive some sort of qualification such as ‘anxious fears’, ‘anger *fretting inwards*’, etc. Bacon was consistent in his discussion of the passions in keeping the vocabulary of health and disease throughout his career. In *The Advancement of Learning*, the book of central concern for our topic and the main focus of this chapter, Bacon suggests a number of dispositions and tools “to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind”.<sup>401</sup> What is particularly interesting is how the theme of health is conjugated with that of learning in this part of the book and how this will inform much of what Bacon has to say about the passions later in his career. Although the passions are never explicitly assimilated to any of the Idols, the attitude towards them, calling them “diseases of the mind” gives them the colouring of Idols of the Tribe in the sense that they are part of the natural weaknesses and tendencies common to all human nature. Thus the definition of the passions as “diseases of the mind” in the passage cited above invites the association of learning with metaphors of healing, remedying, purging, etc.<sup>402</sup> and makes the treatment of the passions part of Bacon’s overall strategy of counteracting the Idols. This outlook on the passions is present also in the *Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his travels*:

Health consisteth in an unmovable constancy and freedom from passions, which are indeed the sicknesses of the mind. [...] To attain to health of mind, we must use the same means that we do for the health of our bodies; that is, to take observation what diseases we are aptest to fall into, and to provide against them, for physic [medicine] hath not more medicines against the diseases of the body, than reason hath preservatives [medicines protecting against disease or infection] against passions of the mind.<sup>403</sup>

This medical analogy emblematically contains Bacon’s approach to the passions: if freedom from the passions is a matter of the rational faculty in man than one must strengthen and cultivate this faculty in order to pre-empt the ascendancy and the harmful effects of the passions. Just as bodily sicknesses can be avoided by strengthening one’s, the health of the

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<sup>401</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 260.

<sup>402</sup> Cf. also the device *Of Tribute* (1592): “Is it not knowledge alone that clear the mind of all perturbations”? B. Vickers, (1996) p. 34.

<sup>403</sup> *Advice*, p. 69-70

mind can be maintained by its proactive cultivation.<sup>404</sup> We shall now discuss in detail Bacon's proposed method for doing so.

## ii) *The Georgics of the Mind*

Bacon addresses the issue of a culture of the mind in Book Two of *The Advancement* in the context of providing the means "how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man" to the "Exemplar or Platform of Good".<sup>405</sup> It is significant how Bacon situates his own approach in matters of moral philosophy. First of all he admits that "the cure of men's minds belongeth to sacred Divinity, [...]: but yet Moral Philosophy may be preferred unto [recommended to] her as a wise servant and humble handmaid."<sup>406</sup> While he is keen to elaborate his "husbandry of the mind" with a view to "subdue, accommodate [adapt] the will of man" he does not question the pertinence and efficiency of faith and charity in this regard. Nowhere does he want to present his contribution to moral philosophy as if it was an alternative or rival route to achieve the high ends of virtue.<sup>407</sup> In other words, there is no

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<sup>404</sup> That Bacon was aware of the possible positive use of the passions is indicated by the following addition, in the *De Augmentis*, to the text of *The Advancement*: "The will is governed by right reason, seduced by apparent good, *having for its spurs the passions*, for its ministers the [bodily] organs and voluntary motions." (Emphasis mine) Quoted by B. Vickers (1996), p. 648.

<sup>405</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 245.

<sup>406</sup> The same, commonplace, relationship between theology and philosophy occurs in the *Advice* as well, cf. the passage quoted above, from *Advice*, p. 70. and elsewhere in *The Advancement*, p. 262 and *passim*.

<sup>407</sup> Cf. "The obliteration of evil hath been practised by two means; some kind of redemption [atonement for an offence] or expiation of that which is past; and an inception [beginning] *de novo* [anew] for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good Moral Philosophy (as was said) is but an handmaid to religion." *The Advancement*, p. 262. Also: "But these be heathen and profane passages [observations], having but a shadow of that divine state of mind which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls Charity, [in the sense of *agape*] which is excellently called the bond of Perfection, because it comprehendeth [includes] and fasteneth all virtues together. [...] so certainly if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist [pretender] in comparison of the other." *Ibid.* p. 263.

question of establishing an autonomous morality, independent of religion. The purpose of Bacon is rather to supplement moral philosophy in the sense of identifying certain gaps or lacunae left previous authors – the avowed purpose of *The Advancement of Learning*. In this regard, his work appears to engage more specifically and chiefly with Aristotle whose ethics he finds deficient in showing how to attain the Platform or Exemplar of Good. This orientation present both in the *Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his travels* and in *The Advancement of Learning* shows that Bacon is more inclined to engage in discussions of the "how" (or *modus operandi*) of moral action than of the "what" of moral ends given that the latter, the Platform of Exemplar of the Good he finds unproblematic. Revealed religion gives enough guidance on this matter and Bacon does not hesitate to quote the Scripture and to refer to Divinity to make his point clear or to dissipate any ambiguity that might arise from his reliance on heathen authors.<sup>408</sup> Without questioning his sincerity on this point, it was also an important strategic issue not to appear contentious when setting forth a program for the advancement of science and learning that was meant to be realised as a public endeavour and thus requiring the open support of the King and of the Church as well.

Where Bacon finds much to contend and supplement in Aristotle is a kind of *modus operandi* of moral behaviour or more precisely a methodical improvement of the mind's faculties as the source of moral agency. For Aristotle ethical virtue is dependent on the capacity of *phronesis* (φρονησις)<sup>409</sup> hence virtuous action requires an intellectual effort when it comes to decide on moral rectitude and right reason (ορθος λογος). The rational part of the soul must persuade the irrational part to obey reason. This persuasion requires the intellectual virtues (wisdom, intelligence and prudence) so that the ensuing behaviour may embody certain moral dispositions like liberality and moderation called moral virtues by Aristotle.<sup>410</sup> When it comes to the passions, no one can be blamed for having them on the first place. In the perspective of the *De anima* they are seen as psychic states involving the body. In the *Rhetoric*, they are useful tools for the orator for swaying his audience. From an ethical perspective, the question is to what degree a man aspiring to virtue may feel passions. The answer to this question involves several points of Aristotle's ethics to which we can only refer

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<sup>408</sup> Cf. for e.g. p. 264. where Bacon quotes *The Gospel according to St. Matthew* 5: 44 and *Luke* 6: 27-28. as well as *Psalms* 145: 9.

<sup>409</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, II, 2, 1103 a34f; VI. 13, 1144 b27; I, 13, 1103 a6.

<sup>410</sup> Cf. *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, 13. 1103 a3-10.

to briefly (*cf.* also above, Chapter II.1.2.). Virtue is a mean that is manifested in feelings avoiding excess and defect, according to an intermediate standard that is also the best (*to ariston*). In the human soul, passions are in the desiring element of the irrational part of the soul. Although irrational, this part can be opened to reason and may listen to it. Thus passion may obey reason and can agree with its right rule. Thus it is possible, for Aristotle, to feel passions *according to* reason, and prudence consists in feeling them “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, and the right way”. It “is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue.”<sup>411</sup> Aristotle also points out that not all passions admit such a mean “for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them.”<sup>412</sup>

How can one achieve moral virtue? What is the general rule for human conduct? To these questions, Aristotle’s answer seemed rather elusive to Bacon. Aristotle’s answer, in the context of the *Ethica Nicomachea* is that the general rule has to be discerned by reason and set up within man’s soul by habituation. But this correct intermediate state with regard to the passions is difficult to attain and a peculiar kind of knowledge is necessary to attain the right way of acting. It can be called a practical insight or *phronesis*.

It seems that in Bacon’s understanding of Aristotle, the pursuit of happiness and of virtue requires an intellectual faculty but Bacon reproaches to Aristotle not to have furnished such a mental training. Excepting of course Aristotle’s emphasis on habit and custom, a topic Bacon elaborates at the end of his passage on the “Culture of the Mind” and later in his essay “Of Custom and Education”. After all, if moral virtue is dependent on intellectual capacities and faculties (intellectual virtues), then the way leading to virtue must begin with the development of the mental faculties – with the “culture or regiment of the mind” in Bacon’s terms. And this is what Bacon finds painfully lacking in Aristotle. Zsolt Almási has recently suggested that Bacon was probably using Aristotle’s *Magna Moralia* only and formulated his criticism concerning Aristotle’s ethics on this basis only, that is, disregarding the *Ethica*

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<sup>411</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, II. 5. 1106 b21ff

<sup>412</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, II. 6. 1107 a5ff

*Nicomachea*.<sup>413</sup> While the misunderstanding caused by Bacon's unfamiliarity with the *Ethica Nicomachea* was crucial for his criticism of Aristotle's handling of custom and habit, it seems, however, that Bacon would have upheld his reproaches to Aristotle concerning the lack of practical advice about the way to attain moral virtues even if he had read the *Ethica Nicomachea*. For Bacon, habit is only one of the factors entering the picture in his "culture of the mind" and Aristotle's four pieces of advice about how to hit the mean<sup>414</sup> would not have satisfied Bacon either. They may be considered as moral precepts but, in themselves, they do not contribute to the increase of the mind's faculties necessary for the right moral choices and governing the will of man.

What's more, Aristotle also admits that there are no fixed rules, no scientific rigour in matters of conduct and it is always the task of the individual to determine what is the right course of action.<sup>415</sup> Thus one has to adapt itself to each individual situation and find the right action without a general principle of morality.

It seems that Bacon's career as moral philosopher and essayist has its origin in his intention to provide a technology or method in matters of ethics. In a way, his *cultura animi* is Bacon's discourse on method for advancing in morality as the etymological sense of the Greek word *methodos* (μεθοδος, *hodos* = way) implies.<sup>416</sup> He reproaches to traditional moral

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<sup>413</sup> Cf. Zsolt Almási, *Angelic Monster – Custom in Early Modern Context*, The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003, p. 103ff.

<sup>414</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, II, 9, 3-6, 1109a30 – 1109b13 referred to by Zsolt Almási, *Ibid*, p. 105.

<sup>415</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, II, 2 1104a 5f

<sup>416</sup> It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest a certain similarity of attitude between the situation Bacon intended to resolve and the intellectual predicament described by Irving Singer in 1966. "Since we live in an age that romanticism has permeated for two hundred years, the popular ideology of the Western world seems to concern itself with little besides love. Yet the word has been a fiery coal burning on the lips of even our greatest philosophers. Thus far the twentieth century has been a stone age in which new tools, new methods of analysis, have been invented but hardly used. In pragmatism, psychoanalysis, analytical philosophy, and certain aspects of existentialism the ground has been cleared of much of what was worthless in earlier thinking. But relatively little has been done toward reconstruction, toward building attitudes of feeling and of action that might sustain a human being in the contemporary world. This part of the enterprise may take several generations to complete. Ultimate success will depend upon an army of technical philosophers addressing themselves to the logic of affective discourse and the phenomenology of affective experience. From their investigations, and from related work in science and the humanities, will emerge new ideals, new values, new patterns of experience. In returning to concepts such as love, the new philosophy may be more rigorous and more empirical than in the past." (my

philosophy that it is deficient in developing an empirical body of knowledge on which to base an effective moral culture. His program set out in Book Two of *The Advancement of Learning* and fleshed out in the *Essays* intends to provide exactly this practical knowledge and it also implies a practice of self-care and industry. In doing so, Bacon foregrounds the ways and means of acquiring virtue. This forms what he calls *cultura animi* and it comes under the topic of the “Appetite and Will of Man” which itself is part of that branch of philosophy dealing with human matters. In Part Two of *The Advancement of Learning* Bacon’s intention is to show what human learning has achieved in this field that answers to the rational faculty in man and to point to and fill in the lacunae left by previous authors.

We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the appetite and will of man: whereof Salomon saith, *ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum; nam inde procedunt actiones vitae*. In the handling of this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires. But how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably. For it is not the disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this part.<sup>417</sup>

The basic assumption underlying Bacon’s programmatic suggestions about the “culture of the mind” is that learning has to be at the service of the remedy of the mind in a practical way. In this sense the vocabulary of medicine and of health is applied to the benefits of learning in the context of a “Georgics of the Mind”, or intellectual husbandry which brings in another metaphoric field, that of agriculture.

It is noteworthy that he begins discussion of “the Appetite and Will of Man” with a biblical quotation from *Proverbs* 4: 23: “Above all, my son, keep thy heart, for out of it

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emphasis) Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love*, vol. 1 *Plato to Luther*, Chicago, London: The Chicago University Press, 19842, (1966) p. xi-xii. Bacon would come across in this comparison as a kind of “technical philosopher” addressing himself to the “phenomenology of affective experience”.

<sup>417</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 243-244.

proceed the actions of life.” This biblical passage, heading the entire section may also be taken as pivotal in the sense of anchoring the topic of the “Culture of the Mind” in this scriptural admonition inasmuch as the biblical ‘heart’ means roughly the same as what Bacon understands by ‘mind’. So the Ciceronian-Virgilian theme of *cultura animi*, “Georgics of the mind” and all its metaphorical exploration in terms of “tilling”, “manuring”, “regiment”, etc. receives a Christian underpinning or overtone that makes it easier for the reader to understand and assimilate. The medical metaphor is also retained throughout in terms like “human medicine”, “health and good estate”, “regiments”, “exercises of the mind”, etc. just as the metaphors of agriculture introduced with the idea of the “Georgics of the mind”. The combination of these two metaphors creates a context where the “exercises of the mind”, the “husbandry and tillage” carried out by the subject himself lead the mind unto “virtue and good estate”.

It were too long to go over the particular remedies which learning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind; sometimes purging the ill-humours, sometimes opening [freeing] the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations [ulcers] thereof, and the like; and, therefore, I will conclude with that which hath *rationem totius*, [‘the essence of the whole’ from Eccles. 12:13] which is, that it disposeth the constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of growth and reformation. For the unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into himself [observe, criticize], or to call himself to account; nor the pleasure of that *suavissima vita, in dies sentire se fieri meliorem*. [‘That most happy state, to feel one’s self becoming a better man day by day.’] The good parts he hath he will learn to show to the full, and use them dexterously, but not much to increase them: the faults he hath he will learn how to hide and colour [conceal, or show in a favourable light] them, but not much to amend them: like an ill [bad] mower, that mows on still [constantly], and never whets his scythe: whereas with the learned man it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment [improvement] of his mind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, further, in general and in sum, certain it is that VERITAS [truth] and BONITAS [goodness] differ but as the seal and the print [impression]: for Truth prints Goodness; and they be the clouds of error which descend [are precipitated by] in the storms of passions and perturbations.<sup>418</sup>

This dense passage is pivotal in that it contains in short Bacon's chief assumptions about the causes of the passions and the way to pre-empt them as much as possible. There is

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<sup>418</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 165.



the assumption about the coincidence of Truth and Goodness (*Veritas* and *Bonitas*). This coincidence prepares the ground for the utility and prestige of knowledge in matters of ethics. It is this emphasis on learning that is specifically Baconian and it also suggests a lot about both the kind of learning required and the sort of ‘descent’ that is understood. Book One of *The Advancement of Learning* deals with “the excellency of learning and knowledge”. The metaphor of healing and medicine is applied to “the diseases of the mind” that learning is expected to cure. While these concepts and metaphors may sound almost self-evident, nevertheless, it is necessary to define more closely the precise content Bacon gives to ‘learning’ as well as to the culture of the mind and the how the former may contribute to healing the diseases of the mind.

What distinguishes the learned man from the unlearned is that the latter “knows not what it is to descend into himself, or to call himself into account”. All he can do is to exhibit ostentatiously the “good parts” and lets the faults stagnate. He lacks the knowledge necessary to improve and advance in the good because his scythe is blunt, that is, he lacks knowledge. More fundamentally, the lack of learning hinders the way from the experience of genuine self-inspection which is a prerequisite to remedying the diseases of the mind that are the passions. A precise interpretation of the above metaphor of storm is revealing for this issue. “[...] and they be the clouds of error which descend [*are precipitated by*] in the storms of passions and perturbations.” (I am not sure if the gloss given by Vickers to ‘descend’ in this sentence is correct.<sup>419</sup>) The question really is whether error *precedes* or *follows from* passions – what is the logical and chronological sequence between the two? Passion may hinder the exercise of reason<sup>420</sup> in general, but the Stoico-Ciceronian approach that Bacon adopts here suggests rather that passions are the *results* of the errors of judgement, hence of the defects of the mind. This interpretation is also in line with the logic of the metaphor of storm: clouds come first and they cause and precipitate in storms. There is first a mental lapse, an error of judgement, a blunt scythe, to pick up another metaphor from Bacon’s text, which then causes a passion,

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<sup>419</sup> If ‘are precipitated by’ means that passions / storms come first and are followed by the clouds of errors, it is certainly against both the logic of the metaphor and of the causal and temporal sequence of how passions are understood in Stoic philosophy.

<sup>420</sup> Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I. – II. 77. 2. “A man who is in a state of passion fails to consider in particular what he knows in general... [for] the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely, even as in sleep or drunkenness.”

perturbation. This is what motivates the Baconian outlook on passion in a treatise on the advancement of learning. Learning (a humanist leitmotif) can serve as a bulwark against passions. The learned man must engage in a self-care in order to be “capable and susceptible of growth and reformation” and to advance in “the amendment of his mind”. One does not need to attack the passions directly but should rather work on the mind and thus reinforce the will. If knowledge and learning rules and clouds of errors are dispelled then passions can be, if not eliminated, at least contained, as the “will” can be subordinated by knowledge.

But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself. For there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of estate [chair of government] in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning.<sup>421</sup>

The “preservatives against passions of the mind” are further elaborated in *The Advancement of Learning*. In fact, Bacon voices his practical and applied approach to morality when he begins to discuss the “Appetite and Will of Man.” He writes pejoratively about a merely descriptive presentation of morality that would “only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts of directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters”.<sup>422</sup> He does not want simply to present “draughts and portraitures of Good, Virtue, Duty, Felicity” but to give practical advice, and to equip the individual with the necessary faculties to attain these ends. It is interesting to note the self-image and self-understanding that emerges from this passage and the pages that follows in *The Advancement*. Bacon sets up himself against other writers (sometimes he portrays them unjustly, as in the case of Aristotle) who prefer eloquence and high themes which meet their own genius rather than helping the reader. As opposed to such vainglorious and self-concerned intellectual behaviour, Bacon puts himself into the position of a practical guide

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<sup>421</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 166. italics mine, G.S. In his essay “On Nature in Men” Bacon indicates the possibility that one’s true nature [that is, his inclination] is best revealed “in passion, for that putteth a man out of his precepts”. (Vickers, ed., p. 418.) This is probably the case when “the highest parts of the mind” are not sufficiently fortified by learning.

<sup>422</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 244.

who helps the reader in achieving the high ideals that others were only painting with eloquence at best.<sup>423</sup> This is why he writes in *De Augmentis*:

I turn common labourer, hodman, anything that is wanted; taking upon myself the burden and execution of many things which must needs be done, and which others through an inborn pride shrink from and decline. ... Moral philosophers in preferring rhetorical ornaments ... have for the most part passed over those things which are of most use of practice.<sup>424</sup>

In this spirit, his metaphor of the Georgics of the mind is no accident in the sense that agriculture is the most down-to-earth activity one can imagine and it comes last in the hierarchy of genres after the epic and the odes in Virgil's œuvre.

And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of Virtue, Duty, and Felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the Exemplar or Platform of Good, and the Regiment or Culture of the Mind: the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.<sup>425</sup>

The special Baconian accent in this paragraph is his emphasis on the Regiment or Culture of the Mind. Of course, the term is not new, it comes from Cicero's *Disputationes* combined with the Virgilian metaphor of the Georgics. The insistence on the practical, "instructional" aspects of the moral outlook that pushes Bacon to develop his thematic and the discourse corresponding to it in the *Essays*. He can rely not only on Cicero and Virgil but on Aristotle's *Magna Moralia* - that he quotes at length - in this orientation to discuss the means of acquiring virtue. The "Culture or Regiment of the Mind" (*cultura animi*) exposed in the next section of the *Advancement of Learning* outlines the means to attain the Exemplar or Platform of Good. It is within the scope of this culture of the mind that the approach to the passions receives further elaboration.

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<sup>423</sup> For a similar commentary on Bacon's practical approach to moral philosophy see Perez Zagorin, *Francis Bacon*, Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 130ff.

<sup>424</sup> Quoted from *De Augmentis* by B. Vickers, (1996), p. 649.

<sup>425</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 245.

The subsection *De cultura animi* is structured in the following way. Bacon announces the subject-matter of this discussion by a reference to Aristotle for the necessity of foregrounding the issue of how to attain virtue. After giving due regard to “the doctrines of Divinity” with which he does not want to enter into debate Bacon makes a distinction, motivated by the practical, applied focus of his endeavour, between “what is in our power and what is not” (*The Advancement*, p. 256.). He goes on to discuss the latter where “application” [adaptation] is necessary. These are “points of nature, and points of fortune” and concern the “several characters and tempers of men’s natures and dispositions”. Bacon claims that he “cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge [...] should be omitted both in morality and policy.” (*The Advancement*, p. 257.) According to Bacon, such knowledge is dispersed in different fields such as astrology, history, poesy but they also form part of daily experience. (*The Advancement*, p. 258.) He reproaches to Aristotle and to Moral Philosophy in general that “these observations are handled in some scattered discourses; but they were never incorporate into Moral Philosophy” (p. 258.) In conformity with his overall intellectual strategy of seeking utility of knowledge and of studies Bacon compares and sometimes assimilates moral knowledge, or Moral Philosophy to medicine<sup>426</sup> and moral guidance to a therapy or cure. Thus knowing the diversity of impressions (both of nature and of fortune) upon the mind is as important for Moral Philosophy as the “knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds” for agriculture and the “diversity of complexions and constitutions” for medicine. These impressions can be caused by nature or by fortune:

Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising *per saltum*, *per gradus*, and the like.<sup>427</sup>

Bacon also lists under the thing not in our power the “affections” [passions]. This division itself marks his distance with regard to a voluntarist, radical stoic self-control of the passions. The very grouping of the passions under “things not in our power” marks a distance with

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<sup>426</sup> In fact, other metaphorical parallels include agriculture, cf. *The Advancement*, p. 165, 258 and passim.

<sup>427</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 258.

regard to radical Stoic doctrines about them. In Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* where the expression *cultura animi* comes from<sup>428</sup> passions are defined as contrary to nature: "This is then Zeno's definition of disorder (*perturbatio*), which he terms *πάθος*, that it is an agitation of the soul alien from right reason and contrary to nature. (*aversa a recta ratione* [*ἀλογία*] *contra naturam animi commotio*)."<sup>429</sup>

Beside taking away much of the burden of a sense of guilt with regard to the passions, acknowledging that they are not in our power to start with but are part of points of nature, opens large the perspective of their cure. In medicining the passions, it is necessary then to know first the divers complexions and constitutions, second the diseases, and lastly the cures. (*The Advancement*, p. 258-259.) More explicitly, Bacon writes about the "diseases and infirmities of the mind" and the task of "human medicine" to "preserve the health and good estate of the mind." (p. 260.) Aristotle is criticised again for his omission of the discussion of the passions and for his lack of practical advice on them. The Stoics are praised for some writings on anger, on comfort upon adverse accidents and on tenderness of countenance. (p. 259.) But the palm goes to "poets and writers of histories who are best doctors [teachers] of this knowledge" (p. 259.)

The discussion then continues with the point within our command that can be taken as a list of "cures" since these are the means that have "force and operation upon the mind to affect the will and appetite and to alter manners":

those points which are within our command, and have the force and operation upon the mind to affect the will and appetite and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation,

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<sup>428</sup> Although Bacon anchored this semi-heathen concept in Scripture as well with his opening quotation from Proverbs 4: 23 ("Above all, my son, keep thy heart, for out of it proceed the actions of life.") and made it at once a Solomonian concept as well.

<sup>429</sup> *Tusc. Disp.* IV. 6. In tracing the Ciceronian-Zenonian origin of Bacon's understanding of passion, and in referring to Stoic conceptions of the passions in general, I do not wish to suggest that all Stoics shared the same definition of passion. For the different appreciations of *apatheia* and hence of passions cf. Somos Róbert, "Metropatheia és apatheia Alexandriai Kelemennél" in *passim*, Filozófiai folyóirat, 2001. III. évfolyam, 1. szám, pp. 252-268, (in particular pp. 256-263 where Somos traces the ramifications of the doctrines of *apatheia* and of *metropatheia*) and the literature cited in the article.

emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies<sup>430</sup>

As Bacon himself points it out, the discussion is rather elliptic or programmatic: most of the themes announced here will be developed in the *Essays* of 1612 and 1625. Habit and custom are discussed within *The Advancement of Learning*, the other topics will become some of the major themes and titles the *Essays* of 1612 and 1625. This orientation and work plan were noted by modern commentators. R. S. Crane showed that the function of *Essays* was to provide treatment of the lacunae in knowledge identified in Book Two of *The Advancement of Learning*.<sup>431</sup> Therefore I wish to argue that Bacon's *demarche* can only be appraised and appreciated for what it is when this section of *The Advancement of Learning* and the *Essays* are taken as a continuum. This, it seems to me, is the self-understanding of Bacon himself: the gaps of knowledge identified in a sort of "encyclopaedia of lacunae" (in Vickers' expression) are to be covered in later works of his own as well as inviting others to follow suit. I would slightly disagree with the appraisal of Zsolt Almási that a "context-shift" occurs between *The Advancement of Learning* and the *Essays*.<sup>432</sup> If context-shift there is in the case of the topic of custom for example, it is because the individual-practical and the socio-political-institutional contexts are encoded, so to say, in the very concept of the Baconian *cultura animi*. The list of points given in *The Advancement of Learning* and quoted above indicates this coherence and built-in expansive scope of the concept of the *cultura animi*. It is probably a Baconian innovation on the Ciceronian theme that was more individualistic in its scope.

As the *Advancement* registered the lack of "active and ample descriptions and observations" (p. 259.) concerning the affections, in his *Essays* Bacon intends to provide such aids to the reader's *cultura animi*. Rather than providing a theory of the passions, the pieces dealing with specific passions (such as revenge, love, envy) describe them, expose the vicissitudes and dangers they entails, the contexts within which they are likely to arise. Thus for example the pair of essays, "Of Envy" and "Of Love" (in the 1625 edition) present them as pairs and qualify them as the ones that "fascinate and bewitch" and have "vehement

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<sup>430</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 260.

<sup>431</sup> Cf. R. S. Crane, "The Relation of Bacon's *Essays* to His Program for the Advancement of Learning" in *Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon*, (Hamden, Conn., 1968; London, 1972) pp. 272-292. The same view is reiterated in Brian Vickers (1996) p. 713-714.

<sup>432</sup> Zsolt Almási, *Ibid*, p. 99ff

wishes” and “make a man pine [long for]”. Both essays “On Envy” list the kinds of people most likely to fall victim to these passions and enumerate the situations within which these passions may rise.

The Ciceronian topic of the *cultus animi* receives a broad sense in Bacon’s program: its scope is not only an individual *cultura mentis* but concerns also its significance in the public (“civill”) domain. The breadth of the meaning of *cultura animi* appears already in his “*Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his travels*” where he writes about the “the gifts or excellencies of the mind” involving Beauty, Health, and Strength. The *Advice* has to be read together with the part of the *Advancement* concerning the culture of the mind: while its Book Two determines the place of the culture of the mind in a program of learning, the *Advice* contributes to giving the contours of what is meant by this term. These can be summarised in the following three points:

1. [*Cultura animi* and behaviour] For Bacon “Beauty of mind” is manifested in graceful and acceptable behaviour. In Book Two of *The Advancement of Learning* he acknowledges that this part of “civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.” In fact, this “civil knowledge” of graceful behaviour is the subject-matter of fashionable and widely read Renaissance conduct-book like *The Courtier (Il Cortegiano)* of Castiglione (translated by Thomas Hoby). His essay “Of Ceremonies and Respects” shows that Bacon himself was also keenly aware of the importance of this topic, his shorthand version of a Renaissance conduct-book. It is no doubt that a life spent in public service and in close proximity to the royal court makes him receptive to this issue. In the spirit of his encyclopaedic embrace Bacon allots a place for such knowledge with a qualifying remark that the behaviour described and advised in the books of conduct can only be “the garment of the mind”. The metaphor of ‘garment’ occurs both in *The Advice to the Earl of Rutland* and in *The Advancement of Learning*:

For behaviour is but a garment, and it is easy to make a comely garment for a body that is itself well-proportioned, whereas a deformed body can never be so helped by a tailor’s art but the counterfeit will appear; and in the form of our mind it is a true rule that a man may mend his faults with as little labour as cover them.<sup>433</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> *Advice*, p. 70.

Similarly in *The Advancement of Learning*:

Behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious [fastidious], it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making [conformation] of the mind, and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait [narrow] or restrained for exercise of motion.<sup>434</sup>

Apparently, without belittling the importance of public behaviour and acceptable manner, Bacon is concerned in the *Advice* and in *The Advancement of Learning* with what produces such behaviour. In the same way as a well proportioned body shows forth in a nice garment, the excellence of the mind appears in the sweetness of behaviour. Behaviour itself being sufficiently dealt with in the conduct-books, the task Bacon sets out for learning is to improve the mind as the origin and backbone of behaviour. Thus Bacon's evocation of the Ciceronian topic and practice of *cultus animi* as "the tilling and manuring of the mind" enriched with the Virgilian-agricultural metaphors of *Georgics* embraces also the link between the state of the mind and behaviour. *Cultus animi* becomes at once an affair on the individual and the public plane. However, Bacon formally separates what he takes to be the two parts of "Human Philosophy or Humanity" that is the consideration of "man segregate [separately], or distributively" and men "congregate [collectively], or in society". He calls the former "Simple and Particular" Human Philosophy and the latter "Conjugate and Civil". But given that the ultimate object of his study is human nature as such, the two spheres are entwined and the topic of the *cultus animi* – taken in Bacon's broad sense – invites precisely such interconnection. *Cultura animi* concerns both "man segregate" and "man congregate" as shown in his engagement with others. *Cultus animi* taken as an individual practice prepares the self for public action. To use Foucault's terminology, it is one of the means by which the individual is invited to change and elaborate himself in order to become ethical subject. It is a self-forming activity or *askesis* in Foucault's broad sense. Thus the Ciceronian topic is diverted from its original reclusive sense on an isolated individual's *cultura mentis* and serves Bacon's agenda of a moral philosophy bridging the private and the public. It provides a link between *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa* and makes room for a science aimed at practical knowledge *pro bono publico*. The "regiment of the mind" is also a form of self-care: it is a "husbandry and tillage" of the subject's "natures and dispositions" (*The Advancement*, p.

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<sup>434</sup> *The Advancement*, p. 266.



257.) His intention with “the culture or cure of the mind of man” is to collect such observations in order to obtain “receits” [recipes] “for use of life.” As noted above, these observations and “receits” form the body of many of the *Essays* and as such they are at the intersection of the subject’s relations to itself and its relations in society. The purpose is “to instruct and suborn [furnish, equip] action and active life” by promoting the excellencies of the mind. The full title of the *Essayes: Counsels Civill and Morall* bears the mark of this twofold but unified concern with “man segregate” (the culture of the individual mind) and “man congregate” (“civill” or public matters). They involve both the *civis* or public life and the *mores* or behaviour of private individuals.<sup>435</sup>

2. The second excellence of the mind is health and the topic of the passions appears explicitly in this regard inasmuch as passions are the diseases of the mind. Just as the diseases of the body can be cured by “physic” [medicine] so the disturbances of the mind can be cured by reason. Although Bacon adopts the Ciceronian notion of passion as *perturbatio animi* he does not approve the radical Stoics’ doctrine of *apatheia* as an antidote to the passions. His remedy to the passions is reason as it operates in the *cultus animi*.

3. A more complex treatment is required for the third excellence, the “Strength of the mind”. The fruits of the “Strength of the mind” are “liberality and magnificence, and fortitude or magnanimity” (*Advice*, p. 70-71). These virtues have a strong Aristotelian resonance and it seems that the purpose of Bacon is to provide guidance on how to achieve these qualities. “Clearness of judgement makes men liberal [generous]” and “custom makes the thing used natural as it were to the user”. In using reason, Bacon’s *cultus animi* entails the exercise of judgement and custom, the two forming a virtuous circle in the sense that the practice of fortitude becoming a custom increases our strength:

And if custom be strong to confirm [strengthen] any one virtue more than another, it is the virtue of fortitude, for it makes us triumph over the fear which we have conquered, and anew to challenge danger which happily [successfully] we have encountered, and hold more dear the reputation of honour which we have increased.<sup>436</sup>

Bacon’s *cultura animi* embraces then not only the medicining of the mind for its health

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<sup>435</sup> Cf. B. Vickers (1996), p.713.

<sup>436</sup> *Advice*, p. 71.

but also the exercise of clear judgement and on that basis the development of custom for its strength. It must be noted that both of these hinge on the capacity of reason: to medicine against passions in one case and to sharpen judgement in the other. The virtuous circle of clear judgement and custom is noteworthy also for its explicit reference to how public perception and acceptance of the strength of mind gives a further impetus to the increase of its capacities. This intertwining of the culture of the mind and its consequences for the public domain is a recurring leitmotif in Bacon's discussions of moral philosophy. The various modalities of *cultus animi* relating to Beauty, Health and Strength of mind together form what could be called in Foucault's broad sense an *asceticism* of self-forming activity.

The practice set out in *The Advancement of Learning* and given core in some of the *Essays* entails a mental procedure: the reader engages with specific topics of everyday life and, by the same token, with the culture of his mind as manifested in his public behaviour. (Cf. the excellencies of the mind and behaviour as garment.) A come and go is thereby implied between "man segregate" and "man congregate", between an individual affective and moral culture and public, civil action. In this way, the advancement of Baconian learning increases the capacities of the individual "to descend into himself, or to call himself to account;" by disposing "the constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of growth and reformation." (*The Advancement*, p. 165.)

## IV. CONCLUSION

The main objective of this dissertation was an assessment of the early modern transformation of ‘passion’ in a context marked by intercultural accommodations between Classical and Christian traditions in the early modern humanist context. This entailed the tracking of a semantic change (that of “passion”) in its major stages with an analysis of some of the cultural, anthropological and theological underpinnings that this change reflects and to which it is also contributes to. The major stages of the semantic change were first examined along the lines of the Oxford English Dictionary entry of “passion” before trying to investigate in more detail the cultural narrative that informed and is also reflected in these changes. For a methodological inspiration I turned to the writings of the late Foucault; his analysis of ‘care of the self’ helped me to approach linguistic manoeuvres and semantic changes as indicative of changes in ethical concern and practice of the subject. Also Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and more particularly of the flesh (*chair*) encouraged me to address a seemingly linguistic problem (the semantic shift of passion) in terms of an ontology of human nature. Interestingly, such an approach is not completely alien to the literature on and of the period: a relatively recent book on Shakespeare by Harold Bloom attributes to him the genius of inventing us as modern humans.<sup>437</sup>

The early modern encounter between Stoicism and Christianity helped to refine and to revise the earlier humanist discourses on the dignity of man by accommodating corporeal and affective aspects in human nature. As this encounter concerned terms that have a long history, I reviewed the major stages of the development of “passion” from the Classical Greek heritage, to Hellenistic Stoicism and early Christianity. The kind of internal struggle within humanism as set out by Bouwsma between Stoicism and Augustinianism showed that the “Roman attitude” of cultural secondariness can generate internal tensions that contribute to revising the lexicon of terms. In this case, early modern humanism provided a context within which competing traditions interacted in a dynamic manner. My overall claim with these investigations was that the semantic shift of “passion” is inseparable and was partly endued

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<sup>437</sup> Harold Bloom, *Shakespeare. The Invention of the Human* (London: Fourth Estate, 1999). Cf. also A. D. Nuttall, *Shakespeare the Thinker* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007)

by this intercultural context that, similarly to the Enlightenment *ethos* advocated by Foucault (and *pace* Foucault), entails a reflexive attitude on historical contingencies inherent in certain words.

Pre-modern (including early-modern) ‘passion’ covered a field that – important debates and distinctions kept apart – was felt to be ethically and psychologically continuous and could thus be designated by a single word. Due to significant changes in the understanding of human psychology and moral outlook (or what is implied in both, in what is to be human: anthropology) the homogeneity of the field covered by “passion” and the ethical judgements it entailed were contested. As some “passions” (or we could say today, “affects” and “emotions”) became legitimate, the single word “passion” could no longer denominate this morally heterogeneous field and the situation called for a semantic rearrangement or reconfiguration. In the double context of the Christian elaboration – and re-elaboration (Augustine and the Reformation) – of interiority and the return to Classical antiquity opened by the Renaissance the following rearrangements could be observed which, in my view, account for the semantic change of “passion”: Certain forms of ‘passion’ continued to be pathologised i.e. rendered morally negative (for some) and psychologically unsound either because of their very nature (like ‘lust’ for Augustine) or because of their intensity and excessive character. Henceforth, the ordinary word “passion” came to refer more to these pathologised passions (apologies for the seeming pleonasm). In the course of time, the moral evaluation underwent changes (cf. the Romantic cult of passion) but by and large, “passions” refer to exaggerated manifestations of affectivity or aspects of it that are considered to be in contrast with Christian doctrine. Pathologising some ‘passions’ legitimised others and legitimised the whole field of affectivity. Since the scope of meaning of “passion” narrowed down to cover those that come under negative ethical judgement, other forms of “passion” became legitimized inasmuch as they are non-excessive. Their manifestation becomes part of standard human affectivity and will in turn, by the 17<sup>th</sup> century be called “emotions” in a morally and psychologically neutral sense. I sought to express this development as a move from a “globalist” to a “localist” attitude, tendencies that are present in the history of “passion” but whose open clash around 1600 (between a revived Stoicism and Augustinian-Lutheran Christianity) induces a semantic change. The globalist attitude supposes a globalist use of “passion”: the word is used as a hyperonym and as such it covers all affective states and defines them as contrary to reason. The localist attitude, by contrast, uses “passion” to express some sort of affective excess, eminently that of amorous-erotic excess. While globalism wants all spheres to be governed by a monolithic reason, localism allows for

different regimes to work in different contexts. Finally, localism makes room for “emotion”, for affective contents that are defined not by virtue of reference to reason or by a supposed irrational quality in them (as is the case with globalist “passions”).

For a Stoic ethics that is based on an anthropology that prizes reason in man above all else, passions is a radical other, (*alogon, perturbatio animi*) that has to be extirpated even at the prize of amputation: cutting away what we (and probably early moderns too) would consider as constitutively human (emotions). The globalism of such Stoic *apatheia* of a senseless sage was a scandal to early moderns Christians. Christianity is not so radical in the appraisal of the passions: the ethical dividing line has been placed elsewhere: not between passion and its opposite, reason but within passions: the affective element gains ground, some passions are ethically admissible, some are even to be valued, some are to be condemned (and thus to be eradicated). One has to leave room for the working of love (of God and of fellow humans) and other affects in the seat of consciousness. Either because some passions are acceptable, or because the depravity of the human condition makes it impossible to get rid of our passions anyway, the subject cannot and therefore should not be modelled on a purely rational cosmic order (globalism) but should allow for different regimes to coexist (localism). Passions, the affective faculties can even serve us as spurs for ethical improvement and can also be the means or even the fruits of regeneration by faith.

Since passions can be found on both sides of the ethical divide and call for different judgements, the utility of the very concept of the “passions” is called into doubts. As long as passions are used in the technical sense they can be treated together, value-judgements about the groups are valid: they fall under the same, negative, ethical consideration. However, once the unity of the concept is challenged (in the Platonic-Augustinian strain of early modern Christianity) on ethical, theological and anthropological grounds (implying a change in the ontology of human nature), the different mental states grouped under passion must be qualified in different ways. Passions are divided inside by an ethical division and the new word “emotion” appears in English to express affective content in morally neutral terms. I admit that the technical sense of “passion” in the broad, Classical sense persists long after this but it gradually becomes more and more scholarly, academic by the late 17<sup>th</sup> – early 18<sup>th</sup> century. In this regard, Shakespeare’s dominant use of the word in the sense of “passion-love” is decisive. It expresses the general thrust of late Renaissance poetry and drama towards the affective. A tendency underpinned by a century of neo-Platonic intimations of love as a cosmic force informing the universe and human nature, by the Petrarcan patterns of yearning love infusing the tradition of English sonnet (Spencer, Sidney, Shakespeare). According to

Denis de Rougemont, this tendency, infused with the cult of the Virgin Mary has been in preparation since the 12<sup>th</sup> century courtly love literature sung by troubadours in Southern regions of France and, on the long run, will contribute to the cult of passion-love in the West and to its conflict with the institution of marriage.<sup>438</sup> It seems to be a fertile ground of further study to trace the articulation of the “lineage of love” (A. J. Smith<sup>439</sup>) on the semantic shift of “passion”, as it seems plausible to assume that a metaphysics of love, a blend of Platonic and Christian elements, as well as the “courtly love” tradition (of *fin amor*)<sup>440</sup> contributed to this shift. A possible way-in to for such research could be the perspective offered by Niklas Luhman who explains the evolution of *love as passion* entails “the gradual inclusion of new problems”. Thus high ideals take on erotic connotations in the context of Medieval ‘courtly love’ and later, in the seventeenth century, “a paradoxicalisation of the semantics of love completed the gradual dissolution of the contrast between ‘higher’ and ‘sensual’ love and initiated the incorporation of *sexuality* into the code as an essential component of love.”<sup>441</sup> Apparently, the semantic change described in my study and the Early Modern transformation described in Luhman’s terms converge: his perspective is on *love as passion* whereas I tried to present and account for the semantic shift of *passion toward* (erotic) *love*.

Three configurations of Early Modern interculturality were examined: Bacon’s case of synthesis of and innovation on Aristotle – Cicero – Seneca; the vernacular interculturality of Montaigne – Florio; and some elements of the Stoic – Christian debate. The example of

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<sup>438</sup> Cf. Denis de Rougemont, *L’Amour en Occident*, (Paris: Plon, 1972)

<sup>439</sup> Cf. A. J. Smith, *The Metaphysics of Love. Studies in Renaissance Love Poetry from Dante to Milton*, Cambridge, London, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985. “Preamble: The Lineage of Love” pp. 1 – 12.

<sup>440</sup> Cf. Maurice Valency, *In Praise of Love. An Introduction to the Love-Poetry of the Renaissance*, New York: Octagon Books, 1975, in particular p. 25. where Valency comments on the first appearance of vernacular love-poetry (cca 1100) in a modern [European] tongue and calls it “romantic passion” in the sense of an “area of erotic activity somewhere between animal passion, on the one hand, and Christian charity on the other.” He also warns that “it would be a mistake to suppose that even here the epithet has any precise application.” From the perspective of the evolution of “passion”, it is precisely such undifferentiated contents and articulations with “love” that would invite further research.

<sup>441</sup> Niklas Luhman, *Love as Passion. The Codification of Intimacy*, translated by Jeremy Gaines and Doris L. Jones, Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press, 1986.

Francis Bacon showed that his encyclopaedic and programmatic work of *Advancement of Learning* (read as pointing to his *Essays*) combines Aristotle's ethical outlook, his optimism in the force of habits, and a faculty psychology of Thomist inspiration with the Ciceronian practice of the *cultura animi* "Regiment of the Mind". Although a critique of certain trends in humanism (mainly its focus on words rather than matter), his "Georgics of the Mind" aims to give a method (that he finds lacking in Aristotle) for ethics that relies ultimately on learning and eloquence in moving the will. Thus rhetoric and learning are instrumental in making the affections obedient. His *Essays* bring these general considerations to concrete human situations by engaging their reader in a "medicining of his mind" in a reciprocal relationship of counsel and self-inspection. Bacon's example also showed the importance of discursive practice in the *care for the self* and the flexibility of adapting different cultural traditions to concrete, local human contexts.

Montaigne can be seen as more radical in this sense: his adherence to concrete human situations, primarily that of his own, made him even more sensitive to the moral issues involved in the choice of words. His anti-universalism, his insistence on the particularities of his own, singular experience prompted him to experiment with new semantic fields as he tried to give an account of his own experience. This model of care for the self places a great value again on discursive practice because a faithful description of what actually happens to the subject is more important than conformity to some abstract ideal. The precision of the description called for new words, or rather, in the case of "emotion", of giving new meaning to old words and thus reconfiguring the vocabulary of the affective sphere. Florio's translation was successful in making available this new vocabulary in English and thereby contributing to the creation of a common European cultural language based on the different vernaculars that fuses Classical and Christian elements in an eclectic manner proper to humanism.

These moments of renegotiation of the classical sense of "passion" responded to changing needs of care for the self: in turn, the shifting meaning also informs changes in the care of the self; the two are inseparable and they cannot be rendered in a relationship of simple causality. "Passion" was an issue of value and called for an ethical solution. It used to be extended to all affective manifestations but progressively a distinction appeared between violent emotions on the one hand (modern "passion") and calmer affections that are completely compatible with an ideal of self-mastery. There was an implicit ambiguity stemming from this duality that seems to have culminated and exploded in the Early Modern period in the context of Neo-Stoicism. The revival and popularity of Stoicism required an explicit encounter with the Classical (primarily Stoic) sense of the term in a Christian context.

This encounter resulted in the semantic shift: Christianity neutralised certain “passions”, it made them not only tolerable but even desirable (love, hope, certain senses of fear, pity,) rejected and countered the anti-social orientation of Hellenistic Stoicism. What is retained in “passion” is its intensity but it no longer covers the broad spectrum it used to have in Cicero and Aquinas.

But, of course, the story does not end with the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Thus in Romanticism, ‘passion’, in the sense of uncontrollable - often amorous - emotion, was highly charged with significance and was exalted. It meant the uncontrollable, the spontaneous, and as such it was a source of inspiration and energy for the outcast Romantic artist and genius. At the same time, the libidinal aspect cannot run amok in society, it needs control and governance. From the broad Classical meaning of “passion”, this word was maintained for that segment that was considered potentially dangerous, subversive for society in the conduct of the individual. Governance was maintained but limited in scope - not all passions (like fear, hatred, envy, etc.) required this special governance. But, at the same time, the ambiguity of control and exaltation persists. So there was in Romanticism and in post-Romantic culture a trend to see passion as the affirmation of the individual and the two “passions”, so to say, are not quite the same in the sense that they repose on different conceptual grounds and value judgements. In both Romantic aesthetics and life (which is often the same) there was an exaltation of passion as the distinctive mark of the individual, a determined thrive for all that is passionate, exceeding the limits of ordinary existence. (Cf. Sturm und Drang, the irrational side of Romanticism, the exaltation of love, etc.)

The definition of “passion” has always been understood in opposition to something else. It was defined by what it is not: namely passivity *vs.* activity, passion *vs.* reason. These contrasting pairs governed the understanding of passion until around the 18th century, when a major change occurred. This was a decline in the firm belief concerning the supremacy of reason and its direct link to the good. This change affected the understanding of the passions in that it abolished the strong reason to which the passions could be opposed. As a result, the evaluation of the passions underwent its most profound change, which still affects our current understanding of them. Passion was no longer conceived necessarily as a perturbation of the good use of reason. The irrationality, disorder, and obscurity of the former diminished in favour of its recognition as energy. Passionate activity was accentuated more than passivity, turning passion into a driving force, a resource, and even ardour. In the modern sense, passion



was not folly but rather something grand and even noble. Authors who contributed to this re-interpretation are, among others, Claude-Adrien Helvetius<sup>442</sup>, Bernard Mandeville<sup>443</sup>, Johann Gottfried von Herder<sup>444</sup>, Johann Gottlieb Fichte<sup>445</sup> [1800] and Alexander Pope<sup>446</sup> to some extent. The culmination of this trend is in Hegel who, in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, stated that "nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion".<sup>447</sup> (Although for Hegel, passion is ultimately a trick of reason: the world spirit uses passion for its own totalising ends...)

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<sup>442</sup> Claude-Adrien Helvetius, *De l'esprit*, (1758) texte revu par Jacques Moutaux, (Paris : Fayard, 1988) III. 5-9;

<sup>443</sup> Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits* (1714) with a commentary Critical, Historical, and Explanatory by F. B. Kaye, (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, edition of 1924, reprint 1988) Remark Q in particular

<sup>444</sup> Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man) (1784-91)

<sup>445</sup> Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* (*The Vocation of Man*) (1800)

<sup>446</sup> *An Essay on Man*, Epistle 1. 5.: "Better for us, perhaps, it might appear, / Were there all harmony, all virtue here; / That never air or ocean felt the wind; / That never passion discomposed the mind : / But ALL subsists by elemental strife; / And passions are the elements of life. / The general ORDER, since the whole began, / Is kept in Nature, and is kept in man."

<sup>447</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* in *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) p. 407.

## **V. APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX 1

### The *Oxford English Dictionary* entry of 'passion' and 'emotion'<sup>448</sup>

**passion**, *n.* Also 2-6 **-iun**, **-ioun**, **-yo(u)n**, etc., 4 **pascioun**.

[a. OF. *passiun*, *passion*, ad. L. *passion-em* suffering (Tertullian, etc.), *n.* of action *f. pati*, *pass-* to suffer. In L. chiefly a word of Christian theology, which was also its earliest use in Fr. and Eng., being very frequent in the earliest ME.]

**1.** The suffering of pain.

**1. a.** (Now usually with capital.) The sufferings of Jesus Christ on the Cross (also often including the Agony in Gethsemane). Formerly also in *pl.*

*Cross of Passion*, in Heraldry: see quots. *Instruments of the Passion*, the cross, the crown of thorns, the nails, scourge, etc.

**c1175** *Lamb. Hom.* 119 Vre drihtnes halie passiun, þet is his halie Prowunge þe he for mancunne underfeng.

**a1225** *St. Marher.* 1 Efter ure louerdas pine, ant his passiun.

**c1290** *S. Eng. Leg.* l. 15/472 Riȝt þane wei þat ore louerd Šeode toward is passioun.

**1340** *Ayenb.* 12 þe uerthe article belongeþ to his passion.

**1382** Wyclif *Acts* i. 3 To which and he Šaf [1388 schewide] hym silf alyue after his passioun. [So all 16-17th c. versions.]

**1526** Tindale 1 *Pet.* i. 11 The passions that shulde come vnto Christ.

**1547** Boorde *Introd. Knowl.* xxxix. (1870) 220 The mount of Caluery, where Iesu Chryst did suffer his passions.

**1548-9** (Mar.) *Bk. Com. Prayer, Litany*, By thy crosse and passion,..Good lorde deliuer us.

**1666** Pepys *Diary* 3 Nov., This morning comes Mr. Lovett, and brings me my print of the Passion, varnished by him.

**1682** J. Gibbon *Introd. ad Lat. Blason.* 76 A long Cross: Bara makes it like a Cross of Passion, that is, the Traverse beam a pretty deal below the top of the palar part.

**1725** Coats *Dict. Her.* s.v., *Cross of the Passion*..not crossed in the Middle but somewhat below the Top, with Arms short in proportion to the Length of the Shaft.

**1754** Sherlock *Disc.* (1759) l. vii. 211 As if the Remission of our Sins was to be ascribed peculiarly to the Passion.

**1839** *Encycl. Brit.* (ed. 7) XIX. 428/1 Pictured representations of the fourteen stages of our Lord's passion.

**1845** G. A. Poole *Churches* vi. 48 The font of North Somercoats, Lincolnshire, has on two of its sides shields charged with the instruments of the passion.

† **b.** Used allusively in asseverations; also *transf.* applied by persons to themselves, as in *passion of me, my heart, my soul. Obs.*

**c1386** Chaucer *Shipman's Prol.* 13 A-bide for godis digne passion.

**c1530** *Hickscorner* in Hazl. *Dodsley* l. 168 Help, help, for the passion of my soul.

**1570** Preston *Cambyeses* l. 180 O' the passion of God, I have done.

**1601** B. Jonson *Ev. Man in Hum.* (Q.) iii. iii. 127 Gods passion, and I had twice so many cares, as you haue, I'd drowne them all in a cup of sacke.

**1601** Shakes. *All's Well* v. ii. 43 Cox my passion, giue me your hand.

**1684** Meriton *Yorksh. Dial.* 477 Pashions a Life! here'st Land-lord just at deaur.

**1738** tr. *Guazzo's Art Conversation* 24 Passion o' me! Who will then carry my Corn to Mill?

**c.** The narrative of the sufferings of Christ from the Gospels; also, a musical or dramatic setting of this; cf. *passion-play*.

**a1300** *Cursor M.* 8844 þus sais sum opinion, Bot sua sais noght þe passion.

**a1533** *Ld. Berners Huon* cxlix. 566 After that your deuyne seruyce be done, and the passyon of our lorde Iesu Chryste red.

<sup>448</sup> Reproduced from OED2 on CD-ROM Version 1.14 © OUP 1994; © AND Software B.V., 1994.

**1823** W. Hone *Anc. Mysteries Described* 169 In 1298, the passion was played at Friuli.

**1844** Lingard *Anglo-Sax. Ch.* (1858) II. ix. 64 That every deacon read two passions.

**1880** in Grove *Dict. Mus.* II. 664/2 Until the latter half of the 16th century the Passion was always sung..by the three Deacons alone.

*Ibid.* 666/1 Bach[’s]..’Passion according to S. Matthew’ is..the finest work of the kind.

**1903** E. K. Chambers *Mediaeval Stage* II. xxii. 129 There were performances of Passions in Reading in 1508, in Dublin in 1528, [etc.].

**1962** R. Southern *Seven Ages of Theatre* 107 The *Passion* of Mons may well have run to ninety-eight separate representations of ‘scenes’.

† **d.** Passion-tide or Passion Week. *Obs.*

**1297** R. Glouc. (Rolls) 10178 þe Sonenday of þe passion.

*Ibid.* 11330 Wiþinne þe passion Wiþ is ost he wende uorþ & arerde is dragon.

**2. a.** The sufferings of a martyr, martyrdom. *arch.*

**a1225** *St. Marher.* 1 Her beginneð þe liflade & te passiun of seinte margarete.

**1377** Langl. *P. Pl.* B. xv. 265 What penaunce and pouerte and passioun þei [the saints] suffered.

**c1440** J. Capgrave *Life St. Kath.* v. 1668 The emperour commaunded..Thei schulde be led on-to her passyon.

**1503** Gold. *Leg.* Colophon, The lyues passyons and myracles of many other sayntes.

**1672** Cave *Prim. Chr.* i. vii. (1673) 160 The great reverence they had for Martyrs. Their passions stiled their Birthday.

**1754-8** T. Newton *Observ. Proph., Dan.* xii. 204 Cyprian ordered the passions of the Martyrs in Africa to be registred.

**1901** T. R. Glover *Life & Lett. 4th Cent.* 250 With the martyrs came their relics, the tales of their passions, their tombs and their images.

*transf.*

**1598** B. Jonson *Ev. Man in Hum.* iii. iv, A fasting-day no sooner comes, but..poore cobs they smoke for it, they are made martyrs o’ the gridiron, they melt in passion.

**b.** A narrative account of the passion of a martyr.

**1904** T. Shearman *Veneration of S. Agnes* 90 Helen of Rossow, or Roswitha, a Benedictine nun of the Convent of Gandersheim, Saxony, wrote poems in the 10th century, ‘to replace,’ as she says in her preface, ‘the pagan passions which dishonour the profane drama, by the triumphs of the Christian heroines, the chaste spouses who are admitted to the Nuptials of the Lamb.’

**1913** E. R. Barker *Rome of Pilgrims* xiii. 183 In an eighth-century manuscript there is a note that Passions are to be read at Office in the Church of S. Peter.

*Ibid.* xiv. 192 It is always the conventional version of a Passion which is reproduced in numerous manuscripts.

*Ibid.* 195 For this saint..there exists not only the contemporary Passion, but also a series of records.

**1927** F. J. E. Raby *Hist. Christian-Latin Poetry* ii. 56 His poem was used as a basis for later prose passions of Cassian.

† **3.** Suffering or affliction generally. *Obs.*

**a1225** *Ancr. R.* 188 In all ower passiuns, þencheð euer inwardliche up o Godes pinen.

**a1340** Hampole *Psalter* xv. 7 In wrangis & temptaciouns & passions.

**14.** in *Tundale’s Vis.* (1843) 130 Sche was exempt from all such passyon [of travail].

**1509** Hawes *Conv. Swearers* xlv, The wounde of synne to me is more passyon Than the wounde of my syde for thy redempcyon.

**1606** Shakes. *Ant. & Cl.* v. i. 63 Giue her what comforts The quality of her passion shall require.

**1656** H. Vaughan *Thalia Rediv., Nativ.* 15 Great type of passions! Come what will, Thy grief exceeds all copies still.

**4. a.** A painful affection or disorder of the body or of some part of it. *Obs.* exc. in certain phrases, as *colic*, *hysteric(al, iliac, sciatic passion)*, for which see the adjs.

**1382** Wyclif *Lev.* xv. 13 If he were helid, that suffreth sicke a maner passioun [L. *hujusmodi passionem*].

**1398-1856** [see *iliac* 1].

**1460** J. Capgrave *Chron.* (Rolls) 40 Asa, Kyng of Juda..had sore feet, wech passioun our bokys sey it was podegra.

**1529** Wolsey in *Four C. Eng. Lett.* 10 Beyng entereyd into the passyon of the dropsy.

**1547** Boorde *Brev. Health* (1557) 33 In latyn it is named *Ventralis passio*. In English..the belly ache, or a passion in the belly.

**1563** T. Gale *Antidot.* ii. 29 It is of ryght good effecte in the passions of the ioyntes.

**1684** tr. *Bonet’s Merc. Compit.* xvi. 566 Thirst is a Passion of the Mouth of the Stomach.

**1822-34** [see hysteric 1].

† **b.** A violent access, attack, or fit of disease.

**1390** Gower *Conf.* III. 7 As a drunke man I swerve, And suffre such a Passion.

**1641** Hinde *J. Bruen* xlvii. 150 His fits and passions were much after this manner.

**II.** The fact of being acted upon, the being passive.

[Late L. *passio*, used to render Gr. *πασχειν*.]

**5. a.** The fact or condition of being acted upon or affected by external agency; subjection to external force: = affection *n.* 1; †an effect or impression produced by action from without. Now *rare* or *Obs.*

**c1374** Chaucer *Boeth.* v. met. iv. 130 (Camb. MS.) The passion, Pat is to seyn Pe suffraunce or the wit in the qwyke body goth byforn extinge and moeuyng the strengthis of the thoght.

**1413** *Pilgr. Sowle* (Caxton 1483) v. xiv. 108 Al that is done withouten might, it lacketh the dignyte and the name of dede, but it is cleped passion.

**1530** Palsgr. 111 Verbes meanes..betoken neyther action nor passion.

**1610** J. Guillim *Heraldry* iii. iii. (1660) 109 The..brightnesse of these [Sun and Moon] is..subject to the passion of darkning or eclipsing.

**1668** Wilkins *Real Char.* iii. i. 303 That kind of word..adjoynd to a Verb, to signifie the quality and affection of the Action or Passion, is stiled an Adverb.

**1725** Watts *Logic* i. iv. §7 The word passion signifies the receiving any action, in a large philosophical sense.

**1846** Trench *Mirac.* xxxiii. (1862) 470 That work shall be the work of passion rather than of action.

† **b.** A way in which a thing is or may be affected by external agency; a passive quality, property, or attribute; = affection 11, 12. *Obs.*

**1570** Billingsley *Euclid* i. xxxiv. 44 In this Theoreme, are demonstrated three passions or properties of parallelogrammes.

**1610** B. Jonson *Alch.* ii. v. What's the proper passion of mettalls?

**1657** W. Morice *Coena quasi* θοιμ□ Diat. iii. 139 Frigidity is the proper passion of water, which is sometime accidentally hot.

**1690** Leybourn *Curs. Math.* 330 Of certain Passions and Properties of the Five Regular Bodies.

**1707** Floyer *Physic. Pulse-Watch* 209 The different Manners..produc'd by a particular hot or cold Diet, or Air, Exercise, and Passions peculiar to each Nation.

**III.** An affection of the mind.

[L. *passio* = Gr. *πασχειν*.]

**6. a.** Any kind of feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or moved; a vehement, commanding, or overpowering emotion; in psychology and art, any mode in which the mind is affected or acted upon (whether vehemently or not), as ambition, avarice, desire, hope, fear, love, hatred, joy, grief, anger, revenge. Sometimes personified.

**c1374** Chaucer *Troilus* iv. 676 (704) As she Pat al Bis mene while brende Of oPer passion Pan bat Pey wende.

**1526** *Pilgr. Perf.* (W. de W. 1531) 118 He wyll stere vp in his soule ye passyons of ire & impacyency.

**1528** Tindale *Obed. Chr. Man* Wks. (Parker Soc.) I. 246 A poor woman with child, which longed, and, being overcome of her passion, ate flesh on a Friday.

**1591** Shakes. *1 Hen. VI.* v. ii. 18 Of all base passions, Feare is most accurst.

**1611** Bible *Acts* xiv. 15 We also are men of like passions with you.

**1647** Cowley *Mistr.*, *Passions* i, From Hate, Fear, Hope, Anger, and Envy free, And all the Passions else that be.

**1710** Norris *Chr. Prud.* vii. 323 By the Passions I think we are to understand certain Motions of the Mind depending upon and accompanied with an Agitation of the Spirits.

**1732** Pope *Ep. Bathurst* 154 The ruling Passion conquers Reason still.

**1791** Mrs. Radcliffe *Rom. Forest* i, A man whose passions often overcame his reason.

**1797** *Encycl. Brit.* (ed. 3) XIV. 2/1 The common division of the passions into *desire* and *aversion*, *hope* and *fear*, *joy* and *grief*, *love* and *hatred*, has been mentioned by every author who has treated of them. *Ibid.* 14/2 Passions, in painting, are the external expressions of the different dispositions and affections of the mind; but particularly their different effects upon the several features of the face.

**1843** Prescott *Mexico* vi. viii. (1864) 401 It were as easy to curb the hurricane in its fury, as the passions of an infuriated horde of savages.

**1872** Ruskin *Eagle's N.* §169 Their reverence for the passion, and their guardianship of the purity, of Love.

**b.** Without article or *pl.*: Commanding, vehement, or overpowering feeling or emotion.

**1590** Spenser *F.Q.* i. v. 1 Such restlesse passion did all night torment The flaming corage of that Faery knight.

**1604** Shakes. *Oth.* iv. i. 277 Is this the Nature Whom Passion could not shake?  
**1678** South *Serm.* (1697) II. x. 434 Passion is the Drunkenness of the Mind.  
**1724** De Foe *Mem. Cavalier* (1840) 3 He told me, with a great deal of passion, that he loved me above all the rest.  
**1770** Wesley *Let., to J. Benson* 5 Oct., Passion and prejudice govern the world.  
**1901** H. Black *Culture & Restraint* iv. 106 Philosophy is a feeble antagonist before passion.  
**c.** A fit or mood marked by stress of feeling or abandonment to emotion; a transport of excited feeling; an outburst of feeling.  
**1590** Spenser *F.Q.* i. i. 49 In this great passion of unwonted lust, Or wonted feare of doing ought amis, He starteth up.  
**1599** Chapman *Hum. Day's Mirth* Plays 1873 I. 92 Come, come, leave your passions, they cannot moove mee.  
**1628** Hobbes *Thucyd.* (1822) 119 They sent these men thither in passion.  
**1725** Pope *Odyss.* iv. 150 From the brave youth the streaming passion broke.  
**1854** Milman *Lat. Chr.* vii. ii. (1864) IV. 98 Henry fell on his knees and in a passion of grief entreated her merciful interference.  
**1856** W. Collins *After Dark* (1862) 214 She burst into an hysterical passion of weeping.  
**d.** A poem, literary composition, or passage marked by deep or strong emotion; a passionate speech or outburst. *Obs.* or *arch.*  
**1582** T. Watson *Centurie of Loue* i. heading, The Authour in this Passion taketh..occasion to open his estate in loue.  
**1590** Shakes. *Mids. N.* v. i. 321 Heere she comes, and her passion ends the play.  
**1599** Massinger, etc. *Old Law* i. i. Wks. (Rtldg.) 416/1 These very passions I speak to my father. [Gifford note These pathetic speeches.]  
**1614** T. Tomkis *Albuzazar* ii. i. in Hazl. *Dodsley* XI. 327 Not a one shakes his tail, but I sigh out a passion.  
**1871** Browning *Balaustion* 193 Now it was some whole passion of a play.  
**7. a. spec.** An outburst of anger or bad temper.  
**1530** Palsgr. 320/1 Passyonate, inclyned sone to be in a passyon.  
**1590** Spenser *F.Q.* ii. iv. 11 It's eath..to..calme the tempest of his passion wood.  
**1688** Miegé *Fr. Dict.* s.v. *Bring*, To bring a Man in a passion [*transporté de colère*] to himself.  
**1731** *Gentl. Mag.* I. 391/1 This put Bluster into such a Passion, that he quitted the Surgery in a Pet.  
**1773** Johnson in *Boswell* 28 Aug., Warburton kept his temper all along, while Lowth was in a passion.  
**1819** *Metropolis* II. 212 She chose, woman-like,..to fly in a passion and to abuse the sheriff's officer.  
**1842** Browning *Pied Piper* x, And folks who put me in a passion May find me pipe after another fashion.  
**b.** Without *a*: Impassioned anger, angry feeling.  
**1524** Wolsey *Let. to Knight* in *Strype Eccl. Mem.* (1721) I. i. iv. 57 Whatsoever they might speak in passion or otherwise.  
**1605** Chapman *All Fools* iv. i. 125, I pray you good Gostanzo, Take truce with passion.  
**1628** Hobbes *Thucyd.* (1822) 37 [To] undergo the danger with them and that without passion against you.  
**1729** Butler *Serm. Resentm.* Wks. 1874 II. 98 Passion; to which some men are liable, in the same way as others are to the epilepsy.  
**1798** Southey *Cross Roads* xviii, Passion made his dark face turn white.  
**1882** J. Parker *Apost. Life* I. 143 We can stifle the hot word of passion.  
**8. a.** Amorous feeling; strong sexual affection; love; †also in *pl.*, amorous feelings or desires. Often *tender passion*.  
**1588** Shakes. *Tit. A.* ii. i. 36 My sword..shall..plead my passions for Launias loue.  
**1590** Spenser *F.Q.* iii. v. 30 But, when shee better him beheld, shee grew Full of soft passion and unwonted smart.  
**1592** Shakes. *Rom. & Jul.* ii. Prol. 13 Passion lends them Power, time, meanes to meete.  
**1658** Phillips, *Passion*..an affection of the mind,..in Poems and Romances it is more peculiarly taken for the passion of love.  
**1710** Steele *Tatler* No. 128 4 Fairest Unknown..I have conceived a most extraordinary Passion for you.  
**1752** Fielding *Amelia* ii. i, I declared myself the most wretched of all martyrs to this tender passion.  
**1855** Milman *Lat. Chr.* ix. viii. (1864) V. 413 Seized with a poetic passion for Eudoxia, wife of William.  
**b. transf.** An object of love, a beloved person.

**1783** Lady Suffolk in *Letf. C'tess S.* (1824) II. 275 Lord Buckingham's former passions go off very quickly; poor Lady Northampton is dead.

**1842** Thackeray *Fitz-Boodle Papers* Wks. (Biogr. ed.) IV. 295 Whenever one of my passions comes into a room, my cheeks flush.

**9.** Sexual desire or impulse.

**1641** Wilkins *Math. Magick* i. i. (1648) 2 Which set a man at liberty from his lusts and passions.

**1667** Milton *P.L.* i. 454 Sions daughters..Whose wanton passions in the sacred Porch Ezekiel saw.

**1798** Malthus *Popul.* iii. iii. (1806) II. 132 Delaying the gratification of passion from a sense of duty.

**1842** Longfellow *Quadroon Girl* x, He knew whose passions gave her life, Whose blood ran in her veins.

**10. a.** An eager outreaching of the mind towards something; an overmastering zeal or enthusiasm for a special object; a vehement predilection.

**1638** Baker tr. *Balzac's Letf.* (vol. II.) 70 Concerning his passion of horses, which he calls his malady..never counsell him to cure it.

**1671** tr. *Frejus' Voy. Mauritania* 1 A passion of meriting the esteem of a considerable Company of Merchants.

**1708** Swift *Sentiments Ch. Eng. Man* Wks. 1755 II. i. 61 That mighty passion for the church, which some men pretend [etc:].

**1780** Cowper *Letf.* 8 May, The passion for landscape-drawing.

**1838** Miss Mitford in *L'Estrange Life* (1870) III. vi. 89 My present passion is for indigenous orchises.

**1874** Green *Short Hist.* iv. §2. 169 The growing passion for the possession of land.

**b. transf.** An aim or object pursued with zeal.

**1732** Pope *Ess. Man* ii. 261 Whate'er the Passion, knowledge, fame, or pelf.

**1856** Froude *Hist. Eng.* (1858) I. i. 69 The drama was the passion of the people.

**1874** Bancroft *Footpr. Time* i. 81 To rule was her passion.

**1883** H. Drummond *Nat. Law Spir. W.* i. i. (1884) 4 The pursuit of Law became the passion of science.

*Mod. Golf* has become a passion with him.

**11. attrib. and Comb.**

**a.** simple attrib., as *passion-fever, -fit, -monger, -pitch, -verse, -wave*; objective and instrumental, as *passion-blazing, -breather, -kindling, -thrilling*, and esp. with any pa. pple. of suitable sense, as *passion-clouded, -coloured, -dimmed, distracted, -driven, -filled, -frantic, -guided, -kindled, -led, -pale, -pastured, -plunged, -ridden, -shaken, -smitten, -stirred, -stung, -swayed, -torn, -tossed, -wasted, -wearied, -winged, -worn*; also *passion-like, -proud* adjs.; *passion-wise* adv.

**1894** *Outing* (U.S.) XXIII. 362/1 Then turns his \*passion-blazing eye and stamps impotently with shackled feet.

**1925** W. B. Yeats *Vision* iii. 183 Aristophanes' \*passion-clouded eye.

**1899** — *Wind among Reeds* 26 Because your crying brings to my mind \*Passion-dimmed eyes and long heavy hair.

**1899** Crockett *Kit Kennedy* 406 Curious freaks of violent and \*passion-driven men.

**1877** M. Arnold *Last Ess. on Ch. & Relig.* 22 The \*Passion-filled reasoning and rhetoric of Pascal.

**1842** Faber *Styrian Lake*, etc. 105 When in a \*passion-fit I spoke.

**1916** A. Huxley *Burning Wheel* 29 So, troubled, \*passion-frantic, The poet's mind boils gold and amethyst.

**a1644** Quarles *Sol. Recant.* Sol. iv. 63 A self-conceit may bribe Thy \*passion-guided Will to take up Arms 'Gainst sovereign Reason.

**a1835** Mrs. Hemans *Poems, Genius singing to Love*, The \*passion-kindled melody Might seem to gush from Sappho's fervent heart.

**1799** Campbell *Pleas. Hope* i. 121 Congenial Hope! thy \*passion-kindling power, How bright, how strong, in youth's untroubled hour!

**1893** F. Greenwood *Lover's Lex.* 275 Then we shall be at peace from the \*passion-mongers.

**1889** O. Wilde in *19th Cent.* Jan. 47 The \*passion-pale face of Andromeda.

**c1865** G. M. Hopkins *Voice from World in Poems* (1967) 125 How turn my \*passion-pastured thought To gentle manna and simple bread?

**1879** Black *MacLeod of D.* xxxvii, Your feelings supposed to be always up at \*passion-pitch.

**1876** G. M. Hopkins *Wreck of Deutschland* xxxiii, in *Poems* (1967) 62 Our \*passion-plunged giant risen, The Christ of the Father compassionate, fetched in the storm of his strides.

**1592** Greene *Disput.* Wks. (Grosart) X. 241, I began to waxe \*passion-proud.

**1606** Sylvester *Du Bartas* ii. iv. ii. *Magnificence* 510 O why is my Minde More \*passion-stirred, then my hand is strong?

**1605** *Ibid.* ii. iii. iv. *Captains* 1070 What Sea more apt to swell Then is th' unbridled Vulgar, \*passion-toss't?

**1880** O. Crawford *Portugal* 369 Modern \*passion-verse generally in its lyric form.

**1799** Coleridge *Lines in Concert Room* ii, Nature's \*passion-warbled plaint.

**1881** O. Wilde *Poems* 4 With \*passion-wearied face.

**1821** Shelley *Adonais* ix, The \*passion-wingèd ministers of thought.

**1814** Southey *Roderick* xiv, One countenance So strongly mark'd, so \*passion-worn.

**b.** Special Combs.:

† **passion-banner**, a banner inscribed with the tokens of Christ's Passion;

**Passion cross**, see quot. and *Cross of Passion* in 1;

† **passion-day**, the day on which a martyr suffered;

**passion-fruit**, the edible fruit of some species of Passion-flower, esp. *Passiflora edulis*, the granadilla, which produces egg-shaped fruit with reddish-purple, slightly wrinkled skin and sweet yellow pulp surrounding small black seeds;

**passion killers** *slang* (see quotes.);

**passion-lettuce**, an early kind of spring lettuce;

**passion-music**, music to which the narrative of the Passion is set (cf. 1 c);

so **passion-oratorio**;

**passion play**, a mystery-play representing the Passion of Christ; also *transf.*;

**passion-tide**, a tide or flow of passion; see also *Passion-tide*;

**passion-tree**, a species of Passion-flower cultivated for its fruit;

**passion vine** = passion-flower;

**passion wagon** *slang* (see quot. 1948). Also *Passion Sunday*, *Passion Week*.

**1552** *Inventory in Ecclesiologist* XVII. 125 A \*passion banner of red sarsnet.

**1780** Edmondson *Her.* II. Gloss., \**Passion Cross*, the same as the *Cross Calvary*. *Cross Calvary*..the *Cross of the Passion*.

**1882** Cussans *Hand-bk. Her.* iv. 60 The Latin Cross is sometimes called a *Passion Cross*; but in the latter, all the limbs should be couped, that is the top and bottom of the Cross should not touch the extremities of the shield while still retaining the distinctive features of the Latin Cross.

**1672** Cave *Prim. Chr.* i. vii. (1673) 204 We celebrate the \*passion days of the Martyrs.

**1752** H. Walpole *Lett.* (1846) II. 454 A garden of Eden, from which..my sister-in-law long ago gathered \*passion-fruit.

**1867** R. Henning *Lett.* 18 Feb. (1966) 234, I have also been making some passionfruit jelly.

**1881** Mrs. C. Praed *Policy & P.* I. 145 A high fence..overgrown with passion-fruit.

**1908** E. J. Banfield *Confessions of Beachcomber* i. vi. 192 There may be some who do not know that the humble papaw..belongs to the passion-fruit family.

**1934** T. Wood *Cobbers* xvii. 217 Passion fruit, squeezed into a wineglass, mixed with cream and sugar and a spoonful of sherry, has a rich smoothness.

**1961** L. van der Post *Heart of Hunter* i. ii. 27 His old lady, dark and wrinkled with age like a passion fruit about to fall.

**1969** *Oxf. Bk. Food Plants* 98/1 Passion Fruit or Purple Granadilla (*Passiflora edulis*). A perennial climbing plant, originally native to Brazil but now widely planted in the tropics, it is also sufficiently hardy to be grown in some Mediterranean countries.

**1974** *Herald* (Melbourne) 5 Apr. 23/1 Pavlova...a crusty meringue-like sweet-cake made from egg whites and sugar and topped with whipped cream and, usually, passionfruit.

**1976** *Observer* 17 Oct. 36/3 (Adv.), Easy to grow delicious passion fruits. Our own specially cultivated pot-grown species of Granadilla for fruiting in Britain.

**1977** 'E. Crispin' *Glimpses of Moon* xii. 235 The infant Grand Duchess..lips a request for a glass of..passion-fruit juice.

**1943** C. H. Ward-Jackson *Piece of Cake* 47 \**Passion killers*, service knickers issued to airwomen.

**1946** J. Irving *Royal Navalese* 136 An elastic-bound bifurcated undergarment said to be worn in the women's Services and known..as 'passion-killers'.

**1974** *Times* 17 Dec. 12/5 Stout fleecy lined drawers..which would have been called by this generation 'passion-killers'.

**1707** Mortimer *Husb.* (1721) II. 148 Another sort of Lettices, called \**Passion Lettice*, prosper well in light Ground.

**1880** W. S. Rockstro in *Grove's Dict. Mus.* II. 665 Here then we have the first idea of the "Passion Oratorio".

**1870** in J. Brown *Lett.* (1912) 378 I was very much touched by the \**Passion-play*, and wrote some very bad verses at Ammergau.



**1873** *Baedeker's South. Germany* (ed. 3) 128 Ober-Ammergau, celebrated for the passion-plays performed there every ten years.  
**1965** B. Sweet-Escott *Baker St. Irreg.* iii. 90 It turned out to be..the ritual passion play on the 10th of the month of Muharram which commemorates the death of Hassan.  
**1975** *Listener* 10 Apr. 472/3 Going to Oberammergau to the Passion Play.  
**1825** D. L. Richardson *Sonn.* 27 While its \*passion-tides serener flow.  
**1741** *Compl. Fam.-Piece* ii. iii. 362 If you now plant, and make Layers of the \*Passion-tree, in most Places, it will make it bear Fruit.  
**1853** 'P. Paxton' *Stray Yankee in Texas* 57 The "passion vine" with its singular flower and luscious fruit.  
**1862** R. Henning *Let.* 23 Sept. (1966) 100 A veranda covered with passion-vine and a garden full of petunias in most brilliant flower.  
**1892** *Daily News* 27 Aug. 3/1 A dish of the edible fruit of the passion vine.  
**1946** *Coast to Coast* 1945 64 Let his girls dig in the orchard or chip around the passion-vines.  
**1957** M. West *Kundu* ii. 19 A passion vine trailing over a bamboo summer-house.  
**1969** *West Australians* 5 July 41/7 (Advt.), Nellie Kelly the amazing grafted passion vine.  
**1948** Partridge *Dict. Forces' Slang* 137 \**Passion waggon*, truck taking men for a day's, or part of a day's, leave, into a town or place of entertainment.  
**1961** *New Left Rev.* Jan.-Feb. 24/2 He knows every girl who comes out the base on Saturday on the passion-wagon.

### The Oxford English Dictionary entry of 'emotion'

#### emotion

[ad. L. *emotion-em*, n. of action f. *e-move-re*, f. *e* out + *move-re* to move.]

† **1.** A moving out, migration, transference from one place to another. *Obs.*

**1603** Knolles *Hist. Turks* (1621) 3 The divers emotions of that people [the Turks].

**1695** Woodward *Nat. Hist. Earth* i. (1723) 45 Some accidental Emotion..of the Center of Gravity.

† **2.** A moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation (in physical sense). *Obs.*

**1692** Locke *Educ.* 7 When exercise has left any Emotion in his Blood or Pulse.

**1708** O. Bridgman in *Phil. Trans.* XXVI. 138 Thunder..caused so great an Emotion in the Air.

**1755** Porter *ibid.* XLIX. 118 The horses rose from their litter with violent emotions.

**1758** *Ibid.* L. 647 The waters continuing in the caverns..caused the emotion or earth~quake.

**1772** Monro *ibid.* LXII. 18 A diluted spirit of vitriol..occasioned no..emotion.

**a1822** Shelley *Love's Philos.* 6 The winds of heaven mix forever With a sweet emotion.

† **3.** *transf.* A political or social agitation; a tumult, popular disturbance. *Obs.*

**1579** Fenton *Guicciard.* ii. There were..great stirres and emociions in Lombardy.

**1709** Addison *Tatler* No. 24 313 Accounts of Publick Emotions, occasion'd by the Want of Corn.

**1757** Burke *Abridgem. Eng. Hist.* Wks. X. 432 Even in England some emotions were excited in favour of the Duke [Robert of Normandy, in 1103].

**4. a.** *fig.* Any agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion; any vehement or excited mental state.

**1660** Jer. Taylor *Duct. Dubit.* (R.), The emotions of humanity..the meltings of a worthy disposition.

**1712** Steele *Spect.* No. 432 39 I hope to see the Pope..without violent Emotions.

**1762** Kames *Elem. Crit.* ii. §2. (1833) 37 The joy of gratification is properly called an emotion.

**1785** Reid *Int. Powers* 725 The emotion raised by grand objects is awful.

**1828** Scott *F.M. Perth*, Desirous that his emotion should not be read upon his countenance.

**b.** *Psychology.* A mental 'feeling' or 'affection' (e.g. of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, surprise, hope or fear, etc.), as distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of consciousness. Also *abstr.* 'feeling' as distinguished from the other classes of mental phenomena.

**1808** *Med. Jnl.* XIX. 422 Sea-sickness..is greatly under the dominion of emotion.

**1841-4** Emerson *Ess. Friendship* Wks. (Bohn) I. 81 In poetry..the emotions of benevolence and complacency..are likened to the material effects of fire.

**1842** Kingsley *Lett.* (1878) I. 61 The intellect is stilled, and the Emotions alone perform their..involuntary functions.

**1871** Tyndall *Fragm. Sc.* (ed. 6) II. xi. 231 He..almost denounces me..for referring Religion to the region of Emotion.

**1875** Jowett *Plato* (ed. 2) l. 249 The..emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their countenances.

**5.** *attrib.* and *Comb.*

**a.** *attrib.*, as *emotion-marker*, *-reaction*.

**b.** objective and obj. gen., as *emotion-arousing*, *-provoking* adjs.

**c.** instrumental, as *emotion-charged*, *-shaken* adjs.

**1884** W. James *Coll. Ess. & Rev.* (1920) 258 What the action itself may be is quite insignificant, so long as I can perceive in it intent or *animus*. This is the emotion-arousing perception.

**1937** *Burlington Mag.* June 262/1 He does not attempt to amend his emotion-charged statements.

**1964** Crystal & Quirk *Prosodic & Paraling. Features in Eng.* iii. 41 The problem arises as to where arbitrary divisions in the cline of spasmodic emotion-markers should be made.

**1951** J. M. Fraser *Psychol.* vi. 65 In ordinary life, however, emotion-provoking situations can seldom be solved by such actions.

**a1930** D. H. Lawrence *Apocalypse* (1931) ix. 93 Nay, every image will be understood differently by every reader, according to his emotion-reaction.

**1906** B. von Hutten *What became of Pam* xiii. 316 The stern, nervous, emotion-shaken face.

## APPENDIX 2

### A Non-Exhaustive List of Treatises on the Passions or Closely Related to the issue

#### Published in English in the Late 16<sup>th</sup> – Early 17<sup>th</sup> Century

- Thomas ROGERS, *A philosophicall discourse, entitled, The anatomie of the Minde*, London 1576;
- Thomas ROGERS, *A patterne of a passionate minde containing a briefe description of the sundry strange affects of the minde of man: in the ende whereof is set downe a lesson, meete to be learned of all estates in general*, London, 1580 (an abridgement of 1576);
- John WOOLTON, *A new anatomie of whole man as well of his body, as of his soule: declaring the condition and constitution of the same, in his first creation, corruption, regeneration and glorification*, London, 1576
- John WOOLTON, *Of the conscience A discourse wherein is plainly declared, the unspeakable joye, and comfort of a good conscience, and the intolerable grieffe and discomfort of an evill conscience*, London, 1576
- John WOOLTON, *A treatise of the immortalitie of the soule*, 1576
- Levinus LEMNIUS, *A Touchstone of Complexions*, translated into English by Thomas Newton in 1576;
- *De proprietabus rerum* by Batholomaeus Anglicus (Bartolomew of Glanville) published in 1582; *Batman vppon Bartholome, his booke De proprietabus rerum*;
- Timothy BRIGHT, *A Treatise of Melancholie*, 1586;
- Philip DE MORNAY, *The True Trial and Examination of a Man's Own Self*, 1586, translated by Thomas Newton;

- Pierre DE LA PRIMAUDAYE, *The French Academie* (Books 1 and 2:1586, 1594) in English translation by Thomas Bowes; Book 3 translated by Robert Dolman, (1601) Book 4 by W(illiam?), P(hilippe?) (1618);
- Juan HUARTE, *Examen de Ingenios, The Examination of mens Wits, in which, by discovering the varietie of natures, is shewed for what possession each one is apt and how far he shall profit them*, translated out of the Spanish tongue by M. Camillo Camilli, Englished out of his Italian, by R. C. Esquire, London, 1596 (Richard Carew)
- Sir John DAVIES, *Nosce Teipsum*, 1599;
- Thomas WRIGHT, *The Passions of the Minde in Generall*, 1601;
- Thomas WRIGHT, *The Passions of the Minde in Generall, corrected, enlarged and with sundry new discourse augmented, With a treatise thereto adjoining of the Clymatericall yeare, occasioned by the death of Queen Elizabeth*, London, 1604
- John DAVIES OF HEREFORD, *Microcosmus, the discovery of the little world*, Oxford, 1603;
- Joseph HALL, *Heaven upon Earth of True Peace and Tranquility of Mind*, 1606
- Joseph HALL, *Characters of Virtues and Vices*, 1608
- Pierre CHARRON, *Of Wisdome in three books*, London 1606 (with a dedication to Prince Henry) and 1612, translated into English by Sampson Lennard;
- Thomas WALKINGTON, *The Optick glass of Humours or the Touchstone of Golden Temperature, or the Philosophers stone to make a golden temper*, London, 1607
- Anthony DIXON, *The Dignitie of man* (1612);
- Nicholas COFFETEAU, *A table of humane passions With their causes and effects. Written by ye Reuerend Father in God F.N. Coeffeteau, Bishop of Dardania ... Translated into English by Edw. Grimeston Sergiant at Armes.*, London : Printed by Nicholas Okes, 1621.
- Nicolas COFFETEAU, *A Table of Humane Passions*, 1621 translated into English by Edmund Grimeston;
- Robert BURTON, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1621.

### APPENDIX 3

#### The entry 'émotion' in *Le Robert*<sup>449</sup>

**ÉMOTION** n. f.

En 1534, esmotion; de émouvoir, d'après motion «mouvement», XIIIe. - Motion, émouvoir.

Action d'émouvoir; résultat de cette action.

- 1. Vx. Mouvement (du corps, d'un corps). - Spécialt. Mouvement (par oppos. à l'état normal de calme) d'un corps collectif, agitation et fermentation populaire à l'occasion d'un événement inquiétant, pouvant dégénérer en troubles civils; par ext., ces troubles. - Conspiration, émeute, révolte, sédition. «L'émotion de Catilina» (Montaigne). Calmer l'émotion populaire. Une grande émotion se dessinait dans l'armée. **CIT. 1. 2.**

Mouvement affectant un individu et ayant pour effet de le soustraire à l'état de repos et d'équilibre. Émotion d'esprit (- Coquetterie, cit. 3). **CIT. 3**

Ce mouvement, considéré dans ses effets physiologiques. - Malaise, trouble. Sentir un peu d'émotion. Émotion du poulx. Émotion de fièvre : mouvement fébrile. **CIT. 4. 5. 6.**

Mouvement plus complexe, intéressant le «coeur» autant que la vie organique. **CIT. 7. 8.**

- 2. Mod. Psychol. et cour. État de conscience complexe, généralement brusque et momentané, accompagné de troubles physiologiques (pâleur ou rougissement, accélération du poulx, palpitations, sensation de malaise, tremblements, incapacité de bouger ou agitation). Les théories physiologiques, intellectualistes de l'émotion (- ci-dessous, cit. 10 et 11). **CIT. 9. 10. 11.**

Par ext. Sensation (agréable ou désagréable), considérée du point de vue affectif. - Affection, douleur, plaisir, sentiment; émoi, excitation, impression. Émotions simples, composées. Émotion sexuelle. Émotions religieuses, morales, esthétiques, intellectuelles. Émotions stimulantes, sthéniques (- Asthénique, cit.). L'émotion tendre. - Sympathie. Émotions fondamentales : amour, chagrin, colère, désir, frayeur, haine, jalousie, joie, peur, plaisir, tristesse. Les racines de l'émotion. - Attraction, aversion, désir, inclination, instinct, répulsion, tendance.

(Syntagmes didact.). L'émotion-choc, brusque et brève. - cour. ou littér. Affolement, agitation, bouleversement, commotion, désarroi, ébranlement, effervescence, enthousiasme, frisson, saisissement, transe, trouble. - L'émotion-sentiment, progressive et stable. - Sentiment. Conditions intérieures et extérieures de l'émotion. Modifications organiques qui accompagnent l'émotion (- Cœur, cit. 6). L'expression des émotions. L'émotion étouffe, coupe (cit. 18) le souffle, affaiblit (- Amollir, cit. 2), paralyse, annihile (cit. 2) la volonté. - Causer une grande émotion à qq. - Bouleverser, émotionner, émouvoir, suffoquer. être brisé (cit. 5) d'émotion. Frémir, frissonner, trembler, tressaillir, s'évanouir d'émotion (- Angoisse, cit. 2). Le cœur, la gorge se serre d'émotion. Frapper, saisir d'émotion. Idées qui suscitent une émotion. Éprouver, ressentir beaucoup d'émotions (- Émotif). La qualité, l'intensité d'une émotion. Une émotion contenue (cit. 18). Dissimuler (cit. 6), maîtriser son émotion. Simuler une émotion. Une émotion forte, intense, poignante, vive; délicate, légère, douce, tendre (- Aube, cit. 10). Des émotions enivrantes (- Annoncer, cit. 17). Le charme d'une émotion. être

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<sup>449</sup> *Le Robert électronique* Version Windows 1.4 (monoposte)

avide d'émotions. Le monde des émotions. Il était plein, vibrant d'émotion. Un cri d'émotion. Parler avec émotion. - Balbutier (- Balbutiement, cit. 1). être égaré par une émotion violente. - Perdre ses esprits\*; être éperdu\*; être hors de soi. S'abandonner à une émotion (- Caresse, cit. 3; dessécher, cit. 15). - Attendrir (s'). Ne pouvoir cacher son émotion. Trahir son émotion. Rougir d'émotion, devenir cramoisi, rouge d'émotion. Sa voix se brisa d'émotion. Devenir blanc, vert d'émotion. Cf. Changer de couleur, de visage. Ne ressentir aucune émotion (- Apathique). Accueillir sans émotion une mauvaise nouvelle (- Devoir, cit. 30), avec indifférence; - Sans sourciller\*. - Fam. On n'a pas eu d'émotion : on n'a eu aucune inquiétude.  
**CIT. 11.1. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.**

(Sens affaibli). État affectif, plaisir ou douleur, nettement prononcé. L'émotion dans l'art. Problème de l'émotion chez l'artiste. - Sensibilité. Émotion créatrice. - Délire, enthousiasme, fureur (vx), inspiration. Émotion esthétique, ressentie par le lecteur, l'auditeur, le spectateur. - Sentiment. Émotion ou insensibilité de l'acteur, de l'exécutant.

**CIT. 17. 18. 19.**

CONTR. Calme, paix, sérénité; apathie, froideur, indifférence, insensibilité, sang-froid.  
 DÉR. Émotionnel, émotionner.

**Citations**

1 Rome autrefois a vu de ces émotions (...) Quand il fallait calmer toute une populace, Le sénat n'épargnait promesse ni menace (...)

CORNEILLE, Nicomède, V, 2.

2 On ne parle que de la guerre (...) toute l'Europe est en émotion.

Mme DE SÉVIGNÉ, Lettres, 259, 23 mars 1672.

3 La définition des passions de l'âme (...) On les peut nommer des perceptions (...) On les peut aussi nommer des sentiments (...) mais on peut encore mieux les nommer des émotions de l'âme, non seulement à cause que ce nom peut être attribué à tous les changements qui arrivent en elle, c'est-à-dire à toutes les diverses pensées qui lui viennent, mais particulièrement pour ce que, de toutes les sortes de pensées qu'elle peut avoir, il n'y en a point d'autres qui l'agitent et l'ébranlent si fort que font ces passions.

DESCARTES, les Passions de l'âme, I, 27-28.

4 Nous-mêmes, pour bien faire, ne devrions jamais mettre la main sur nos serviteurs, tandis que la colère nous dure. Pendant que le pouls nous bat et que nous sentons de l'émotion, remettons la partie (...) c'est la passion qui commande alors (...) ce n'est plus nous.

MONTAIGNE, Essais, II, 437.

5 (...) le printemps vous fait toujours quelque émotion (...)

Mme DE SÉVIGNÉ, Lettres 961, 29 avr. 1685.

6 (...) le bon abbé ne se porte pas bien; il a mal à un genou, et un peu d'émotion tous les soirs.

Mme DE SÉVIGNÉ, Lettres 504, 19 févr. 1676.

7 La tendresse visible de leurs mutuelles ardeurs me donna de l'émotion; j'en fus frappé au coeur et mon amour commença par la jalousie (...) le dépit alarma mes désirs (...)

MOLIÈRE, Dom Juan, I, 2.

8 Je ne répondrai point, Madame, à toute l'émotion que vous a donnée le gain d'une bataille (Neerwinde) qui nous coûte si cher. Nous avons passé par ces tristes réflexions (...)  
Mme DE SÉVIGNÉ, Lettres 1362, 26 août 1693.

9 Il n'y a, ce me semble, émotion que là où il y a choc, secousse. On devrait, par suite, appeler émotion l'action exercée sur la volonté (au sens large) par une représentation ou une affection simple, action qui provoque ensuite la réaction de la volonté.  
J. LACHELIER, cité par LALANDE.

10 J'entends par émotion un choc brusque, souvent violent, intense, avec augmentation ou arrêt des mouvements : la peur, la colère, le coup de foudre en amour, etc. En cela, je me conforme à l'étymologie du mot «émotion» qui signifie surtout mouvement.  
Th. RIBOT, Logique des sentiments, p. 67.

11 L'émotion est une cause dont les manifestations physiques sont les effets, disent les uns; les manifestations physiques sont la cause dont l'émotion est l'effet, disent les autres. Selon moi, il y aurait un grand avantage à éliminer de la question toute notion de cause et d'effet (...) et substituer à la position dualiste une conception unitaire (...) Aucun état de conscience ne doit être dissocié de ses conditions physiques : ils composent un tout (...) Chaque espèce d'émotion doit être considérée de cette manière : ce que les mouvements de la face et du corps, les troubles vaso-moteurs, respiratoires, sécrétoires expriment objectivement, les états de conscience corrélatifs (...) l'expriment subjectivement.  
Th. RIBOT, Psychologie des sentiments, p. 113.

11.1 (...) un physionomiste eût sans peine reconnu que le bourgmestre van Tricasse était le flegme personnifié. Jamais - ni par la colère, ni par la passion -, jamais une émotion quelconque n'avait accéléré les mouvements du cœur de cet homme ni rougi sa face; jamais ses pupilles ne s'étaient contractées sous l'influence d'une irritation, si passagère qu'on voudrait la supposer.  
J. VERNE, le Docteur Ox, p. 10, Hachette 1966.

12 Si le goût est une chose de caprice, s'il n'y a aucune règle du beau, d'où viennent donc ces émotions délicieuses qui s'élèvent si subitement, si involontairement, si tumultueusement au fond de nos âmes, qui les dilatent ou qui les serrent, et qui forcent de nos yeux les pleurs de la joie, de la douleur, de l'admiration, soit à l'aspect de quelque grand phénomène physique, soit au récit de quelque grand trait moral? Apage, Sophista! tu ne persuaderas jamais à mon cœur qu'il a tort de frémir; à mes entrailles, qu'elles ont tort de s'émouvoir.  
DIDEROT, Sur la peinture, VII.

13 J'avoue que, pour ma part, j'avais le cœur serré comme par une main invisible; les tempes me sifflaient, et des sueurs chaudes et froides me passaient dans le dos. C'est une des plus fortes émotions que j'aie jamais éprouvée.  
Th. GAUTIER, Voyage en Espagne, p. 55.

14 Car l'amour est un art, comme la musique. Il donne des émotions du même ordre, aussi délicates, aussi vibrantes, parfois peut-être plus intenses (...)  
Pierre LOUYS, Aphrodite, I, Chrysis.

15 (...) l'émotion presque religieuse qu'inspire un passé très lointain.  
Ch. MAURRAS, Anthinée, p. 51.

16 Nathanaël, que toute émotion sache te devenir une ivresse. Si ce que tu manges ne te grise pas, c'est que tu n'avais pas assez faim.  
GIDE, *les Nourritures terrestres*, p. 41.

17 Quel jeu plus parfait que celui de la Clairon? cependant suivez-la, étudiez-la, et vous serez convaincu qu'à la sixième représentation elle sait par coeur tous les détails de son jeu comme tous les mots de son rôle (...) Je ne doute point que la Clairon n'éprouve le tourment du Quesnoy dans ses premières tentatives; mais la lutte passée, lorsqu'elle s'est une fois élevée à la hauteur de son fantôme, elle se possède, elle se répète sans émotion.  
DIDEROT, *Paradoxe sur le comédien*.

18 En un mot, la poésie ne peut exister sans l'émotion, ou, si l'on veut, sans un mouvement de l'âme qui règle celui des paroles.  
CLAUDEL, *Positions et Propositions*, p. 97.

19 L'émotion créatrice est la seule et véritable connaissance.  
André SUARÈS, *Trois hommes, «Dostoïevski»*, III, p. 223.

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